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Unconditional Relationships within Zero Knowledge
Abstract
Zero-knowledge protocols enable one party, called the prover, to convince another
party, called the veriﬁer, the validity of a mathematical statement such that the veriﬁer
learns nothing other than the fact that the proven statement is true. The diﬀerent ways of
formulating the terms “convince” and “learns nothing” give rise to four classes of
languages having zero-knowledge protocols, which are: statistical zero-knowledge proof
systems, computational zero-knowledge proof systems, statistical zero-knowledge
argument systems, and computational zero-knowledge argument systems.
We establish complexity-theoretic characterizations of these four zero-knowledge
complexity classes, of which our characterizations for argument systems are novel. Using
these characterizations, we show that for languages in NP, the following hold.
I Instance-dependent commitment schemes are necessary and suﬃcient for
zero-knowledge protocols. Instance-dependent commitment schemes for a given
language are commitment schemes that can depend on the instance of the language,
and where the hiding and binding properties are required to hold only on the YES
and NO instances of the language, respectively.
I Computational zero knowledge and computational soundness (a property held by
argument systems) are symmetric properties. Namely, we show that the class of
languages in NP ∩ co-NP having zero-knowledge arguments is closed under
complement, and that a language in NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument
system if and only if its complement has a computational zero-knowledge proof
system.
I Any zero-knowledge argument system that is only guaranteed to be secure against
the honest veriﬁer that follows the prescribed protocol can be transformed into one
that is secure against malicious veriﬁers that can deviate from the protocol. In
addition, our transformation gives us zero-knowledge argument systems with
desirable properties like public coins, perfect completeness, a black-box simulator,
and an eﬃcient prover.
The novelty of our results above is that they are unconditional, meaning that they do
not rely on any unproven complexity assumptions such as the existence of one-way
functions. Moreover, in establishing our complexity-theoretic characterizations, we give
the ﬁrst construction of statistical zero-knowledge argument systems for all of NP based
on any one-way function.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose you solved a famous mathematical problem—like the P versus NP problem, one of
the seven Millennium Prize Problems proposed by the Clay Mathematics Institute.1 Will
you be able to convince someone of the proof without letting the person steal your idea and
claim entitlement to your proof?
The answer, surprisingly, is yes; zero-knowledge protocols, introduced by Goldwasser,
Micali, and Rackoﬀ [GMR1], provide a way for one party, called the prover, to convince
another party, called the veriﬁer, the validity of a statement such that the veriﬁer learns
nothing other than the fact that the proven statement is true. In particular, even after
interacting with the prover, the veriﬁer does not gain the ability to reprove the statement
to other parties!
In this dissertation, we study zero-knowledge protocols in a complexity-theoretic frame-
work; in other words, we investigate the classes of languages2 having zero-knowledge pro-
tocols. We study zero-knowledge protocols because in addition to being fascinating mathe-
matical objects of study, zero-knowledge protocols have vast applicability in cryptography
and complexity theory; for their vast applicability, we refer the reader to a comprehensive
survey on zero knowledge by Goldreich [Gol3]. Furthermore, the study of zero knowledge
has led to many developments in seemingly unrelated areas of theoretical computer science
like the ﬁeld of inapproximability. For instance, it can be shown that no polynomial-time
1The P versus NP problem, arguably the most important unsolved problem in computer science, asks
whether the class P of languages that can be solved eﬃciently equals the class NP of languages that can be
veriﬁed eﬃciently. It is widely believed that P 6= NP; indeed most results in cryptography and complexity
theory would be either trivial or be not applicable if P = NP.
2A language is used to describe a collection of valid statements that relate to a certain algorithmic task.
Refer to Section 1.1 for an informal description, and to Section 2.2.1 for a formal description.
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algorithm can always ﬁnd a vertex cover3 of a given graph that is at most 1.37 times larger
than the minimum vertex cover, unless P = NP [DS]. On the other hand, a simple greedy
algorithm will always ﬁnd a vertex cover that is at most twice the size of the optimal. The
way these inapproximability results, like the one for vertex cover, come about was through
the study of probabilistically checkable proofs (cf., [FGL+, AS, ALM+]), which in turn was
inspired by zero-knowledge protocols (cf., [BOGKW, FRS]). In conclusion, zero knowl-
edge has—and we predict will continue to—serve as a bridge between complexity theory,
cryptography, and other areas of theoretical computer science.
Chapter organization. An overview of zero-knowledge protocols is provided in the next
section. In Section 1.2, we highlight the main contributions of this dissertation. In Sec-
tion 1.3, we state our work in perspective with previous results. We conclude this chapter
with Section 1.4, detailing our agenda for the remaining chapters.
1.1 An Overview of Zero Knowledge
In this section, we give an overview of zero knowledge protocols; a more detailed and formal
discussion is provided in Section 2.3. The material presented in this section is inspired by
Vadhan’s thesis [Vad1] and survey [Vad2], and by Sipser’s book [Sip].
Languages
In theoretical computer science, a language is used to describe a collection of valid state-
ments that relate to a certain algorithmic task. For example, the task of determining
whether two graphs are isomorphic4 can be formulated by the following language:
Graph Isomorphism = {(G,H) : G and H are isomorphic} .
Thus, we can think of a language L as deﬁning the following algorithmic task: given a string
x, determine if x ∈ L or x / ∈ L.
NP proof systems
Recall the brief discussion we had earlier about the P versus NP problem. The class P
is the set of languages L such that the algorithmic task of determining if x ∈ L can be
done eﬃciently: taking a polynomial number of computation steps. It is not known if the
language Graph Isomorphism is in P; the naive method of trying all possible permutations
of the nodes in the graph G and then comparing it to H is very ineﬃcient. Nevertheless, if
we are given a permutation that reorders the nodes of G so that it matches H, then we can
3A vertex cover of a graph is a subset of nodes where every edge of that graph touches one of those
nodes. Finding the minimum-size vertex cover in a given graph is NP-hard [Kar].
4Graphs G and H are isomorphic if the nodes of G may be permuted so that it is identical to H.1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE 3
easily verify that G and H are indeed isomorphic graphs. We classify languages possessing
this eﬃcient veriﬁability property as the class NP.
We can therefore think of NP languages as having two entities: a prover that ﬁnds a
valid proof for a given statement, and an eﬃcient veriﬁer that checks the proof. While
the veriﬁer must be eﬃcient, the prover is allowed to be computationally unbounded since
ﬁnding a valid proof might be tedious. More precisely, a language L is in NP if there exists
a prover P and an eﬃcient veriﬁer V satisfying the following two conditions.
I Completeness: for every x ∈ L (valid statement), the proof provided by prover P
makes veriﬁer V accept.
I Soundness: for every x / ∈ L (invalid statement), no proof, even ones concocted by
cheating provers, will convince veriﬁer V to accept.
We call (P,V ) satisfying the above conditions an NP proof system for the language L.
Zero-knowledge protocols
Putting this in context of Graph Isomorphism, the NP proof system that we hinted to
above is a prover P that sends a permutation π of the nodes in G so that it matches
H, and a veriﬁer V that accepts only if π(G) = H.5 The permutation π provided by P,
however, reveals a lot of knowledge: it gives the veriﬁer V the ability to prove to some
other party that G and H are isomorphic graphs since V now knows a valid permutation.
This limitation is inherent in all traditional mathematical proofs—where a static proof is
written down to be checked—since knowing that static proof would allow one to reprove
it to some other party. Therefore, in order to get around this bottleneck, Goldwasser,
Micali, and Rackoﬀ [GMR1], in their original treatise on zero knowledge, provided two
additional features to the prover and the veriﬁer. First, these two entities are allowed to
be interactive: the prover and the veriﬁer exchange messages in multiple rounds, after
which the veriﬁer decides to accept or reject. Second, these two entities are allowed to be
probabilistic: the veriﬁer can send random challenges to the prover, and the prover can
respond with random answers. Hence, in this setting, the veriﬁer will be convinced of a
correct proof only with a high degree of conﬁdence, but not with absolute certainty. If either
of these two features—interactive or probabilistic—is missing, it is impossible to achieve
zero knowledge for nontrivial languages [GO]. To accommodate these two features, the
completeness and soundness conditions for zero-knowledge protocols are made probabilistic
as follows.
I Completeness: for every x ∈ L (valid statement), prover P interacting with veriﬁer
V will make V accept with at least 99% probability.
5π(G) denotes the graph obtained by reordering the nodes of graph G according to permutation π.4 CHAPTER 1 / INTRODUCTION
I Soundness: for every x / ∈ L (invalid statement), no cheating prover P∗ can make V
accept with probability greater than 1%. In other words, V will reject with at least
99% probability, no matter what strategy the prover pursues.
The above two conditions by themselves do not yet capture the essence of a zero knowl-
edge, which is the magical property of the veriﬁer learning nothing from its interaction with
the prover, other than the fact that the statement proven is true. This guarantee of learning
nothing is formalized in [GMR1] by requiring the existence of an eﬃcient algorithm, called a
simulator, whose output is indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction
with the prover, where the veriﬁer’s view consists of all messages exchanged between the
prover and veriﬁer and the veriﬁer’s random coins. (Unlike the veriﬁer, the simulator does
not have access to the prover.) Intuitively, the veriﬁer learns nothing because it could run
the simulator instead of interacting with the prover. Thus, (P,V ) is said to be a zero-
knowledge protocol if it satisﬁes the completeness and soundness conditions above, and
an additional condition below.
I Zero Knowledge: for every x ∈ L (valid statement), and every eﬃcient (cheating)
veriﬁer V ∗, there exists an eﬃcient simulator S whose output is indistinguishable
from the V ∗’s view of the interaction with the prover P.
The zero-knowledge condition is required to hold only when x ∈ L because the prover
only provides proofs for valid statements. In addition, we have required that even veriﬁers
deviating from the prescribed protocol will learn nothing. This requirement is generally
what is needed in cryptography because we cannot assume parties to act as prescribed.
There is a weaker notion of zero knowledge, called honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge,
which guarantees that only an honest veriﬁer that follows the prescribed protocol learns
nothing; we explore this notion in Section 2.3.
Flavors of zero-knowledge protocols
Zero-knowledge protocols come in several ﬂavors, depending on how one formulates the two
security conditions: (i) the zero-knowledge condition, which says that the veriﬁer learns
nothing other than the fact the assertion being proven is true, and (ii) the soundness
conditions, which says that the prover cannot convince the veriﬁer of a false assertion.
We call these security conditions because they these two conditions need to hold even
against cheating parties; the former against cheating veriﬁers, and the latter against cheating
provers. In contrast, the completeness condition is not considered a security condition
because it only refers to honest provers and veriﬁers that follow the prescribed protocol.
In statistical zero knowledge, the zero-knowledge condition holds regardless of the
computational resources the veriﬁer invests into trying to learn something from the interac-1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE 5
tion (except with small probability).6 In computational zero knowledge, we only require
that eﬃcient, probabilistic polynomial-time veriﬁers learn nothing from the interaction.7
Similarly, for soundness, we have statistical soundness, giving rise to proof systems,
where even a computationally unbounded prover cannot convince the veriﬁer of a false state-
ment, and computational soundness, giving rise to argument systems [BCC], where
we only require that an eﬃcient, probabilistic polynomial-time prover cannot convince the
veriﬁer of a false statement. Using a preﬁx of S or C to indicate whether the zero knowledge
is statistical or computational and a suﬃx of P or A to indicate whether we have a proof
system or argument system, we obtain four complexity classes corresponding to the diﬀerent
types of zero-knowledge protocols: SZKP, CZKP, SZKA, and CZKA.
We return to our question of whether the NP-language Graph Isomorphism has a
zero-knowledge protocol. If we make complexity assumptions, then it turns out that every
language in NP has zero-knowledge protocols where at least one of the security conditions is
computational: namely, NP ⊆ CZKP [GMW2] and NP ⊆ SZKA [BCC].8 (This also implies
that NP ⊆ CZKA since CZKA has the weakest securities properties, and hence contains
all the other zero-knowledge complexity classes.) In other words, assuming widely believed
but unproven complexity assumptions, every traditional mathematical proof can be argued
convincingly in a way that does not leak knowledge.
Our goal in this dissertation is to conduct a study on these four zero-knowledge com-
plexity classes—SZKP, CZKP, SZKA, and CZKA—without relying on unproven complexity
assumptions. For example, if a language L is in CZKA, what can be said of its comple-
ment L = {x : x / ∈ L}? This will be answered in Section 1.2, where we also present
our main contributions, but before going there, we highlight the close relationship between
zero-knowledge protocols and a cryptographic primitive called commitment schemes.
Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme is a two-stage protocol between a sender and a receiver. In the
ﬁrst stage, called the commit stage, the sender commits to a private message m. In the
second stage, called the reveal stage, the sender reveals m and proves that it was the mes-
sage to which she committed in the ﬁrst stage. We require two properties of commitment
schemes. The hiding property says that an adversarial receiver learns nothing about m in
the commit stage. The binding property says that after the commit stage, an adversarial
6There is a third ﬂavor of zero knowledge which is the strongest of all: perfect zero knowledge, where
the veriﬁer cannot learn anything even with negligible probability. In this dissertation, we do not study
the distinction between perfect zero knowledge and statistical zero knowledge. See Section 2.3.4 for a more
detailed discussion.
7More precisely, in statistical zero knowledge, we require that the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction can be
eﬃciently simulated up to negligible statistical distance, whereas in computational zero knowledge, we only
require that the simulation be computationally indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view.
8While statistical zero-knowledge proofs are most desirable to have, it is unlikely that every language in
NP has them [For, AH, BHZ].6 CHAPTER 1 / INTRODUCTION
sender is bound to a particular value of m: namely, she cannot successfully open the com-
mitment to two diﬀerent bits in the reveal stage. Like the zero knowledge and soundness
conditions, the hiding and binding properties each come in two ﬂavors: (i) statistical,
where the property holds regardless of the adversary’s computational resources, and (ii)
computational, where the property holds only for eﬃcient, probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries.
Earlier we mentioned that if we make complexity assumptions, then every language in
NP has a zero-knowledge protocol. This result was ﬁrst proven by Goldreich, Micali, and
Wigderson [GMW2], who constructed computational zero-knowledge proof systems for ev-
ery language in NP. Their zero-knowledge protocol uses commitment schemes—speciﬁcally,
of the computationally-hiding and statistically-binding ﬂavor—and their usage of commit-
ment schemes is precisely the reason why their protocol requires complexity assumptions;
commitment schemes are not known to exist unconditionally, and indeed the existence of
commitment schemes implies the existence of one-way functions [IL].9
Nevertheless, as observed by Itoh, Ohta, and Shizuya [IOS], zero-knowledge protocols
based on commitment schemes actually do not require the hiding and binding properties
of commitments to hold at the same time. In the Goldreich, Micali & Wigderson proto-
col [GMW2], and many other zero-knowledge protocols, the hiding and binding properties
of the commitment schemes used translate to the zero knowledge and soundness conditions,
respectively. Hence, the hiding property is only required when x ∈ L, and the binding
property is only required when x / ∈ L.
Based on this observation, Itoh, Ohta, and Shizuya deﬁned instance-dependent com-
mitment schemes to be analogues of commitments schemes that are tailored speciﬁcally
to a given language.10 More precisely, the sender and receiver of an instance-dependent
commitment scheme receive an instance x of a language L as auxiliary input, and the
scheme is required to be hiding when x ∈ L and be binding when x / ∈ L. Thus, instance-
dependent commitment schemes are a relaxation of standard commitment schemes, since
we do not require that the hiding and binding properties hold at the same time. This
relaxation, however, is still useful in constructing zero-knowledge protocols for L ∈ NP,
due to the following two observations: (i) the hiding and binding properties of the commit-
ment schemes used in some zero-knowledge protocols translate to the zero knowledge and
soundness conditions, respectively, and (ii) the zero knowledge and soundness conditions
are only required when x ∈ L and x / ∈ L, respectively. Therefore, we conclude this section
9One-way functions are functions that are easy to compute but are computationally infeasible to
invert. Assuming that factoring large integers is computationally infeasible, the multiplication function
f(x,y) = x · y is a one-way function. Although many researchers believe that one-way functions exist, a
proof of their existence who give a proof that P 6= NP, resolving arguably the most important unsolved
problem in computer science. A formal deﬁnition of one-way functions is given in Section 2.4.1.
10There were various terms used to describe instance-dependent commitment schemes. Itoh, Ohta, and
Shizuya [IOS] called these language-dependent cryptographic primitives, Micciancio and Vadhan [MV] called
these problem-dependent commitment schemes, and the present usage traces to Vadhan [Vad3].1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION 7
by stressing that having an instance-dependent commitment scheme for a language L ∈ NP
suﬃces to unconditionally construct a zero-knowledge protocol for L.
1.2 Contributions of this Dissertation
In this section, we highlight several new research results contained in this dissertation.
1.2.1 Necessity of instance-dependent commitments
At the end of the previous section, we saw that an instance-dependent commitment for a
language L ∈ NP suﬃces to construct a zero-knowledge protocol for L, based on techniques
from [GMW2, IOS]. In this dissertation, we show that the converse holds: an instance-
dependent commitments for a language L ∈ NP is necessary to obtain a zero-knowledge
protocol for L.
THEOREM 1.2.1
1. The SZKP case: a language L ∈ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge proof system if and
only if L has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding when
x ∈ L and statistically binding when x / ∈ L.
2. The CZKP case: a language L ∈ NP has a computational zero-knowledge proof system
if and only if L has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computationally
hiding when x ∈ L and statistically binding when x / ∈ L.
3. The SZKA case: a language L ∈ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument system if
and only if L has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding
when x ∈ L and computationally binding when x / ∈ L.
4. The CZKA case: a language L ∈ NP has a computational zero-knowledge argument
system if and only if L has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computa-
tionally hiding when x ∈ L and computationally binding when x / ∈ L.
This theorem will be proven in Chapter 4; speciﬁcally, it will follow from Theorems 4.1.1,
4.1.2, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5 in Section 4.1. This theorem can be viewed as demonstrating the
centrality of commitment schemes in zero-knowledge protocols of NP. To paraphrase
Damg˚ ard [Dam2, p.19], many researchers intuitively believe that commitment schemes
are fundamental to the construction of zero-knowledge protocols. Hence, we made this
intuition—held by many researchers—precise.
Prior to our work, Vadhan [Vad3] constructed instance-dependent commitments, albeit
with an ineﬃcient (i.e., exponential time) sender, for languages with zero-knowledge proofs.
For these same languages, Nguyen and Vadhan [NV] constructed instance-dependent com-
mitments, whose sender and receiver algorithms are eﬃcient (i.e., polynomial time), but8 CHAPTER 1 / INTRODUCTION
paid a price of obtaining commitments with a weaker and nonstandard 1-out-of-2 bind-
ing property. Instance-dependent commitments for a restricted class of zero-knowledge
proofs, namely 3-round public-coin zero-knowledge proofs, were implicit in the works of
Damg˚ ard [Dam2, Dam3]. Indeed, Kapron, Malka, and Srinivasan [KMS] used Damg˚ ard’s
techniques to show that 3-round public-coin zero-knowledge proofs where the veriﬁer just
sends a random bit—called V-bit protocols—exactly characterize noninteractive instance-
dependent commitments.11 Finally, we note that Ostrovsky and Wigderson [OW] showed
that zero-knowledge proofs for hard-on-average languages imply one-way functions, and
hence standard commitment schemes [Nao, HILL]. Consequently, our results are the ﬁrst
to achieve instance-dependent commitments with standard properties—such as an eﬃcient
sender and a standard binding property—from general zero-knowledge complexity classes.
1.2.2 Symmetry between zero knowledge and soundness
Recall that the two security conditions for zero-knowledge protocols are the zero-knowledge
condition and the soundness condition. These two security conditions have diﬀerent traits;
zero knowledge is a secrecy condition, whereas soundness is more like an unforgeability
condition. Nevertheless, in a remarkable paper, Okamoto [Oka] established a symmetry
between statistical zero knowledge and statistical soundness by proving that a language
L ∈ SZKP if and only if its complement L ∈ SZKP.12 We view this as a symmetry
result because the statistical zero knowledge property for L—which holds when x ∈ L or
equivalently, when x / ∈ L—translates to a statistical soundness property for L, and vice-
versa. Thus, by showing that SZKP is closed under complement, Okamoto established a
symmetry between zero knowledge and soundness, in the case when both security conditions
are statistical.
We ask whether an analogous theorem holds when the security conditions are compu-
tational, namely when considering computational zero-knowledge arguments. If we make
complexity assumptions, then the answer is yes, because all languages in NP ∩ co-NP and
their complements have computational zero-knowledge arguments [GMW2, BCC]. In this
dissertation, we establish an unconditional symmetry between computational zero knowl-
edge and computational soundness.
11Noninteractive commitments are commitments where the sender commits to a message in the commit
stage by sending a single message to the receiver; hence, the receiver does not send any message, both in
the commit and reveal stages.
12Okamoto’s result was actually for the class of languages having honest-veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge
proofs, but Goldreich, Sahai, and Vadhan [GSV1] showed that this is the same as the class of languages
having general, malicious-veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge proofs.1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION 9
THEOREM 1.2.2
(Symmetry Theorem.)
I CZKA versus co-CZKA: a language L ∈ NP∩co-NP has a computational zero-knowledge
argument system if and only if its complement L has a computational zero-knowledge
argument system.
I SZKA versus CZKP: a language L ∈ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument
system if and only if its complement L has a computational zero-knowledge proof system.
The above Symmetry Theorem will be proven in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4.
Remark. On page 5, we asked if a language L is in CZKA, what can be said of its
complement L = {x : x / ∈ L}? The Symmetry Theorem answers this aﬃrmatively, by
placing L ∈ CZKA if L ∈ NP ∩ co-NP.
1.2.3 Honest-veriﬁer equals malicious-veriﬁer zero-knowledge arguments
We show that for every language L ∈ NP, any zero-knowledge argument system for L that is
only guaranteed to be secure against the honest veriﬁer that follows the prescribed proto-
col can be unconditionally transformed into one that is secure against malicious veriﬁers
that can deviate from the protocol. In addition, our transformation gives us zero-knowledge
argument systems with desirable properties like public coins, perfect completeness, a black-
box simulator, and an eﬃcient prover.13 Previously, such results were only known under
unproven complexity assumptions [GMW2, BCC], or were known unconditionally for the
case of zero-knowledge proof systems [Oka, GSV1, Vad3, NV].
This result will be established in Chapter 4; speciﬁcally, it will be stated in Theo-
rems 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5 in Section 4.1.
1.2.4 New characterizations of zero-knowledge argument systems
All our unconditional results highlighted in the previous subsections are obtained by new
characterizations of the classes of languages in NP having zero-knowledge argument systems.
These characterizations are a generalization of the “SZK/OWF Characterization Theorem”
of Vadhan [Vad3], which states that any language L having a computational zero-knowledge
proof system can be described as having a statistical zero-knowledge proof plus a set of
instances I ⊆ L from which we can construct a one-way function. To characterize zero-
knowledge argument systems, we will also allow some additional instances in the complement
set L from which we can construct a one-way function. We honor the pioneering work
13The properties—eﬃcient prover, perfect completeness, public coins, and black-box simulation—are de-
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of Vadhan that provides this useful method for characterizing zero-knowledge complexity
classes by calling it the Vadhan condition.
DEFINITION 1.2.3
A language L satisﬁes the Vadhan condition if there exists a set of instances I such that:
I the promise problem14 (L \ I,L \ I) is in SZKP, and
I there exists a polynomial-time computable function fx: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|), with
n(·) and m(·) being polynomials and instance x given as an auxiliary input, which acts
like a one-way function on every x ∈ I. That is, for every nonuniform probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A, and for every constant c > 0, we have
Pr
y←{0,1}n(|x|)

A(fx(y)) ∈ f−1
x (fx(y))

≤
1
|x|
c ,
for every suﬃciently long x ∈ I.
We call I the set of OWF instances, I ∩ L the set of OWF YES instances, and I ∩ L
the set of OWF NO instances.
We use the Vadhan condition to characterize the four zero-knowledge complexity classes
as follows.
THEOREM 1.2.4
1. The SZKP case (trivial): a language L ∈ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge proof
system if and only if L satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF instances, namely
I = ∅.
2. The CZKP case ([Vad3]): a language L ∈ NP has a computational zero-knowledge proof
system if and only if L satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF NO instances, namely
I ∩ L = ∅.
3. The SZKA case (new): a language L ∈ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument
system if and only if L satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES instances, namely
I ∩ L = ∅.
4. The CZKA case (new): a language L ∈ NP has a computational zero-knowledge argu-
ment system if and only if L satisﬁes the Vadhan condition.
14A promise problem Π consists of a pair (ΠY,ΠN) of disjoint sets of strings, corresponding to YES
and NO instances of Π, respectively [ESY]. All of the complexity classes that we consider—for instance,
SZKP, CZKP, SZKA, and CZKA—generalize to promise problems in a natural way: completeness and zero
knowledge are required for YES instances, and soundness is required for NO instances. A language L is a
special case of a promise problem, by taking Π = (L,L).1.3 MOTIVATION AND OTHER RELATED WORKS 11
This theorem will be proven in Chapter 4; speciﬁcally, it is a succinct version of Theo-
rems 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5 in Section 4.1.
1.2.5 Statistical zero-knowledge arguments for NP from one-way
functions
We give the ﬁrst construction of statistical zero-knowledge arguments for NP based on any
one-way function, as stated in the following theorem.
THEOREM 1.2.5
If one-way functions exist, then every language in NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument
system.
This theorem will be established in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3. Although this theorem is
a conditional result, it is used to establish the SZKA and CZKA cases of Theorem 1.2.4,
which gives unconditional complexity-theoretic characterizations of zero-knowledge argu-
ment systems.
Previous constructions of statistical zero-knowledge arguments for NP, starting from
the construction of Brassard, Chaum, and Cr´ epeau [BCC], require stronger complexity as-
sumptions. Our result can be viewed as settling the complexity of statistical zero-knowledge
arguments for NP because the existence of one-way functions is essentially the minimal com-
plexity assumption needed [Ost].15
1.3 Motivation and Other Related Works
The research presented in this dissertation was inspired by the seminal work of Vad-
han [Vad3] on the unconditional study of computational zero-knowledge proofs, and by the
work of Nguyen and Vadhan [NV] who show that zero-knowledge proofs can be uncondi-
tionally converted into ones with eﬃcient provers. Vadhan’s work is the ﬁrst unconditional
study done on an entire zero-knowledge complexity class where at least one of the security
conditions is computational (in his case, the zero knowledge condition is computational).
Prior to Vadhan, the unconditional works in zero knowledge centered around statistical
zero-knowledge proofs, where both the zero knowledge and soundness conditions are statis-
tical; examples of these works include [BP, DDPY1, DC, Oka, DOY, DDPY2, SV, GSV1,
GV, GSV2, Vad1, MV]. In this dissertation, we extend work of Vadhan [Vad3] and Nguyen
and Vadhan [NV] to unconditionally study the more general classes of languages having
zero-knowledge arguments, where the soundness condition is computational.
Vadhan’s work, in turn, was motivated by the work of Ostrovsky and Wigderson [OW],
“who gave the ﬁrst hint that it might be possible to prove unconditional results about zero
15The result of Ostrovsky [Ost] is stated only for proof systems, but it also holds for argument systems.12 CHAPTER 1 / INTRODUCTION
knowledge” [Vad3, p.1161]. They showed that if hard-on-average16 languages have com-
putational zero-knowledge proofs, then one-way functions exists. With one-way functions,
we know that all languages in NP have computational zero-knowledge proofs [GMW2, Nao,
HILL]. Thus, if we can show that NP * BPP implies NP has hard-on-average languages,
then we can conclude—without assuming any unproven complexity assumptions—that ev-
ery language in NP has computational zero-knowledge proofs. The reason for this is that
we can do the following case analysis: (i) if NP ⊆ BPP, then every language L in NP
is also in BPP, and hence L has a trivial zero-knowledge proof system where the veriﬁer
decides the language on its own; (ii) if NP * BPP, then by the above hypothesis, NP has
hard-on-average languages, and hence by [OW], one-way functions exist. As argued above,
one-way functions imply that NP ⊆ CZKP.
Unfortunately, our current knowledge of complexity theory does not exclude the possi-
bility of both NP * BPP and NP having no hard-on-average language happening simul-
taneously. Indeed, this possibility is often referred to as the Heuristica world of Impagli-
azzo [Imp].
Our research aims to overcome this gap in our understanding of zero knowledge even
if we live in the Heuristica world. To achieve this objective, we follow Vadhan [Vad3] and
characterize zero-knowledge protocols on a language-by-language basis instead of analyzing
consequences of zero knowledge for an entire complexity class like NP. In other words, we
study implications of a zero-knowledge protocol for a language L that are directly related
to the language L itself. To get a more concrete taste of what this means, refer to the
statements in Theorems 1.2.1 and 1.2.4.
Other unconditional works in cryptography. Our unconditional results should also
be contrasted with some other works that do not rely on complexity assumptions, but work
in less standard models of cryptography. For example, the works of Maurer [Mau], Cachin
and Maurer [CM], and Ding and Rabin [DR] oﬀer unconditionally secure cryptographic
protocols against memory-bounded adversaries. In contrast, we only limit our adversaries
in terms of its running time (to be probabilistic polynomial time), which is more standard in
cryptography. In a diﬀerent setting, Pass and Shelat [PS] constructed noninteractive zero-
knowledge proof systems17 in the secret parameter setup model for NP, where in this model
the prover and the veriﬁer is assumed to be able to obtain correlated private information.
16A language L is hard on average if it is hard to decide whether a random instance is in L or out of L.
For a precise deﬁnition, refer to [Vad3, Def.7.2].
17Noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs, introduced by Blum et al. [BDMP], are zero-knowledge proofs
that consists only of a single message from the prover to the veriﬁer. Zero knowledge is achievable in this
setting because both prover and veriﬁer is assumed to have access to a common random string, uniformly
chosen by a trusted third party.1.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS DISSERTATION 13
1.4 Structure of this Dissertation
We provide an outline for the remaining chapters in this dissertation as follows.
Chapter 2 (A Tour of Zero Knowledge) is designed to provide the necessary deﬁni-
tions in order to understand the results in this dissertation.
Chapter 3 (Statistically-Hiding Commitments) has two main focuses. The ﬁrst is to
construct a statistically-hiding and computationally-hiding commitment scheme based
on any one-way function. The second is to show that every language L in SZKP has
an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding when x ∈ L
instances and statistically binding when x / ∈ L.
Chapter 4 (Unconditional Characterizations of Zero Knowledge) provides the main
unconditional results of this dissertation, which were highlighted in Section 1.2. It
does so by establishing an expanded version of Theorem 1.2.4 that gives characteri-
zations of zero-knowledge protocols in terms of the Vadhan condition.
Chapter 5 (Future Research) explores a direction for future research.
Appendix A (Deferred Proofs) presents the proofs that are absent in the main text.14 CHAPTER 1 / INTRODUCTION2
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A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter, we provide the necessary deﬁnitions in order to understand our results in
Chapters 3 and 4. In general, unless noted otherwise, we use standard notations from com-
plexity theory and cryptography; Sipser’s textbook [Sip] provides an excellent introduction
to complexity theory, and Vadhan’s survey [Vad2] provides an illuminating introduction to
zero-knowledge proofs and interactive proofs. For a comprehensive reference on the topics
covered in this chapter, we refer the reader to a book by Goldreich [Gol2].
Chapter organization. In Section 2.1, we illustrate the concepts of zero knowledge
through the elegant example of Graph Isomorphism. After that, we review basic com-
plexity theory and cryptographic notions in Section 2.2.
In Section 2.3, we deﬁne the various ﬂavors and variants of zero knowledge protocols.
And then, in Section 2.4, we introduce one-way functions and commitments schemes, and
their instance-dependent analogues. We conclude this chapter, in Section 2.5, by showing
that instance-dependent commitments for a language in NP can be used to construct zero-
knowledge protocols for that language.
2.1 An Example: Graph Isomorphism
Recall the algorithmic task of determining whether two graphs are isomorphic from Sec-
tion 1.1. To recap, graphs G and H are isomorphic if the nodes of G may be permuted
so that it is identical to H, and the language
Graph Isomorphism = {(G,H) : G and H are isomorphic} .
We have seen that given an permutation π of the nodes in G, one can easily check if
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π(G) = H, in which case, G and H are isomorphic graphs.1 Furthermore, if G and H are
not isomorphic, then no permutation π will give rise to π(G) = H. We classify these types
of languages into the class NP, which is formally deﬁned next.
DEFINITION 2.1.1
A language L is in NP if there exists a deterministic polynomial-time veriﬁer V and a
constant c > 0 satisfying the following two conditions.
I Completeness: for every x ∈ L (valid statement), there exists a string w of length less
than |x|
c that makes the veriﬁer accept. In other words, ∃w such that |w| ≤ |x|
c and
V (x,w) = 1.
I Soundness: for every x / ∈ L (invalid statement), every string w of length less than |x|
c
will make the veriﬁer reject. In other words, ∀w such that |w| ≤ |x|
c it is the case
that V (x,w) = 0.
We can think of the string w as being supplied by another entity called a prover P. The
reason why we bound the length of w to a polynomial in the length of x is so that V can
check the supplied proof w eﬃciently.
Note that if we prove that G and H are isomorphic graphs by sending over a permutation
π such that π(G) = H, then the veriﬁer would learnt a reordering of the nodes of G
that makes it equal to H. Hence, is there a way to prove that G and H are isomorphic
graphs in a way that the veriﬁer learns nothing? The answer is yes, and we present the
following zero-knowledge protocol for Graph Isomorphism due to Goldreich, Micali, and
Wigderson [GMW2].
PROTOCOL 2.1.2                                         
Zero-knowledge protocol for Graph Isomorphism [GMW2].
Common input: pair of graphs (G,H). (We assume that the number of nodes in G and
H are equal; otherwise, these graphs are not isomorphic.)
Auxiliary input for P: a permutation π such that π(G) = H.
P → V : Select a uniformly random permutation π0 over the nodes of H, and send graph
J = π0(H).
V → P: Send a uniformly random bit c.
P → V : If c = 0, send permutation π00 = π0 ◦ π. Otherwise, if c = 1, send permutation
π00 = π0.
V : Accept if c = 0 and π00(G) = J, or if c = 1 and π00(H) = J. Otherwise, reject.
                                                               
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In the protocol above, it is useful to think of the veriﬁer’s bit c as a challenge for the
prover to show a permutation of G, when c = 0, or a permutation of H, when c = 1, that
makes it match J.
We informally argue the completeness and soundness of Protocol 2.1.2 as follows:
Completeness. If G and H are isomorphic graphs, and the auxiliary input π to P is
such that π(G) = H, then it is straightforward to check that the veriﬁer V will
always accept (with probability 1). Hence, Protocol 2.1.2 is said to have perfect
completeness.
Soundness. On the other hand, if G and H are not isomorphic, then any (cheating) prover
P∗ will not be able to convince V on both challenges c = 0 and c = 1 after graph
J has been sent over in the ﬁrst round. This is because in order to convince V on
both c = 0 and c = 1, there must be permutations of both G and H that match J,
implying that G and H isomorphic—and this is a contradiction. Therefore, in the
case when G and H are not isomorphic, V will reject with probability at least 1/2,
giving a soundness error of 1/2. To reduce the soundness error to 2−k, we can repeat
the protocol, sequentially or in parallel, k times.
Intuitively, veriﬁer in Protocol 2.1.2 learns nothing because all it sees are a randomly
permuted graph J from either G or H, and a permutation π00 that establishes it. It could
have, without the help of a prover, toss a coin to decide whether to pick graph G or H,
and then randomly permute the chosen graph on its own. To make our intuition precision,
as stated in Section 1.1, this zero-knowledge guarantee of learning nothing is formalized
in [GMR1] by requiring the existence of an eﬃcient algorithm, called a simulator, whose
output is indistinguishable from the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction with the prover, where
the veriﬁer’s view consists of all messages exchanged between the prover and veriﬁer and
the veriﬁer’s random coins. As a ﬁrst cut, we present a simulator for the honest veriﬁer
that follows the prescribed protocol.
ALGORITHM 2.1.3                                       
Simulator S1 for the honest veriﬁer V in Protocol 2.1.2.
Input: pair of graphs (G,H). (As in Protocol 2.1.2, we assume that the number of nodes
in G and H are equal; otherwise, these graphs are not isomorphic.)
1. Select a uniformly random permutation π0 over the nodes of H, and a uniformly
random bit b.
2. If b = 0, output (π0(G),0,π0). Otherwise, if b = 1, output (π0(H),1,π0).
                                                               18 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
It is important to realize that the simulator is only required to work in the case when
G and H are isomorphic graphs. This is because the prover only provides proofs for valid
statements. With this in mind, we informally argue the honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge
property of Protocol 2.1.2 as follows.
Honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge. With probability 1/2, the veriﬁer’s view in Proto-
col 2.1.2 is (π0(H),0,π0 ◦ π) = (π0 ◦ π(G),0,π0 ◦ π), noting that π0 ◦ π is a uniformly
random permutation over the nodes of G (since π0, a uniformly random permutation,
composed with π, a ﬁxed permutation, yields a uniformly random permutation, i.e.,
π0 ◦ π). With the remaining probability of 1/2, the veriﬁer’s view in Protocol 2.1.2 is
(π0(H),1,π0), where π0 is a uniformly random permutation over the nodes of H.
With the same probabilities, the simulator S1 outputs identical distributions to the
above; namely, with probability 1/2, S1 outputs (π0(G),0,π0), and with the remaining
probability 1/2, S1 outputs (π0(H),0,π0), where in both cases, π0 is a uniformly ran-
dom permutation. Therefore, the output of S1 is identically distributed to veriﬁer’s
view in Protocol 2.1.2.
Parties in cryptography are usually malicious; in our case, a malicious veriﬁer could bias
the bit c in hope of learning something, or could base the value of c on the graph J sent
in the ﬁrst round. To guarantee that no veriﬁers, even malicious ones, can gain knowledge
from the prover, we present the following simulator that handles arbitrary behaviors of
malicious veriﬁers.
ALGORITHM 2.1.4                                       
Simulator S2 for any malicious veriﬁer V ∗ in Protocol 2.1.2.
Input: pair of graphs (G,H). (As in Protocol 2.1.2, we assume that the number of nodes
in G and H are equal; otherwise, these graphs are not isomorphic.)
1. Select a uniformly random string r so that we can ﬁx the random tape of V ∗ to be r.
2. Select a uniformly random permutation π0 over the nodes of H, and a uniformly
random bit b.
3. If b = 0, set graph J = π0(G). Otherwise, if b = 1, set graph J = π0(H).
4. Let c = V ∗(J;r).
5. If c = b, then output (J,c,π0,r) and halt. Otherwise, if c 6= b, then output fail.
                                                               
We informally argue the zero knowledge property (i.e., secure against malicious veriﬁers)
of Protocol 2.1.2 as follows.2.2 PRELIMINARIES 19
Zero knowledge (secure against malicious veriﬁers). We ﬁrst argue that condition-
ing on simulator S2 not outputting fail, its output is identically distributed to V ∗’s
view of the interaction with the prover in Protocol 2.1.2. This is because, even if graph
J is set as π0(G) by S2, J is still a uniformly random isomorphic copy of H since G
and H are isomorphic graphs. Hence, the ﬁrst-round message, namely J, produced
by either S2 or P is identically distributed. The second-round message, namely the
bit c, produced by either S2 or V ∗ is also identically distributed conditioned on any
J, since both S2 and V ∗ set the value of c to be equal V ∗(J;r). The third round
message produced by by either S2 or V ∗ is also identically distributed conditioned on
any J and c, since c = b (we are in the case where S2 does not output fail).
Next, we argue that S2 outputs fail with probability at most 1/2. This is because
the bits c and b are independent, and b is a uniform bit. (The only way V ∗ can
make c be dependent on b is by correlating c with J, but since J does not reveal any
information about b, the values of c and b cannot be correlated.) So the probability
that c 6= b, which corresponds to S2 outputting fail, is exactly 1/2. This probability
can be made exponentially small to 2−k by running the simulator k times.
It is interesting to note that parallel repetition of Protocol 2.1.2 preserves the honest-
veriﬁer zero knowledge property, but does not necessarily preserve the zero knowledge
(against malicious veriﬁers) property. This is because in the honest veriﬁer case, a sim-
ulator can toss coins and determine the value of c in advance, whereas in the malicious
veriﬁer case, a simulator must guess the value of c. So if the protocol is repeated k times
in parallel, the simulator for a malicious veriﬁer might get all k values of the c’s correctly
only with probability 2−k. This is an exponentially small value and cannot be increased to
a constant by a polynomial number of repetitions. The zero knowledge (against malicious
veriﬁers) property, however, is preserved under sequential repetition, at a cost of increas-
ing the number of rounds. See Remark 2.3.6 for a further discussion on parallel versus
sequential repetitions in the context of zero-knowledge protocols.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Basic notations
Strings. Inputs of an algorithmic task are normally modeled as ﬁnite sequences of ele-
ments that come from a ﬁnite set. To be precise, we deﬁne an alphabet to be any ﬁnite set,
a string to be any ﬁnite sequence of elements from that alphabet, and a language to be
any set of strings. A computation process is normally thought of as manipulations of bits,
so in this regard, the natural alphabet is the binary alphabet {0,1}. The binary alphabet
can be used without loss of generality since it is easy to encode strings over a non-binary
alphabet as a binary string without expanding the length of the string too much. At times,20 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
especially when considering security parameters, we use a unary alphabet, and denote a
unary string of length k as 1k.
Random variables. A random variable, formally stated, is a measurable function map-
ping a probability space into a measurable space. Since we are dealing with only ﬁnite spaces
in this dissertation, we can treat a random variable X as a function from a ﬁnite set S to
the nonnegative reals R≥0 with the property that
P
S∈S X(S) = 1. Hence, we can think
of random variable X taking on value S with probability X(S). A random variable X is
uniform over a ﬁnite set S if it has equal weights on every element in S, i.e., X(S) = 1/|S|
for all S ∈ S. Because a random variable can be thought of as representing a probability
distribution, we sometimes use these two terms interchangeably.
We write x ← X to indicate that x is selected according to X. For a subset T of S,
we write x ← T to mean that x is selected according to the uniform random variable over
T. We adopt the convention that when the same random variable occurs several times in
an expression, they refer to a single sample. For example, Pr[f(X) = X] is deﬁned to be
the probability that when x ← X, we have f(x) = x. We write Un to denote the random
variable that is uniform over {0,1}n.
Polynomially-small and negligible functions. A function µ : N → [0,1] is polyno-
mially small if µ(n) = n−Ω(1). A function ε: N → [0,1] is negligible if ε(n) = n−ω(1).
Let neg(n) denote an arbitrary negligible function (i.e., when we say that f(n) < neg(n)
we mean that there exists a negligible function ε(n) such that for every n, f(n) < ε(n)).
Likewise, poly(n) denotes any function f(n) = nO(1).
Probabilistic algorithms. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we write A(x;r) to denote
the output of A on input x and coin tosses r. In this case, A(x) is a random variable
representing the output of A for uniformly selected coin tosses. The term PPT refers
to probabilistic algorithms (i.e., Turing machines) that run in strict polynomial time. A
nonuniform PPT algorithm is a pair (A, ¯ z), where ¯ z = z1,z2,... is an inﬁnite sequence of
strings where |zn| = poly(n), and A is a PPT algorithm that receives pairs of inputs of the
form (x,z|x|). (The string zn is the called the advice string for A for inputs of length n.)
Nonuniform PPT algorithms are equivalent to (nonuniform) families of polynomial-sized
Boolean circuits.
Statistical measures. The statistical diﬀerence, also known as variation distance,
between random variables X and Y taking values in U is deﬁned to be
∆(X,Y ) = max
S⊂U
|Pr[X ∈ S] − Pr[Y ∈ S]| .
Random variables X and Y are ε-close if ∆(X,Y ) ≤ ε. Conversely, random variables X
and Y are ε-far if ∆(X,Y ) > ε. For basic facts about this metric, see [SV, Sec.2.3].2.2 PRELIMINARIES 21
Entropy. The entropy of a random variable X is
H(X) = E
x←X

−logPr[X = x]

,
where here and throughout all logarithms are of base 2. This notion of entropy corresponds
to Shannon entropy or information entropy in the information theory literature. Intuitively,
H(X) measures the amount of randomness in X on average (in bits). For a worst-case
measure of randomness, the min-entropy of X is most often used, and is deﬁned as
H∞(X) = min
x

−logPr[X = x]

.
In general H∞(X) ≤ H(X), but when X is ﬂat (that is, uniform on its support), then
H(X) = H∞(X) = log|Supp(X)|.
2.2.2 Indistinguishability of probability ensembles
Recall that the zero-knowledge guarantee of learning nothing is formalized in [GMR1] by
requiring the existence of an eﬃcient simulator whose output is indistinguishable from the
veriﬁer’s view of the interaction with the prover. Now, we formalize the notion of being
indistinguishable.
DEFINITION 2.2.1
A probability ensemble, or just an ensemble, is a set of random variables {Ax}x∈{0,1}∗,
where Ax takes values in {0,1}p(|x|) for some polynomial p. We call such an ensemble
samplable if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M such that for every x,
the output M(x) is distributed according to Ax.
DEFINITION 2.2.2
Ensembles {Ax}x∈{0,1}∗ and {Bx}x∈{0,1}∗ are computationally indistinguishable on I ⊆
{0,1}∗ if for every nonuniform PPT D, there exists a negligible function ε such that for all
x ∈ I,
|Pr[D(x,Ax) = 1] − Pr[D(x,Bx) = 1]| ≤ ε(|x|) .
Similarly, ensembles {Ax}x∈{0,1}∗ and {Bx}x∈{0,1}∗ are statistically indistinguishable
on I ⊆ {0,1}∗ if the above is required for all functions D, instead of only nonuniform PPT
ones. Equivalently, {Ax}x∈{0,1}∗ and {Bx}x∈{0,1}∗ are statistically indistinguishable on I if
and only if Ax and Bx are ε(|x|)-close for some negligible function ε and all x ∈ I. We use
≈c and ≈s to denote computational and statistical indistinguishability, respectively.22 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
2.2.3 Promise problems
In Section 1.1, we mentioned that a language L can be thought of as deﬁning the following
algorithmic task: given a string x, determine if x ∈ L or x / ∈ L.
We now consider a wider class of algorithmic tasks than those represented by languages.
Speciﬁcally, we allow some input strings to be excluded. This new algorithmic task is
formalized by a promise problem [ESY], which is speciﬁed by two disjoint sets of strings
Π = (ΠY,ΠN), where ΠY is the set of YES instances and ΠN is the set of NO instances.
Such a promise problem is associated with the following algorithmic task: given an input
string that is promised to lie in ΠY ∪ ΠN, decide whether it is in ΠY or in ΠN. Note that
languages are a special case of promise problems (namely, a language L over alphabet Σ
corresponds to the promise problem (L,Σ∗ \ L)). Thus working with promise problems
makes our results more general. Moreover, even to prove our results just for languages, it
turns out to be extremely useful to work with promise problems along the way.
The complement of a promise problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) is the promise problem Π =
(ΠN,ΠY). The union of two promise problems Π and Γ is the promise problem Π ∪ Γ =
(ΠY ∪ ΓY,ΠN ∩ ΓN). The intersection of two promise problems Π and Γ is the promise
problem Π ∩ Γ = (ΠY ∩ ΓY,ΠN ∪ ΓN). A class of promise problems is a set of promise
problems. If C is a class of promise problems, then the complement class is deﬁned as
co-C = {Π : Π ∈ C}.
Most complexity classes, typically deﬁned as classes of languages, extend to promise
problems in a natural way, by translating conditions on inputs in the language to be
conditions on YES instances, and conditions on inputs not in the language to be con-
ditions on NO instances. For example, a promise problem Π is in BPP if there is a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A such that x ∈ ΠY ⇒ Pr[A(x) = 1] ≥ 2/3 and
x ∈ ΠN ⇒ Pr[A(x) = 0] ≤ 1/3.
A promise problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) polynomial-time reduces, or just reduces, to
another promise problem Γ = (ΓY,ΓN) if there is a polynomial-time computable function
f satisfying f(x) ∈ ΓY for every x ∈ ΠY and f(x) ∈ ΓN for every x ∈ ΠN. That is, we work
with polynomial-time mapping reductions (i.e., Karp reductions), unless otherwise speciﬁed.
If Π reduces to Γ and vice versa, then Π and Γ are polynomial-time equivalent. If C
is a class of promise problems, then Π is complete for C (or C-complete) if Π ∈ C and
every promise problem in C reduces to Π.
REMARK 2.2.3
Some theoretical computer science papers do make a distinction between BPP, the class
of languages that are decidable in probabilistic polynomial time, and prBPP, the promise
variant of BPP. This is mainly because their results do not apply to both classes: for
example, prBPP = prP implies BPP = P, but the converse is not known.
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classes as well as classes of languages. Hence, throughout this dissertation, all complexity
classes are classes of promise problems. In addition, we often use the term problem Π to
mean the promise problem Π.
2.3 Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Our goal in this section is to build up the necessary machinery to understand the various
ﬂavors and variants of zero-knowledge protocols. Throughout our discussions, it will be
helpful to keep the example of Graph Isomorphism from Section 2.1 in mind.
2.3.1 Interactive proofs and interactive arguments
In Protocol 2.1.2 for Graph Isomorphism the prover exchange messages with the veriﬁer
in order to prove that the two graphs are isomorphic. We model this interaction between
the prover and veriﬁer in a setting of an interactive protocol.
DEFINITION 2.3.1
An interactive protocol (A,B) consists of two algorithms A and B that compute the next-
message function of the (honest) parties in the protocol. Speciﬁcally, for even values of k,
A(x,a,m1,...,mk;rA) denotes the next message mk+1 sent by party A when the common
input is x, A’s auxiliary input is a, A’s coin tosses are rA, and the messages exchanged so
far are m1,...,mk. Analogously for party B, B(x,b,m1,...,mk;rB), for odd values of k,
denotes the next message mk+1 sent by party B when the common input is x, B’s auxiliary
input is b, B’s coin tosses are rB, and the messages exchanged so far are m1,...,mk. There
are two special messages, accept and reject, which immediately halt the interaction.
Party A (resp. B) is polynomial-time computable if its next-message function can
be computed in polynomial time (in |x| + |a| + |m1| + ··· + |mk|).
The number of rounds in an execution of the protocol is the total number of messages
exchanged between A and B, not including the ﬁnal accept/reject message.
Interactive protocol (A,B) is public coin if all of the messages sent by B are simply the
output of its coin-tosses (independent of the history), except for the ﬁnal accept/reject
message which is computed as a deterministic function of the transcript. (Such protocols
are also sometimes known as Arthur-Merlin games [BM].)
For an interactive protocol (A,B), we write (A(a),B(b))(x) to denote the random pro-
cess obtained by having A and B interact on common input x, (private) auxiliary inputs a
and b to A and B, respectively (if any), and independent random coin tosses for A and B.
We call (A,B) polynomially bounded if there is a polynomial p such that for all x,a,b, the
total length of all messages exchanged in (A(a),B(b))(x) is at most p(|x|) with probability
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if the total length of the messages ever exceeds p(|x|), and similarly for B interacting with
any A∗.
View of the interaction. To denote A’s view of the interaction, we use random
variable viewA(A(a),B(b))(x) to mean (x,a,m1,m2,...,mt,rA), where the mi’s are all
the messages exchanged and rA is A’s coin tosses. Similarly, to denote B’s view of the
interaction, we use random variable viewB(A(a),B(b))(x) to mean (x,b,m1,m2,...,mt,rB),
where the mi’s are all the messages exchanged and rB is B’s coin tosses. When dealing with
interactive protocols (P,V ) involving a prover P and a veriﬁer V , it is common to write
hP,V i(x) to denote V ’s view of the interaction, that is hP,V i(x) = viewV (P,V )(x).
Transcripts and outputs. A transcript of interactive protocol (A,B), denoted by the
random variable transcript(A(a),B(b))(x), is the messages exchanged in the protocol includ-
ing the common input x, i.e., (x,m1,m2,...,mt). Let random variables outputA(A(a),B(b))
and outputB(A(a),B(b))(x) denote A’s and B’s private output after the interaction, re-
spectively. At times, we will refer to protocols with a joint output; such an output is speciﬁed
by a deterministic, polynomial-time computable function of the messages exchanged.
Statistical versus computational soundness. Recall that in Section 1.1, we discussed
two ﬂavors of soundness: statistical soundness, giving rise to interactive proof sys-
tems, where even a computationally unbounded prover cannot convince the veriﬁer of a
false statement, and computational soundness, giving rise to interactive argument
systems [BCC], where we only require that an eﬃcient, probabilistic polynomial-time
prover cannot convince the veriﬁer of a false statement.
First, we give a formal deﬁnition of statistical soundness, which gives rise to interactive
proof systems.
DEFINITION 2.3.2
An interactive protocol (P,V ) is an interactive proof system for a promise problem Π
if exist functions c,s : N → [0,1] such that 1 − c(n) > s(n) + 1/poly(n) and the following
conditions hold.
I Eﬃciency: (P,V ) is polynomially bounded, and V is polynomial-time computable.
I Completeness: if x ∈ ΠY, then V accepts in (P,V )(x) with probability at least
1 − c(|x|),
I Statistical soundness: if x ∈ ΠN, then for every P∗, V accepts in (P∗,V )(x) with
probability at most s(|x|).
We call c(·) the completeness error and s(·) the soundness error. Interactive protocol
(P,V ) has negligible error if both c and s are negligible; it has perfect completeness
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Let IP be the class of promise problems possessing interactive proof systems. An equiva-
lent deﬁnition of IP is the class of problems possessing public-coin interactive proof systems
with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error [GS, FGM+].
Let MA be the class of promise problems possessing single-round interactive proof sys-
tems: in such protocols, the prover P sends a single message to V , and V decides whether
to accept or reject based on the prover’s message and its own random coins. Thus, we can
think of MA as a generalization of NP where the veriﬁcation of witnesses is probabilistic.
Remark. Protocol 2.1.2 for Graph Isomorphism is an interactive proof system with
perfect completeness and soundness error 1/2.
Next, we give a formal deﬁnition of computational soundness, which gives rise to inter-
active argument systems.
DEFINITION 2.3.3
An interactive protocol (P,V ) is an interactive argument system for Π if the soundness
condition in Deﬁnition 2.3.2 holds against all nonuniform PPT P∗, instead of every, even
computationally unbounded, P∗. Speciﬁcally, we require interactive argument systems to
satisfy both the eﬃciency and the completeness conditions in Deﬁnition 2.3.2, and to satisfy
a weaker, computational soundness condition below.
I Computational soundness: if x ∈ ΠN, then for every nonuniform PPT P∗, V accepts
in (P∗,V )(x) with probability at most s(|x|).
Let IA be the class of promise problems possessing interactive argument systems.
Unlike interactive proofs, the complexity-theoretic aspects of IA are not well-studied.
In particular, we do not know if general interactive arguments can be made to have public
coin or to have perfect completeness. The completeness and soundness error, however, can
be made negligibly small by sequential repetition.
2.3.2 Eﬃcient provers
Although we deﬁne interactive arguments without restricting the computational resource
the honest prover P, it is natural to do since the cheating provers P∗ are restricted to be
PPT. Hence, interactive arguments are most interesting when considering problems in NP,
because for these problems, we can restrict the honest prover to be PPT given a witness of
membership. To formalize this idea, we deﬁne witness relations for problems in NP.
Recall that NP, informally stated, is the class of problems that can be veriﬁed in polyno-
mial time given a valid witness. To formally deﬁne the relationship between an instance and
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time if deciding whether an element is in W can be done in polynomial time in the length
of the ﬁrst component of the input (this is typically the length of the problem instance).
With this in mind, a problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) is in NP if there exist a polynomial-time binary
relation W ⊆ {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗ such that the following two conditions hold:
I for every x ∈ ΠY, there exists a w with (x,w) ∈ W;
I for every x ∈ ΠY, and for every w, it is the case that (x,w) / ∈ W.
Any polynomial-time binary relation W that satisﬁes the above two conditions is said to
be an NP-relation for the problem Π.
For MA, the probabilistic analog of NP, we generalize the relation W to allow for
randomness; speciﬁcally, we expand the domain of W ⊆ {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗. To
relate it with the NP case above, we abuse notation and write (x,w) ∈ W if Prr[(x,w,r) ∈
W] ≥ 2/3, and write (x,w) / ∈ W if Prr[(x,w,r) ∈ W] ≤ 1/3. Then, a problem Π =
(ΠY,ΠN) ∈ MA if there exist a polynomial-time relation W ⊆ {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗ × {0,1}∗
such that the following two conditions hold:
I for every x ∈ ΠY, there exists a w with (x,w) ∈ W, namely Prr[(x,w,r) ∈ W] ≥ 2/3;
I for every x ∈ ΠY, and for every w, it is the case that (x,w) / ∈ W, namely Prr[(x,w,r) ∈
W] ≤ 1/3.
Any polynomial-time relation W that satisﬁes the above two conditions is said to be an
MA-relation for the problem Π.
In an interactive protocol (P,V ) for problem Π ∈ NP [resp., Π ∈ MA], prover P is an
eﬃcient prover if its strategy on problem instance x is computable in polynomial time
given w as auxiliary input, where (x,w) ∈ W and W is an NP-relation [resp., MA-relation]
for Π. When this is the case, protocol (P,V ) is said to have an eﬃcient prover. By allowing
the relation W to be more general, we could have deﬁned the notion of eﬃcient prover to
languages outside MA. Nevertheless, we did not do so since eﬃcient provers can be deﬁned,
without loss of generality, only for problems in MA [BD, BLV].
Remark. Protocol 2.1.2 for Graph Isomorphism has an eﬃcient prover.
2.3.3 Flavors and variants of zero knowledge
Recall that in Section 1.1, we discussed the two ﬂavors of zero knowledge: statistical
zero knowledge, where the zero-knowledge condition holds regardless of the computational
resources the veriﬁer invests into trying to learn something from the interaction (except
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eﬃcient, probabilistic polynomial-time veriﬁers learn nothing from the interaction.2 For
each of these ﬂavors, there are several variants of zero knowledge, referring to how rich a
class of veriﬁer strategies are considered.
Honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge
We start with the weakest variant of zero knowledge, where only the honest veriﬁer that
follows the prescribed strategy is guaranteed to learning nothing.3
DEFINITION 2.3.4
An interactive proof system (P,V ) for a promise problem Π is statistical [resp., compu-
tational] honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time
simulator S such that the ensembles {hP,V i(x)} and {S(x)} are statistically [resp., com-
putationally] indistinguishable on the set ΠY.
HV-SZKP and HV-CZKP denote the classes of promise problems have honest-veriﬁer
statistical and computational zero-knowledge proofs, respectively. Analogously, HV-SZKA
and HV-CZKA denote the classes of promise problems have honest-veriﬁer statistical and
computational zero-knowledge arguments, respectively.
Malicious-veriﬁer, auxiliary-input zero knowledge
While honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge is already a nontrivial and interesting notion, cryp-
tographic applications usually require that the zero-knowledge condition holds even if a
malicious veriﬁer deviates arbitrarily from the speciﬁed protocol. This is captured by
the following deﬁnition.
DEFINITION 2.3.5
An interactive proof system (P,V ) for a promise problem Π is statistical [resp., com-
putational] auxiliary-input zero knowledge4 if for every PPT V ∗ and polynomial p,
there exists a PPT S such that the ensembles {hP,V ∗(z)i(x)} and {S(x,z)} are statistically
2There is a third ﬂavor of zero knowledge which is the strongest of all: perfect zero knowledge, where
the veriﬁer cannot learn anything even with negligible probability. In this dissertation, we do not study
the distinction between perfect zero knowledge and statistical zero knowledge. See Section 2.3.4 for a more
detailed discussion.
3This is an instantiation of what is called an honest-but-curious adversary or passive adversary in the
literature on cryptographic protocols.
4Our formulation of auxiliary-input zero knowledge is slightly diﬀerent than, but equivalent to, the
deﬁnition in the textbook [Gol2]. We allow V
∗ to run in polynomial time in the lengths of both its input
x and its auxiliary input z, but put a polynomial bound on the length of the auxiliary input. In [Gol2, Sec
4.3.3], V
∗ is restricted to run in time that is polynomial in just the length of the input x, and no bound is
imposed on the length of the auxiliary input z (so V
∗ may only be able to read a preﬁx of z). The purpose of
allowing the auxiliary input to be longer than the running time of z is to provide additional nonuniformity
to the distinguisher (beyond that which the veriﬁer has); we do this directly by allowing the distinguisher
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[resp., computationally] indistinguishable on the set {(x,z) : x ∈ ΠY,|z| = p(|x|)}.
SZKP and CZKP are the classes of promise problems possessing statistical and computa-
tional auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proofs, respectively. Analogously, SZKA and CZKA
are the classes of promise problems possessing statistical and computational auxiliary-input
zero-knowledge arguments, respectively. To avoid cumbersome terminologies, we often drop
the preﬁx “auxiliary input” and just use zero knowledge to mean auxiliary-input zero
knowledge.
REMARK 2.3.6
The auxiliary input z in the above deﬁnition allows one to model a priori information that
the veriﬁer may possess before the interaction begins, such as from earlier steps in a larger
protocol in which the zero-knowledge proof is being used or from prior executions of the same
zero-knowledge proof. As a result, auxiliary-input zero knowledge is closed under sequential
composition. That is, if an auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof is repeated polynomially
many times sequentially, then it remains auxiliary-input zero knowledge [GO]. Plain zero
knowledge (i.e., without auxiliary inputs) is not closed under sequential composition [GK2],
and thus auxiliary-input zero knowledge is the deﬁnition typically used in the literature.
We caution that parallel repetition does not, in general, preserve the (auxiliary input) zero
knowledge property [GK2, FS].
Black-box zero knowledge
Typically, a protocol is proven to be zero knowledge by actually exhibiting a single, universal
simulator that simulates an arbitrary veriﬁer strategy V ∗ by using V ∗ as a subroutine. That
is, the simulator does not depend on or use the code of V ∗ (or its auxiliary input), and
instead only requires black-box access to V ∗. This type of simulation is formalized as follows.
DEFINITION 2.3.7
An interactive proof system (P,V ) for a promise problem Π is statistical [resp., compu-
tational] black-box zero knowledge if there exists an oracle PPT S such that for every
nonuniform PPT V ∗, the ensembles {hP,V ∗i(x)} and {SV ∗(x,·;·)(x)} are statistically [resp.,
computationally] indistinguishable on the set ΠY.
Remark. Protocol 2.1.2 for Graph Isomorphism is statistical black-box zero knowledge
since its simulator S2 in Algorithm 2.1.4 only requires black-box access to the malicious
veriﬁer V ∗, and outputs transcripts that are statistically indistinguishable from V ∗’s view
of the interaction with the prover.
Even though the above Deﬁnition 2.3.7 does not explicitly refer to an auxiliary in-
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nonuniform (and thus the auxiliary input can be hardwired in V ∗ as advice). The work
of Barak [Bar] demonstrated that non-black-box zero-knowledge arguments can achieve
properties (such as simultaneously being public coin, having a constant number of rounds,
and having negligible error) that were known to be impossible for black-box zero knowl-
edge [GK2]. Nevertheless, our results will show that, when ignoring round eﬃciency consid-
erations, black-box zero knowledge is as rich as auxiliary-input zero knowledge; for example,
in Chapter 4, we show that every problem in CZKA has a black-box computational zero-
knowledge argument system.
2.3.4 Remarks on the deﬁnitions
Our deﬁnitions mostly follow the now-standard deﬁnitions of zero-knowledge proof and
argument systems as presented in [Gol2], but we highlight the following points.
1. Prover complexity: interactive proofs and interactive arguments, and their zero-
knowledge analogues, allow the honest prover to be computationally unbounded, un-
less we specify eﬃcient prover. It was shown by Nguyen and Vadhan [NV] that for
problems in NP (actually, also MA), any zero-knowledge proof system with an un-
bounded prover can be transformed into one with an eﬃcient prover; we will show the
same for argument systems.
2. Promise problems: as has been done numerous times before (e.g., [GK3, SV]), we
extend all of the deﬁnitions to promise problems Π = (ΠY,ΠN) in the natural way, i.e.,
conditions previously required for inputs in the language (e.g., completeness and zero
knowledge) are now required for all YES instances, and conditions previously required
for inputs not in the language (e.g., soundness) are now required for all NO instances.
Similarly, all of our complexity classes (e.g., CZKA, SZKP and BPP) are classes of
promise problems. These extensions to promise problems are essential for formalizing
our arguments, but all the ﬁnal characterizations and results we derive about CZKA
automatically hold for the corresponding class of languages, simply because languages
are a special case of promise problems.
3. Nonuniform formulation: as has become standard, we have adopted a nonuniform
formulation of zero knowledge, where the computational indistinguishability has to
hold even with respect to nonuniform distinguishers and is universally quantiﬁed over
all YES instances. Uniform treatments of zero knowledge are possible (see [Gol1] and
[BLV, Apdx.A]), but the deﬁnitions are much more cumbersome. We do not know
whether analogues of our results hold for the uniform formulation of zero knowledge,
and leave that as a problem for future work.
4. Strict polynomial-time simulators: we restrict our attention to zero knowledge with
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and 2.3.7, the simulator is PPT, which means that in runs in strict polynomial time.
The original Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoﬀ deﬁnition, however, allows the running
time of the simulator to be expected polynomial time; we say that random variable Xn
is expected polynomial if E[Xn] = poly(n). We prefer the strict polynomial time
deﬁnition of zero knowledge, because as pointed out by Levin [Lev], the deﬁnition of
expected polynomial time is dependent on the model of computation and does not
compose well.5
5. Perfect versus statistical zero knowledge: A third ﬂavor of zero knowledge proposed
by [GMR1], which is the strongest of all, is perfect zero knowledge. This is where
all veriﬁers cannot learn anything even with negligible probability; that is, the output
of the simulator is required to be identically distributed to the view of the veriﬁer.
Refer to [Gol2, Def.4.3.1] for a formal deﬁnition of perfect zero knowledge.
In this dissertation, we do not study the distinction between perfect zero knowledge
and statistical zero knowledge. We note that perfect zero knowledge is a fragile
property to manipulate and could depend on the model of computation. For instance,
Protocol 2.1.2, the zero-knowledge protocol for Graph Isomorphism, is perfect zero
knowledge with perfect completeness only if we assume that the prover is able to
uniformly select a random permutation. In a model of probabilistic computation with
random bits, selecting a uniform permutation can be achieved only by allowing for a
negligible probability of failure. (This is because the total possible permutations over
n elements, which is n!, is not a power of 2.) Nevertheless, by considering statistical
zero knowledge, we are able to absorb this negligible probability of failure into the
statistical diﬀerence between the output of the simulator and the view of the veriﬁer,
and hence achieve a statistical zero knowledge proof system for Graph Isomorphism
with perfect completeness.
Furthermore, if we insist on perfect zero knowledge, the malicious-veriﬁer simulator
for Protocol 2.1.2, such as the one in Algorithm 2.1.4, must be allowed to fail with
small probability; no eﬃcient simulator is known to be able to output a distribution
that is identical to the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction in Protocol 2.1.2 without
failing [Gol2, Sect.4.3.1.1]. Again by considering statistical zero knowledge, we are
able to absorb this small probability of failure into the statistical diﬀerence between
the output of the simulator and the view of the veriﬁer, and obtain a simulator that
does not need to fail.
5For instance, if Xn is expected polynomial time, it is not necessarily the case that X
2
n is expected
polynomial time. A counterexample is Xn equaling 2
n with probability 2
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2.4 Cryptographic Primitives and Instance-Dependent
Analogues
In this section, we give formal deﬁnitions of one-way functions and commitment schemes,
and their instance-dependent analogues.
2.4.1 One-way functions
The most basic primitive of modern cryptography is a one-way function, which are functions
that are easy to compute but hard to invert.
DEFINITION 2.4.1
Let s: N → N be any function. A function f : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a s(n)-secure one-way
function, or equivalently has security s(n), if f is computable in polynomial time and
for every nonuniform PPT A,
Pr
y←{0,1}n[A(1n,f(y)) ∈ f−1(f(y))] < 1/s(n),
for all suﬃciently large n. Function f is a one-way function if f is s(n)-secure for every
polynomial s.
Without loss of generality, we can consider only one-way functions that are length-
preserving, that is for all y ∈ {0,1}∗, |f(y)| = |y|. This is because general one-way functions
can be converted into ones that are length-preserving (cf., [Gol2, p.39]).
One-way function f is a regular one-way function with preimage size g(n) if there
exists a function g: N → N such that ∀z ∈ Supp(f(Un)), |{y ∈ {0,1}n : f(y) = z}| = g(n).
2.4.2 Commitment schemes
Another basic primitive of modern cryptography is a (bit) commitment scheme, which is
a two-stage protocol between a sender and a receiver. In the ﬁrst stage, called the commit
stage, the sender commits to a private bit b. In the second stage, called the reveal stage,
the sender reveals b and proves that it was the bit to which she committed in the ﬁrst
stage. We require two properties of commitment schemes. The hiding property says that
the receiver learns nothing about b in the commit stage. The binding property says that
after the commit stage, the sender is bound to a particular value of b; that is, she cannot
successfully open the commitment to two diﬀerent bits in the reveal stage.32 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
DEFINITION 2.4.2
An commitment scheme is an interactive protocol Com = (S,R) with the following
properties:
1. Scheme Com proceeds in two stages: a commit stage and a reveal stage. In both
stages, the sender S and the receiver R receive a security parameter 1n as common
input.
2. At the beginning of the commit stage, sender S receives a private input b ∈ {0,1},
which denotes the bit that S is supposed to commit to. At the end of the commit
stage, both sender S and receiver R output a commitment string c.
3. In the reveal stage, sender S sends a pair (b,d), where d is the decommitment string
for bit b. Receiver R accepts or rejects based on b, d, and c.
4. The sender S and receiver R algorithms are computable in polynomial time in the
security parameter n.
5. R will always accept (with probability 1) if both sender S and receiver R follow their
prescribed strategy.
A commitment scheme is public coin if all messages sent by the receiver are independent
random coins.
Next, we deﬁne the hiding and binding properties of commitment schemes.
DEFINITION 2.4.3
Commitment scheme Com = (S,R) is statistically [resp., computationally] hiding
if for every [resp., nonuniform PPT] R∗, the ensembles {viewR∗(S(0),R∗)(1n)}n∈N and
{viewR∗(S(1),R∗)(1n)}n∈N are statistically [resp., computationally] indistinguishable, where
viewR∗(S(b),R∗) denotes the view of R∗ in the commit stage interacting with S(b).
DEFINITION 2.4.4
Commitment scheme Com = (S,R) is statistically [resp., computationally] binding
if for every [resp., nonuniform PPT] S∗, there exists a negligible function ε such that the
malicious sender S∗ succeeds in the following game with probability at most ε(n):
On security parameter 1n, S∗ interacts with R in the commit stage obtaining
commitment c. Then S∗ outputs pairs (0,d0) and (1,d1), and succeeds if in the
reveal stage, R(0,d0,c) = R(1,d1,c) = accept.
In the two next subsections—Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4—we consider analogues of one-way
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2.4.3 Instance-dependent one-way functions
It will be useful for us to work with cryptographic primitives that may depend on an instance
x of a problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN), and where the security condition will hold only if x is in
some particular set I ⊆ {0,1}∗. Indeed, recall that the Vadhan condition (Deﬁnition 1.2.3)
refers to such a variant of of one-way functions, as captured by Deﬁnition 2.4.6 below.
To deﬁne instance-dependent one-way functions, we will need to deﬁne what it means
for a function to be instance dependent.
DEFINITION 2.4.5
An instance-dependent function is a family F = {fx: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|)}x∈{0,1}∗,
where n(·) and m(·) are polynomials. We call F polynomial-time computable if there
is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm F such that for every x ∈ {0,1}∗ and y ∈
{0,1}n(|x|), we have F(x,y) = fx(y).
To simplify notation, we often write fx: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|) to mean the instance-
dependent function {fx: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|)}x∈{0,1}∗.
DEFINITION 2.4.6
For any set I ⊆ {0,1}∗, a polynomial-time computable instance-dependent function
fx: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|) is an instance-dependent one-way function on I if for
every nonuniform PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ε such that for every
x ∈ I,
Pr
y←{0,1}n(|x|)

A(x,fx(y)) ∈ f−1
x (fx(y))

≤ ε(|x|) .
Next we consider an instance-dependent variant of distributionally one-way functions,
which are functions that are hard for PPT adversaries to invert in a distributional manner—
that is, given y it is hard for PPT adversaries to output a random preimage f−1(y).
The standard deﬁnition of distributionally one-way function is given by Impagliazzo and
Luby [IL]; here we give the instance-dependent analogue.
DEFINITION 2.4.7
For any set I ⊆ {0,1}∗, a polynomial-time computable instance-dependent function
fx: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|) is an instance-dependent distributionally one-way func-
tion on I if there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every nonuniform PPT adversary
A, the random variables (Un(|x|),fx(Un(|x|))) and (A(fx(Un(|x|))),fx(Un(|x|))) are 1/p(|x|)-far
for all suﬃciently long x ∈ I.
Asking to invert in a distributional manner is a stronger requirement that just ﬁnding
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functions. Impagliazzo and Luby [IL], however, proved that they are in fact equivalent. Like
almost all reductions between cryptographic primitives, this result immediately extends to
the instance-dependent analogue (using the same proof).
PROPOSITION 2.4.8
(Based on [IL, Lem.1].) For every set I ⊆ {0,1}∗, there exists an instance-dependent one-way
function on I if and only if there exists an instance-dependent distributionally one-way function
on I.
2.4.4 Instance-dependent commitment schemes
Recall the standard deﬁnition of the commitment schemes from Section 2.4.2. Instance
dependent analogues of commitments schemes are commitments schemes that are tailored
speciﬁcally to a speciﬁc problem Π. More precisely, instance-dependent commitment
schemes [BMO, IOS, MV] receive an instance x of the problem Π as auxiliary input, and
are required to be hiding when x ∈ ΠY and be binding when x ∈ ΠN.6 Thus, they are a
relaxation of standard commitment schemes, since we do not require that the hiding and
binding properties hold at the same time. Nevertheless, as observed in [IOS], this relaxation
is still useful in constructing zero-knowledge protocols. The reason is that zero-knowledge
protocols based on commitments (for example, the protocol of [GMW2]) typically use only
the hiding property in proving zero knowledge (which is required only when x is a YES
instance) and use only the binding property in proving soundness (which is required only
when x is a NO instance).
We give a deﬁnition of instance-dependent commitment schemes that extends the stan-
dard (that is, non-instance dependent) deﬁnition of commitment schemes in a natural way.
Note that in our deﬁnition below, the reveal stage is noninteractive (that is, consisting of a
single message from the sender to the receiver). This because in the reveal stage, without
loss of generality, we can have the sender provide the receiver the random coin tosses it
used in the commit stage, and the receiver veriﬁes consistency.
DEFINITION 2.4.9
An instance-dependent commitment scheme is a family {Comx}x∈{0,1}∗ with the fol-
lowing properties:
1. Scheme Comx proceeds in two stages: a commit stage and a reveal stage. In both
stages, the sender and receiver receive instance x as common input, and hence we
denote the sender and receiver as Sx and Rx, respectively, and write Comx = (Sx,Rx).
6There were various terms used to describe instance-dependent commitment schemes. Itoh, Ohta, and
Shizuya [IOS] called these language-dependent cryptographic primitives, Micciancio and Vadhan [MV] called
these problem-dependent commitment schemes, and the present usage traces to Vadhan [Vad3].2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES AND INSTANCE-DEPENDENT ANALOGUES 35
2. At the beginning of the commit stage, sender Sx receives a private input b ∈ {0,1},
which denotes the bit that S is supposed to commit to. At the end of the commit
stage, both sender Sx and receiver Rx output a commitment c.
3. In the reveal stage, sender Sx sends a pair (b,d), where d is the decommitment string
for bit b. Receiver Rx accepts or rejects based on x, b, d, and c.
4. The sender Sx and receiver Rx algorithms are computable in polynomial time (in |x|),
given x as auxiliary input.
5. For every x ∈ {0,1}∗, Rx will always accept (with probability 1) if both sender Sx
and receiver Rx follow their prescribed strategy.
Instance-dependent commitment scheme {Comx = (Sx,Rx)}x∈{0,1}∗ is public coin if for
every x ∈ {0,1}∗, all messages sent by Rx are independent random coins.
To simplify notation, we write Comx or (Sx,Rx) to denote instance-dependent commit-
ment scheme {Comx = (Sx,Rx)}x∈{0,1}∗.
The hiding and binding properties of standard commitments—stated in Deﬁnitions 2.4.3
and 2.4.4—extend in a natural way to their instance-dependent analogues.
DEFINITION 2.4.10
Instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx = (Sx,Rx) is statistically [resp., compu-
tationally] hiding on I ⊆ {0,1}∗ if for every [resp., nonuniform PPT] R∗, the ensembles
{viewR∗(Sx(0),R∗)}x∈I and {viewR∗(Sx(1),R∗)}x∈I are statistically [resp., computation-
ally] indistinguishable, where random variable viewR∗(Sx(b),R∗) denotes the view of R∗
in the commit stage interacting with Sx(b). For a problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN), an instance-
dependent commitment scheme Comx for Π is statistically [resp., computationally]
hiding on the YES instances if Comx is statistically [resp., computationally] hiding on
ΠY.
DEFINITION 2.4.11
Instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx = (Sx,Rx) is statistically [resp., compu-
tationally] binding on I ⊆ {0,1}∗ if for every [resp., nonuniform PPT] S∗, there exists
a negligible function ε such that for all x ∈ I, the malicious sender S∗ succeeds in the
following game with probability at most ε(|x|).
S∗ interacts with Rx in the commit stage obtaining commitment c. Then S∗
outputs pairs (0,d0) and (1,d1), and succeeds if in the reveal stage, Rx(0,d0,c) =
Rx(1,d1,c) = accept.
For a problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN), an instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx for Π
is statistically [resp., computationally] binding on the NO instances if Comx is
statistically [resp., computationally] binding on ΠN.36 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
For concreteness, we present an instance-dependent commitment scheme for the Graph
Isomorphism problem (cf., [BMO, IOS]).
ALGORITHM 2.4.12                                      
Instance-dependent commitment scheme for Graph Isomorphism.
Problem instance: A pair of graphs (G0,G1) (this corresponds to pair (G,H) in the
deﬁnition of Graph Isomorphism presented in Section 2.1.)
Commit stage: to commit to a bit b, sender S(G0,G1) selects a uniformly random permu-
tation π over the nodes of Gb, and sends as commitment the graph J = π(Gb) to the
receiver.
Reveal stage: sender S(G0,G1) sends (b,π) to the receiver. Receiver R(G0,G1) accepts if
π(Gb) = J, and rejects otherwise.
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This instance-dependent commitment scheme for Graph Isomorphism is statistically
hiding on the YES instances, and statistically binding on the NO instances. For a YES
instance (G0,G1) ∈ Graph Isomorphism, a commitment to b is a uniformly random
permutation over the nodes of Gb. Since G0 and G1 are isomorphic, the commitments to 0
and 1 are identically distributed, thus yielding the statistical hiding (in fact, perfect hiding)
property. For a NO instance (G0,G1) / ∈ Graph Isomorphism, a commitment to b is also a
uniformly random permutation over the nodes of Gb. In this case, however, G0 and G1 are
not isomorphic, so distributions of the commitments to 0 and 1 are disjoint. (If not, there
will exist permutations π and π0 such that π(G0) = π0(G1), contradicting the assumption
that G0 and G1 are isomorphic graphs.) This yields the statistical binding (in fact, perfect
binding) property.
As demonstrated by this Graph Isomorphism example, instance-dependent commit-
ments have an edge over standard commitments because they can be both statistically
hiding and statistically binding, and they can be obtained unconditionally; in Section 3.6
and Chapter 4, we prove that instance-dependent commitments can be obtained uncondi-
tionally from every problem having zero-knowledge protocols. On the other hand, standard
commitment schemes do require computational assumptions, and we will see this connection
next.
Constructing standard commitments based on any one-way function
Naor [Nao] constructed computationally-hiding and statistically-binding commitments from
any pseudorandom generator, which in turn can be based on any one-way function [HILL].
The combined results of [Nao, HILL] is viewed as settling the complexity of computationally-
hiding and statistically-binding commitments because the existence of one-way functions is
the minimal complexity assumption needed for these commitments [IL].2.5 ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOLS FROM INSTANCE-DEPENDENT COMMITMENTS 37
PROPOSITION 2.4.13
(From [Nao, HILL].) If one-way functions exist, then there exist commitment schemes that are
computationally hiding and statistically binding. Moreover, the instance-dependent commitment
scheme obtained is public coin and constant round.
It turns out that the statistical binding property of Naor’s scheme does not depend
on the one-way security of the function. Thus, we can construct an instance-dependent
commitment scheme from any instance-dependent function such that the scheme is always
statistically binding, but is guaranteed to be computationally hiding only on the instances
where the function is hard to invert. This is stated in the following proposition, which can
be viewed as an instance-dependent formulation of Proposition 2.4.13.
PROPOSITION 2.4.14
(Follows from [Nao, HILL].) For every set K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if there is an instance-dependent one-
way function on K, then problem (K,K) has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is
computationally hiding on the YES instances (namely, instances in K), and statistically binding
on the NO instances (namely, instances in K). Moreover, the instance-dependent commitment
scheme obtained is public coin and constant round.
In Chapter 3, we derive analogous results for the construction of statistically-hiding
and computationally-binding commitments from one-way functions (see Theorem 3.0.4 and
Proposition 3.5.44).
2.5 Zero-Knowledge Protocols from Instance-Dependent
Commitments
In this section, we formalize what we informally concluded at the end of Section 1.1, which
is that having an instance-dependent commitment scheme for a problem Π ∈ NP is suﬃcient
to unconditionally construct a zero-knowledge protocol for Π.
Following Itoh, Ohta, and Shizuya [IOS], we substitute standard commitments in ex-
isting zero-knowledge protocols with instance-dependent commitments. Speciﬁcally, we do
this substitution in the Blum zero-knowledge protocol [Blu]. We use Blum’s protocol for
round eﬃciency; at a cost of having more rounds for comparable soundness error, we can
also use the Goldreich, Micali & Wigderson protocol [GMW2].
We present a description of Blum’s protocol in Protocol 2.5.1, where we explicitly substi-
tute instance-dependent commitments for standard commitments. Before presenting Pro-
tocol 2.5.1, a few deﬁnitions are in place. A Hamiltonian cycle in a directed graph is a
directed path that goes through each and every node exactly once and returns to the start-
ing node. The problem Hamiltonian Path is the task of determining whether a given38 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
directed graph G has a Hamiltonian cycle, and this problem is NP-complete [Kar]. The
adjacency matrix of a directed graph G is a matrix with rows and columns labeled by
the nodes of G, with 1 or 0 in position (vi,vj) according to whether there is an edge from
vi to vj or not—1 if there is an edge, and 0 if an edge is not present.
PROTOCOL 2.5.1                                         
Protocol (P,V ) for problem Π ∈ NP using instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx.
Common input: instance x of the problem Π.
Auxiliary input to P: a witness w for x such that (x,w) ∈ W, where W is an NP-relation
for Π.
1. P and V : Reduce the instance x to a directed graph G of the Hamiltonian
Path problem.
2. P: Reduce the NP-witness w to a Hamiltonian cycle C in the graph G. Select a
uniform permutation π over the nodes of G, and deﬁne the graph G0 = π(G).
3. P ↔ V : P commits to V the entire adjacency matrix of G0 (entry by entry)
using Comx.
4. V → P: Send a random bit c ← {0,1}.
5. P → V : If c = 0, reveal the permutation π and decommit all entries of the
adjacency matrix of G0. Otherwise, if c = 1, reveal only the commitments to
entries that correspond to the cycle C, i.e., (π(i),π(j)) where (i,j) ∈ C.
6. V : Accept if c = 0 and π(G) = G0, or if c = 1 and the revealed entries correspond
to a simple cycle of length n. (Also, check that the revealed committed values
are valid.) Otherwise, reject.
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The hiding and binding properties of the commitment scheme Comx translates to the
zero knowledge and soundness properties of protocol (P,V ), respectively.
PROPOSITION 2.5.2
(Based on [Blu].) If Comx is an instance-dependent commitment scheme for problem Π ∈ NP,
then Protocol 2.5.1 is:
I statistical [resp., computational] zero knowledge if Comx is statistically [resp., computa-
tionally] hiding on the YES instances, and
I a proof [resp., argument] system if Comx is statistically [resp., computationally] binding
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An immediate corollary of the above proposition is that standard commitments are
also suﬃcient for zero-knowledge protocols for NP, because standard commitments are
stronger than instance-dependent commitments. Standard commitments, however, require
complexity assumptions, whereas instance-dependent commitments sometimes do not.
COROLLARY 2.5.3
I If there exist commitment schemes that are statistically [resp., computationally] hiding
and statistically binding, then there exist statistical [resp., computational] zero-knowledge
proof systems for all of NP.
I If there exist commitment schemes that are statistically [resp., computationally] hiding and
computationally binding, then there exist statistical [resp., computational] zero-knowledge
argument systems for all of NP.
Because the main ideas behind Proposition 2.5.2 have been presented by Blum [Blu]
and clariﬁed in many other works (e.g., [Gol2, BL, BLV]), we only give a proof sketch of
this proposition.
Proof Sketch of Proposition 2.5.2. It is straightforward to see that Protocol 2.5.1 has perfect
completeness. We argue the zero knowledge and soundness properties as follows.
Zero knowledge. Let us analyze the veriﬁer’s view at the end of the interaction. If c = 0,
then all it sees is a random permutation π of the graph G, which it can clearly generate
on its own. Otherwise, if c = 1, then it just sees a random simple cycle of length n.
This is because the cycle C in G has been permuted into a random cycle π(C) in
G0 = π(G). Again, it can clearly generate a random cycle on its own.
Soundness. Consider a cheating prover P∗ and the case where x ∈ ΠN, which translates
to the graph G not having a Hamiltonian cycle. We claim that after the prover
P∗ has committed to the adjacency matrix of any graph G0 (not necessarily one
chosen according to the protocol), then it cannot answer both the veriﬁer’s challenges
c = 0 and c = 1 in a way that makes the veriﬁer accept, unless P∗ breaks the
binding property of the commitment (which happens with negligible probability). For
simplicity, assume the commitments are always binding. If P∗ can successfully answer
to c = 0, then there is a permutation π of G such that π(G) = G0, and hence we know
that G and G0 are isomorphic graphs. If P∗ can also successfully answer to c = 1,
then there is a Hamiltonian cycle in G0. Consequently, graph G, being isomorphic to
G0, has a Hamiltonian cycle too, which contradicts the case where x ∈ ΠN.
To reduce the soundness error while maintaining the zero knowledge property and round
complexity, we repeat Protocol 2.5.1 a total of O(logn) times in parallel (cf., [BL, BLV]).40 CHAPTER 2 / A TOUR OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
Conclusion. We conclude this chapter with the following observation based on Proposi-
tion 2.5.2.
An instance-dependent commitment scheme for a problem in NP is suﬃcient
to unconditionally construct a zero-knowledge protocol for that problem, and
that the hiding and binding properties of the commitment scheme translates
to the zero knowledge and soundness properties of the constructed protocol,
respectively.
In the next chapter, we begin our technical exposition of the results contained in this
dissertation, starting with statistically-hiding commitments and statistical zero-knowledge
protocols.3
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STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
The two main focuses of this present chapter is the complexity of statistically-hiding commit-
ment schemes, and the relationship between statistically-hiding commitments and statistical
zero-knowledge protocols. For the ﬁrst, we investigate the minimal complexity assumption
needed to construct statistically-hiding commitments, and prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 3.0.4
(First appeared in [HR2, Thm.1.1].) If one-way functions exist, then there exist commitment
schemes that are statistically hiding and computationally binding. Moreover, the commitment
schemes obtained are public coin.
For the second, we study the relationship between statistically-hiding commitments and
statistical zero-knowledge protocols. In Section 2.5, we showed that instance-dependent
commitments for a problem Π ∈ NP that are statistical hiding on the YES instances and
statistically binding on the NO instances imply that Π has a statistical zero-knowledge
proof system (i.e., Π ∈ SZKP). Here, we prove the converse.
THEOREM 3.0.5
Every problem in SZKP has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically
hiding on the YES instances and statistically binding on the NO instances. Moreover, this
instance-dependent commitment scheme is public coin and is constant round.
These are the two main theorems developed in this chapter. It will be helpful to keep
these theorems in mind as they are used to establish the results in Chapter 4.
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Chapter organization. The complexity of statistically-hiding commitment schemes, the
ﬁrst focus of this chapter, is explored in Sections 3.1 through 3.5. In Section 3.1, we re-
view the history of the construction of statistically-hiding commitments from a complexity-
theoretic viewpoint. After that, we work progressively towards lowering the complexity as-
sumptions needed to construct statistically-hiding commitments: in Section 3.2, we present
a construction based on one-way permutations; in Section 3.3, we show a construction
based on regular one-way functions with known preimage size; in Section 3.4, we give a
construction based on regular one-way functions with unknown preimage size; and ﬁnally
in Section 3.5, we develop a construction based on any one-way function, which is the
minimal complexity assumption needed [IL].
The second focus of this chapter, explored in Section 3.6, is the relationship between
statistically-hiding commitments and statistical zero-knowledge protocols. In that section,
we construct instance-dependent commitment schemes for any problem in SZKP; our con-
struction is unconditional in that it does not rely on any unproven complexity assumptions.
3.1 A Complexity-Theoretic History
Unlike their computational counterpart (namely, computationally-hiding commitments)
whose existence has been shown to be equivalent to the existence of one-way functions
by 1990 [HILL, Nao], the complexity of statistically-hiding commitments was still an open
problem up till very recently. The early constructions of statistically-hiding commitments
were based on speciﬁc number-theoretic complexity assumptions like hardness of factor-
ing large integers [BCC] and hardness of discrete logarithm [BKK, CDG, Ped].1 Later
constructions have reduced the complexity assumption to any family of claw-free permuta-
tions [GK1], and then to any collision-resistant hash family [NY] (see also [DPP]).2 All
these assumptions, explicitly or implicitly, have a collision resistance property attached to
them, and for quite a while it seemed that this property might be necessary for statistically-
hiding commitments.
In 1992, Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan and Yung [NOVY] dispelled the idea that a colli-
sion resistance criterion is needed by giving an elegant construction of statistically-hiding (in
fact, perfectly-hiding) commitments from any one-way permutation.3 They left as an open
question whether statistically-hiding commitments can be based on any one-way function,
the minimal complexity assumption needed [IL]. The ﬁrst progress in the past decade came
1The constructions of Boyar et al. [BKK], Chaum et al. [CDG] and Pedersen [Ped] yield perfectly-hiding
commitments. In perfectly-hiding schemes, commitments to any message are identically distributed.
2The fact that claw-free permutations imply a collision-resistant hash family was shown in [GMR2,
Dam1], and the early constructions of claw-free permutations based on speciﬁc number-theoretic complexity
assumptions were given by [GMR2, BKK].
3A one-way permutation is a one-way function that is also a permutation. We note that one-way
permutations and collision-resistant hashing are known to be incomparable under black-box reductions [Sim,
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in 2005 when Haitner et al. [HHK+] constructed statistically-hiding commitments from any
regular one-way function with known preimage size.4 (Actually, their construction is more
general in that in works for any approximable preimage size one-way function, which is a
one-way function where we can eﬃciently approximate the preimage size of points in the
range.)
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Figure 3.1: A complexity-theoretic history of statistically-hiding commitments.
Inspired by this recent development, we construct a relaxed variant of statistically-
hiding commitment schemes called 1-out-of-2-binding commitments (a notion introduced
by Nguyen and Vadhan [NV]), based on any one-way function. These commitments have
a weaker 1-out-of-2 binding property, a notion that will be discussed in Section 3.4.1. Up
till very recently, we do not know if these 1-out-of-2-binding commitments would yield
commitments with the standard binding property. Nevertheless, it turns out that 1-out-
of-2-binding commitments suﬃce for obtaining statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all
of NP, and thus our result shows that statistical zero-knowledge arguments for NP can be
based on any one-way function (Theorem 1.2.5).
Building on our result, Haitner and Reingold [HR2] settled the complexity of statistically-
hiding commitments by providing an elegant transformation technique converting 1-out-
4A regular one-way function is a one-way function where all points in the range have the same preimage
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of-2-binding commitments into commitments with the standard binding property. Their
transformation uses a novel application of a universal one-way hash family, a cryptographic
primitive that can constructed from any one-way function [Rom] (see also [KK]).
Figure 3.1 summarizes the complexity-theoretic history of statistically-hiding commit-
ment schemes as presented in this section. The dotted arrows in Figure 3.1 indicate trivial
implications, and the section numbers, preceded by the symbol §, indicate where those
results are presented in this chapter.
3.2 From One-Way Permutations
Consider a one-way permutation f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n. Naor, Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and
Yung [NOVY] obtained a statistically-hiding commitment scheme based on f by using a
protocol called interactive hashing as a subroutine. Our agenda for this section is as follows:
we will ﬁrst informally describe interactive hashing and state the two main properties that
we want from it; then, in Section 3.2.1 we give an informal description of the Naor et al.
scheme, henceforth called the NOVY commitment scheme; and ﬁnally, in Section 3.2.2, we
give a formal deﬁnition of interactive hashing and a protocol satisfying that deﬁnition.
Interactive hashing is a protocol between a sender SIH and receiver RIH. The sender
begins with a private input z, and at the end both parties outputs z0 and z1 such that
z ∈ {z0,z1}. Informally, an interactive hashing protocol has the following two properties:
1. Hiding: if the sender’s private input z is uniformly random, then every receiver, even
computationally-unbounded malicious ones, does not learn which of z0 or z1 equals
to z, and
2. Binding: the sender, including PPT malicious ones, can only control the value of at
most one of the two outputs, and the value of the other output that it does not control
is uniformly distributed.
3.2.1 The NOVY commitment scheme
Using an interactive hashing protocol as a subroutine, Naor et al. [NOVY] constructed the
following statistically-hiding commitment scheme.
1. S chooses a uniform x ← {0,1}n, and computes z = f(x).
2. S and R engage in an interactive hashing protocol. Let z0 and z1 be the common
outputs, and let z = zd, for some d ∈ {0,1}, be S’s private output.
3. To commit to bit b, S sends c = b ⊕ d to R.
4. To decommit, S sends b, c, d, and x to R. R veriﬁes the decommitment by checking
if c = b ⊕ d and zd = f(x).3.2 FROM ONE-WAY PERMUTATIONS 45
Let us informally argue why the above scheme constitutes a statistically-hiding and
computationally-binding commitment. First, we argue its hiding property. We have men-
tioned that z is uniform in {0,1}n because f is a permutation and x is chosen uniformly in
{0,1}n. By the hiding property of interactive hashing, even a computationally-unbounded
malicious receiver does not know if z = z0 or z = z1, or equivalently, it does not know if
d = 0 or d = 1. Therefore, the scheme is statistically hiding. Next, we argue its binding
property. By the binding property of interactive hashing, at least one of the outputs, say
zα, is uniform in {0,1}n and outside the sender’s control. Therefore if the sender is able
to decommit to both 0 and 1, it must ﬁnd a preimage of zα. This is equivalent to ﬁnd-
ing a preimage of f(Un), and this task is computationally infeasible since f is a one-way
permutation. Hence, the scheme is computationally binding.
3.2.2 Interactive hashing
Interactive hashing was introduced by Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and Yung [OVY] in the con-
text of oblivious transfer protocols. Although we do not study oblivious transfer, interactive
hashing will prove to be a powerful and useful tool in our construction of statistically-hiding
commitments based on any one-way function. For our application, we will need the sender
to commit to multiple bits in one execution of interactive hashing. Consequently, we ex-
tend the notion of interactive hashing to allow multiple outputs (instead of just two output
strings). Since the number of outputs could be possibly superpolynomial, we succinctly
describe the set of outputs as the image of a polynomial-sized circuit C: {0,1}k → {0,1}q,
where k and q are polynomially related to the security parameter.
In addition to allowing for multiple outputs, our application of interaction hashing also
requires a more reﬁned notion of computational binding that the one provided by Naor,
Ostrovsky, Venkatesan, and Yung [NOVY].5 It is for this reason we deﬁne the notion of
what it means to be a witness for a given relation W as follows: For a relation W, deﬁne the
set of witnesses for z as Wz = {x : W(z,x) = 1}, and we naturally refer to any x ∈ Wz
as a witness for z.
DEFINITION 3.2.1
An interactive hashing with multiple outputs protocol is a polynomial-time protocol
(SIH,RIH) where both parties receive common inputs (1q,1k) and SIH receives a private
input z ∈ {0,1}q. At the end of the interaction, the common output is a polynomial-sized
circuit C: {0,1}k → {0,1}q, and the private output of SIH is a string d ∈ {0,1}k. We call
q the input length, and k the output length. The protocol (SIH,RIH) has to satisfy the
following security properties.
5Although the notion of interactive hashing was introduced by Ostrovsky et al. [OVY], it was Naor et al.
[NOVY] who proved a computational binding property of interactive hashing that allows for its application
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1. Correctness: for all R∗ and all z ∈ {0,1}q, it is the case that C(d) = z, where
C = (SIH(z),R∗)(1q,1k) is the common output, and d = outputSIH(SIH(z),R∗) is the
private output of SIH.6
2. Hiding: for all R∗, random variables (V,Z) and (V,Uk) are identically distributed,
where the view of receiver R∗ is V = viewR∗(SIH(Uq),R∗), and the private output of
SIH is Z = outputSIH(SIH(Uq),R∗).
3. Binding: there exists an oracle PPT algorithm A such that for every adversary S∗ and
any relation W, denoting the common output as C = (S∗,RIH)(1q,1k), and private
output of S∗ as ((x0,d0),(x1,d1)) = outputS∗(S∗,RIH), if it is the case that
Pr[x0 ∈ WC(d0) ∧ x1 ∈ WC(d1) ∧ d0 6= d1] > ε ,
where the above probability is over the coins of RIH and S∗, then it is also the case
that
Pr
z←{0,1}q[AS∗
(z,1q,1k,ε) ∈ Wz] > 2−k · (ε/q)O(1) .
REMARK 3.2.2
We make three remarks regarding Deﬁnition 3.2.1.
1. The security requirements should hold for computationally unbounded R∗ (for cor-
rectness and hiding) and computationally unbounded S∗. In addition, the relation W
need not be polynomial-time computable.
2. To simplify notation, we often write AS∗
(z), or even A(z), to denote AS∗
(z,1q,1k,ε).
Since we are dealing with nonuniform security (see discussion in Section 2.3.4), we
can hardwire the (approximate) value of ε as nonuniform advice.
3. Although the private output of the honest sender SIH is always a string d, the private
output of the cheating sender S∗ is arbitrary; hence, we can assume without loss
of generality that S∗ breaks binding by producing two pairs of strings (x0,d0) and
(x1,d1).
The interactive hashing protocol given in [OVY, NOVY], henceforth called the NOVY
Interactive Hashing, satisﬁes Deﬁnition 3.2.1 with k = 1. To obtain an interactive hashing
with multiple outputs protocol (i.e., the case when k > 1), we simply end the NOVY
Interactive Hashing protocol k − 1 rounds earlier.
6The correctness property of protocols is typically deﬁned for honest parties, in our setting this would
be SIH and RIH. Our applications, however, need a stronger correctness property that would hold against
malicious receivers R
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Interactive hashing with multiple outputs (SIH,RIH).
Inputs:
1. Input length 1q and output length 1k, both given as common input.
2. String z ∈ {0,1}q, given as private input to sender SIH.
Protocol:
RIH: Select h0,h1,...,hq−k−1 such that each hi is a random vector over GF[2] of the form
0i1{0,1}q−i−1 (i.e., i number of 0’s followed by a 1, and random choice for the last
q − i − 1 positions).
For j = 0,...,q − k − 1, do the following:
RIH → SIH: Send hj.
SIH → RIH: Send cj = hhj,zi.
Output:
I Common output is a circuit C: {0,1}k → {0,1}q computing an aﬃne transformation
whose image is {z : hhj,zi = cj ∀j = 0,...,q − k − 1}.
I Private output of SIH is a string d ∈ {0,1}k such that C(d) = z. (In fact, d can be
taken to be the last k bits of z.)
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We defer the proof that Protocol 3.2.3 satisﬁes Deﬁnition 3.2.1 to Appendix A.1, as it is
just an extension of the proof given in [NOVY]; here we just state the theorem that follows.
THEOREM 3.2.4
There exists an interactive hashing with multiple outputs protocol, namely Protocol 3.2.3.
Information-theoretic bounds
We think of the string d as a k-bit string commitment associated to one of the 2k outputs
strings, namely z = C(d), and a witness x ∈ Wz = WC(d) as a decommitment to d.
Intuitively, the knowledge of x gives the sender the ability to decommit to d. The binding
property, read in its contrapositive, says that if it is hard to ﬁnd a witness for a uniformly
random string z, then it is hard for a sender to successfully decommit to two diﬀerent values.
Notice that this property holds even if the set of z’s for which is it hard to ﬁnd a witness is
not ﬁxed in advance, but depends on the algorithm trying to ﬁnd a witness for z (namely,48 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
an element in Wz). In several places, however, we will only need the special case of a static
set of z’s as captured in the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.2.5
(Binding for Static Sets.) For any protocol (SIH,RIH) satisfying the binding condition of Def-
inition 3.2.1, the following holds: For all S∗ and any set Γ ⊆ {0,1}q, denoting the common
output as C = (S∗,RIH)(1q,1k), we have
Pr[∃d0 6= d1 such that C(d0),C(d1) ∈ Γ] < (µ(Γ) · 2k)Ω(1) · poly(q) ,
where the above probability is taken over the coins of S∗ and RIH.
Setting k = 1 in the above lemma gives an information-theoretic bound of the NOVY In-
teractive Hashing; information-theoretic bounds on NOVY Interactive Hashing were studied
in the context of memory-bounded oblivious transfer [CCM, DHRS, CS]. Our bound is not
tight, but suﬃces for our applications. For tighter bounds, we refer the reader to [CCM, CS],
or for a constant-round interactive hashing protocol that is binding for static sets, we refer
the reader to [DHRS].
Compare the bound of the Lemma 3.2.5 to the case where the adversarial sender S∗ had
control of only one output string. This means that the rest of the 2k −1 outputs strings are
distributed uniformly on {0,1}q, and hence the bound would be µ(Γ)·(2k −1). The reason
for this is that S∗ will make the string that it controls lie in Γ, and the probability that at
least one of the rest of the 2k −1 strings lie in Γ is at most µ(Γ)·(2k −1), by a union bound
argument. The above bound is almost as good, and in particular if µ(Γ) is negligible and k
logarithmic, both probabilities are negligible.
Proof of Lemma 3.2.5. Deﬁne the relation W = {(a,b) : a ∈ Γ}, that is W(a,b) = 1 if a ∈ Γ
(for all values of b), and 0 if a / ∈ Γ (no matter what the value of b is). Suppose there exists an
S∗ that with probability ε, produces two elements d0 6= d1 such that both C(d0),C(d1) ∈ Γ.
Then, by the binding condition of Deﬁnition 3.2.1, there will be a procedure that is given
a random z ← {0,1}q makes z ∈ Γ with probability 2−k · (ε/q)O(1). Since Γ is a ﬁxed set,
it must be the case that 2−k · (ε/q)O(1) ≤ µ(Γ). This implies that ε < (µ(Γ) · 2k)c · poly(q),
for some constant c > 0. 
3.3 From Regular One-Way Functions with Known Preimage
Size
Our ﬁrst hurdle is to relax the permutation structure of f to just assuming that f is a
regular one-way function with known preimage size of say 2n−t, for some known value of
t ∈ {1,2,...,n}. This is the setting considered by Haitner et al. [HHK+], and we review3.3 FROM REGULAR ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS WITH KNOWN PREIMAGE SIZE 49
ideas from their construction in this section. To simplify the construction and analysis,
we further assume f has a known superpolynomial security s(n) = nω(1). (We stress that
Haitner et al. [HHK+] does not make this assumption.)
Observe that the statistical hiding property of the NOVY commitment scheme based on
one-way permutation f only rely on the fact that f is a permutation because we require that
f(Un) be uniform. Now if f just a regular function, then f(Un) might no longer be uniform,
but instead all we can say is that f(Un) is a ﬂat distribution with support Supp(f(Un)) of
size 2t. We will use pairwise-independent hash functions, a notion to be discussed next, to
obtain an almost-uniform distribution from f(Un).
3.3.1 Hashing and randomness extraction
A family of hash functions H = {h : {0,1}n → {0,1}m} is pairwise independent if for
any two x 6= x0 ∈ {0,1}n and any two y,y0 ∈ {0,1}m, when we randomly choose h ← H,
we have Pr[h(x) = y and h(x0) = y0] = 2−2m.
An example of a pairwise-independent family of hash functions is the family H =
{ha,b: {0,1}n → {0,1}m}, where ha,b(x) = (a · x + b)|m, arithmetic is done in the ﬁeld
GF(2n), and |m denote taking the ﬁrst m bits. We deﬁne `(n,m) to be the number of bits
required to describe an element of the hash function family H. In our example, it takes
2n bits to describe each hash function ha,b since both a and b are elements of GF(2n);
hence, we now know that a family of pairwise-independent hash functions H mapping n-
bit strings to m-bit strings exists with `(n,m) = 2n. We will use the following property
of pairwise-independent hash functions to obtain an almost-uniform random variable from
a random variable with suﬃcient min-entropy. (The deﬁnition of min-entropy is given in
Section 2.2.1.)
LEMMA 3.3.1
(Leftover Hash Lemma [BBR, ILL].) Let random variable H denote a uniformly random hash
function from a family of pairwise-independent hash functions H mapping n-bit strings to m-
bit strings, and let X be a random variable taking values in {0,1}n. For any ε > 0, if the
min-entropy H∞(X) ≥ m + 2log(1/ε), and H is independent from X, then random variable
(H,H(X)) is ε-close in statistical distance to uniform.
3.3.2 The commitment scheme
Let us return to our regular one-way function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n with known preimage
size 2n−t and known security s(n) = nω(1).7 Consider a family of pairwise-independent
hash functions H =

h: {0,1}n → {0,1}t−∆	
, where t = H(f(Un)) and ∆ = 1
2 logs(n). Let
7To avoid introducing new parameters, we consider only length-preserving functions, that is |f(x)| = |x|
for all x ∈ {0,1}
∗. Our construction, nevertheless, can be easily generalized to regular one-way functions
that are not length preserving.50 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
random variable H represent a random hash function selected from H. By the Leftover Hash
Lemma 3.3.1, random variable Z = (H,H(f(Un))) is (1/s(n))Ω(1)-close to uniform, which in
turn is statistically close to uniform since s(n) = nω(1). So if we designate z = (h,h(f(x)))
as the sender’s private input to the interactive hashing protocol (Protocol 3.2.3), even an
all-powerful receiver will not get more than a negligible advantage to guess which one of
the outputs is z. This hints to the following commitment scheme.
PROTOCOL 3.3.2                                         
Commitment scheme (S,R) based on a regular one-way function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n with
known preimage size 2n−t and known security s(n) = nω(1).
Commit stage.
1. Let H =

h: {0,1}n → {0,1}t−∆	
, where t = H(f(Un)) and ∆ = 1
2 logs(n). S
selects a uniform x ← {0,1}n and hash function h ← H, and computes y = f(x)
and z = (h,h(y)).
2. S and R engage in interactive hashing (Protocol 3.2.3) with S acting as SIH, R
acting as RIH, parameters k = 1 and q = |z|, and SIH having private input z.
Their common output is a circuit C: {0,1} → {0,1}q, and the sender receives a
bit d ∈ {0,1} such that C(d) = z.
3. To commit to the bit b, S sends c = d ⊕ b to R. The commitment of b is
represented as the pair (C,c).
Reveal stage. To decommit, S sends bits b and d, string x, and hash function h to R. R
veriﬁes the decommitment by checking if c = d ⊕ b and C(d) = (h,h(f(x))).
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As we have argued previously, the sender’s private input z is statistically close to uni-
form, and hence by the hiding property of interactive hashing, this implies that the com-
mitment scheme is statistically hiding. As for the binding property, the one-wayness of f
intuitively guarantees that the set Γ of w’s for which a sender S∗ can compute an element
of f−1(w) is of density at most 1/s(n) in the range of f, that is the size of Γ is at most
2H(f(Un))−logs(n). Thus for any ﬁxed h, the fraction of z = (h,h(w)) such that w ∈ Γ is at
most 2H(f(Un))−logs(n)/2t−∆ = s(n)−1/2 = neg(n). By the binding property of interactive
hashing (refer to Lemma 3.2.5), the probability that S∗ can force both C(0),C(1) ∈ Γ is
negligible and hence, the scheme is computationally binding. The complete argument to
prove the binding property is actually more subtle because the set Γ is not actually ﬁxed
in advance, and so we need to employ the binding property given in Deﬁnition 3.2.1.3.4 FROM REGULAR ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS WITH UNKNOWN PREIMAGE SIZE 51
3.4 From Regular One-Way Functions with Unknown
Preimage Size
Our next hurdle is to remove to the constraint on knowing (i.e., being able to eﬃciently
compute) the preimage size. For this setting, let us consider a regular one-way function
f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n with preimage size 2n−t, for an unknown8 value of t ∈ {1,2,...,n},
but with known security s(n) = nω(1).9 Constructing statistically-hiding commitments even
in this setting was still an open problem prior to our work.
Let us examine why we need to know the correct value of t in the previous scheme of
Protocol 3.3.2. If the value of t is too high, that is t  H(f(Un)), then the scheme is no
longer hiding (but would be binding). This is because the Leftover Hash Lemma 3.3.1 no
longer applies, since in this case the min-entropy H(f(Un)) is too small relative to t. On the
other hand, if the value of t is too low, that is t  H(f(Un)), then the scheme is no longer
binding (but would be hiding). To see this, at least intuitively, observe that when t is very
small, we are hashing f(Un) to a very small set {0,1}t−∆; in other words, h collapses too
many elements in f(Un). As a consequence, inverting h(f(Un)) could be easy (even though
inverting f(Un) is hard), and this allows us to break the binding property of our scheme.
All hope, however, is not lost. We can still use Protocol 3.3.2, trying all values of
t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, to do our ﬁrst phase commitments. And to overcome the diﬃculty of
ensuring both hiding and binding, we will introduce a second phase that will be binding
when t < ∼ H(f(Un)), and hiding when t > ∼ H(f(Un)); this is obtained by the sender using a
hash of the preimage x as an input to another execution of interactive hashing. This means
that for the right value of t = H(f(Un)), both phases will be hiding, but for any value of
t, at least one phase is binding. What we are describing here is a 2-phase commitment
scheme with a 1-out-of-2 binding property, notions that we formally deﬁne in the next
section.
3.4.1 2-phase commitment schemes
As mentioned previously, we will work with 2-phase commitment schemes, an alternate
variant of commitments introduced by Nguyen and Vadhan [NV]. These are commitment
schemes with two sequential and related stages such that in each stage, the sender commits
to and reveals a value.
8What we mean by unknown is that we are not able to compute the preimage size eﬃciently.
9Like in Section 3.3, we consider only length-preserving functions, that is |f(x)| = |x| for all x ∈ {0,1}
∗,
to avoid introducing new parameters. Our construction can nevertheless be easily generalized to regular
one-way functions that are not length preserving.52 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
DEFINITION 3.4.1
A 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R), with security parameter n and message lengths
(k1(n),k2(n)), consists of four interactive protocols: the ﬁrst commitment stage (S1
c,R1
c),
the ﬁrst reveal stage (S1
r,R1
r), the second commitment stage (S2
c,R2
c), and the second reveal
stage (S2
r,R2
r). For us, both reveal phases will always be noninteractive, consisting of a
single message from the sender to the receiver.
1. In the ﬁrst commitment stage, S1
c receives a private input σ(1) ∈ {0,1}k1 and coin
tosses rS. At the end of the interaction, both S1
c and R1
c output a commitment
c(1). (Without loss of generality, we can assume that c(1) is the transcript of the ﬁrst
commitment stage.)
2. In the ﬁrst (noninteractive) reveal stage, both S1
r and R1
r receive as common inputs
the commitment c(1), and S1
r receives as private input its previous coin tosses rS. S1
r
sends R1
r a pair (σ(1),γ(1)) with γ(1) interpreted as a decommitment for σ(1) ∈ {0,1}k1.
R1
r accepts or rejects based on c(1), σ(1), and γ(1). After that, both S1
r and R1
r outputs
a string τ. (Without loss of generality, we can assume that τ is the transcript of the
ﬁrst commitment stage and the ﬁrst reveal stage and includes R1
r’s decision to accept
or reject.)
3. In the second commitment stage, both S2
c and R2
c receive as common input the string
τ, and S2
c receives a private input σ(2) ∈ {0,1}k2 and its previous coin tosses rS. At
the end of the interaction, both S2
c and R2
c output a commitment c(2). (Without loss
of generality, we can assume that c(2) is the concatenation of τ and the transcript of
the second commitment stage.)
4. In the second (noninteractive) reveal stage, both S2
r and R2
r receive as common input
the commitment c(2), and S2
r receives as private input its previous coin tosses rS. S2
r
sends R2
r a pair (σ(2),γ(2)) with γ(2) interpreted as a decommitment for σ(2) ∈ {0,1}k2.
R2
r accepts or rejects based on c(2), σ(2), and γ(2).
I We insist that scheme (S,R) have perfect completeness. That is to say, if both
sender S and receiver R follow their prescribed strategy, then R will always accept
(with probability 1).
I The sender and receiver’s algorithms, denoted by S = (S1,S2) = ((S1
c,S1
r),(S2
c,S2
r))
and R = (R1,R2) = ((R1
c,R1
r),(R2
c,R2
r)) respectively, are computable in polynomial
time.
I Scheme (S,R) is public coin if all messages sent by R to S are independent random
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REMARK 3.4.2
We make several remarks regarding Deﬁnition 3.4.1.
1. We generally consider schemes that have the same message length for both phases.
When this is the case, namely k = k1 = k2, we say our 2-phase commitment scheme
has message length k. It is only in Section 3.5.5 that we will use this feature of
diﬀerent message lengths.
2. Instead of providing sender S with decommitment values as private outputs of the
commitment phases, we simply provide it with the same coin tosses rS throughout
(so it can recompute any private state from the transcripts of the previous phases).
The receiver R, however, operates using independent coin tosses in each phase as it
does not need to keep private states.
3. The 2-phase commitment schemes that we construct will be public coin scheme where
the receiver R strategy is just to send random coins in each round.
Hiding for 2-phase commitment schemes. As for standard commitment schemes,
we deﬁne the security of the sender in terms of a hiding property. Stated informally, the
hiding property for a 2-phase commitment scheme says that both commitment phases are
hiding. Note that since the phases are run sequentially, the hiding property for the second
commitment stage is required to hold even given the receiver’s view of the ﬁrst stage.
DEFINITION 3.4.3
2-phase commitment scheme (S,R), with security parameter n and message lengths
(k1(n),k2(n)), is statistically hiding if for all adversarial receiver R∗,
1. The views of R∗ when interacting with the sender in the ﬁrst phase on any two mes-
sages are statistically indistinguishable. Namely, for all σ(1),e σ(1) ∈ {0,1}k1, the prob-
ability ensembles

viewR∗(S1
c(σ(1)),R∗)(1n)
	
n∈N and

viewR∗(S1
c(e σ(1)),R∗)(1n)
	
n∈N
are statistically indistinguishable.
2. The views of R∗ when interacting with the sender in the second phase are statisti-
cally indistinguishable no matter what the sender committed to in the ﬁrst phase.
Namely, for all σ(1) ∈ {0,1}k1, and all σ(2),e σ(2) ∈ {0,1}k2, the probability ensem-
bles

viewR∗(S2
c(σ(2)),R∗)(T,1n)
	
n∈N and

viewR∗(S2
c(e σ(2)),R∗)(T,1n)
	
n∈N, where
T = transcript(S1(σ(1)),R∗)(1n), are statistically indistinguishable.
We stress that the second condition of the above hiding deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 3.4.3)
requires that the view of receiver in the second phase be indistinguishable for any two
messages even given the transcript of the ﬁrst phase, T = transcript(S1(σ(1)),R∗)(1n).54 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
1-out-of-2 binding for 2-phase commitment schemes. The 1-out-of-2 binding prop-
erty, informally stated, says that at least one of the two commitment phases is binding.
In other words, for every (nonuniform PPT) malicious sender S∗, at most one of the two
phases is bad in that S∗ can decommit a given commitment to two diﬀerent messages in
that phase. We allow this bad phase to be determined dynamically by S∗. Moreover, we
require that the second phase be statistically binding if the sender breaks the ﬁrst phase.
Our construction achieves this stronger property, and using it simpliﬁes some of our proofs.
DEFINITION 3.4.4
2-phase commitment scheme (S,R), with security parameter n and message lengths
(k1(n),k2(n)), is statistically [resp., computationally] 1-out-of-2 binding if there
exist a set B of ﬁrst phase transcripts and a negligible function ε(n) such that:
1. For all [resp., nonuniform PPT] adversary S∗, S∗ succeeds in the following game with
probability at most ε(n) for all suﬃciently large n:10
(a) S∗ and R1
c interact and output a ﬁrst-phase commitment c(1).
(b) S∗ outputs two full transcripts λ = (τ,κ) and e λ = (e τ,e κ) of both phases with the
following three properties:
I Transcripts λ and e λ both start with preﬁx c(1).
I Transcript λ contains a successful opening of c(1) to the value σ(1) ∈ {0,1}k1
using a ﬁrst-phase transcript τ not in B, and R1
r and R2
r both accept in λ.
I Transcript e λ contains a successful opening of c(1) to the value e σ(1) ∈ {0,1}k1
using a ﬁrst-phase transcript e τ not in B, and R1
r and R2
r both accept in e λ.
(c) S∗ succeeds if all of the above conditions hold and σ(1) 6= e σ(1).
2. For every (even computationally unbounded) sender S∗, the ﬁrst-phase transcripts
in B make the second phase statistically binding. In other words, for all S∗ and all
τ ∈ B, with probability at least 1 − ε(n) over c(2) = (S∗,R2
c)(τ), there is at most one
value σ(2) ∈ {0,1}k2 such that outputR(S∗,R2
r)(c(2),σ(2)) = accept.
REMARK 3.4.5
For computationally 1-out-of-2 binding schemes, we require that Condition 1 holds against
(nonuniform) PPT adversaries, but Condition 2 must hold against all, computationally-
unbounded adversaries. For statistically 1-out-of-2 binding schemes, we require that both
Conditions 1 and 2 hold against computationally-unbounded adversaries.
10Deﬁnitions of cryptographic primitives in the literature often use the reverse order of quantiﬁers, asking
that for every (nonuniform) PPT adversary S
∗, there exists a negligible function ε(n) such that the success
probability of S
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3.4.2 Our 2-phase commitment scheme
We now describe our 2-phase commitment scheme for general functions f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n,
not necessarily regular nor one-way—as we shall later see, it is the regularity condition that
gives the hiding property, and the one-wayness of the function that gives the binding prop-
erty of our scheme. Let H = {h: {0,1}n → {0,1}m} be a family of pairwise-independent
hash functions. As shown in Section 3.3.1, we have a family whose description of each
element takes `(n,m) = 2n bits. It will be convenient to make `(n,m)+m = q(n), for some
ﬁxed polynomial q(n), so that for every y ∈ {0,1}n, |h,h(y)| = q(n). This can be done by
padding random bits to the description of h.
In addition, it will be convenient to work with protocols where the sender has no input
σ(j) to be committed to, but rather privately receives an output d(j) at the end of each
phase j ∈ {1,2} of the commitment. If we can ensure that d(j) is close to uniform given the
receiver’s view, such a protocol can be easily tuned into a commitment scheme: the sender
can commit to an σ(j) of its choice by sending d(j) ⊕ σ(j) at the end of the commit stage.
PROTOCOL 3.4.6                                         
2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) based on f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n.
Parameters: Integers t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, k1 = k2 = k ∈ {1,2,...,n}, ∆1 ∈ {0,1,...,t}, and
∆2 ∈ {0,1,...,n − t}.
Sender’s private input: String x ∈ {0,1}n. (Note that this is not the value to which the
sender is committing, but is rather part of its coins, which will be chosen uniformly
at random by S unless otherwise speciﬁed.)
First phase commit:
1. S1
c sets y = f(x).
2. Let H1 = {h1: {0,1}n → {0,1}t−∆1} be a family of pairwise-independent hash
functions. S1
c chooses a random hash h1 ← H1, and computes v = (h1,h1(y)) ∈
{0,1}q.
3. (S1
c,R1
c) run the interactive hashing protocol (SIH(v),RIH)(1q,1k), given by Pro-
tocol 3.2.3, with S1
c and R1
c acting as SIH and RIH respectively.
Let circuit C(1): {0,1}k → {0,1}q be the common output and d(1) ∈ {0,1}k be
SIH’s private output in (SIH(v),RIH)(1q,1k).
First phase sender’s private output: String d(1) ∈ {0,1}k.
First phase reveal:
S1
r sends the tuple γ(1) = (d(1),y,h1).
Receiver R1
r accepts if and only if C(1)(d(1)) = (h1,h1(y)).56 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Second phase commit:
Second phase common input: First-phase transcript τ = transcript(S1(x),R1), which
in particular includes the string y.
1. Let H2 = {h2: {0,1}n → {0,1}n−t−∆2} be a family of pairwise-independent hash
functions. S2
c chooses a random hash h2 ← H2, and computes w = (h2,h2(x)) ∈
{0,1}q.
2. (S2
c,R2
c) run the interactive hashing protocol (SIH(w),RIH)(1q,1k), given by Pro-
tocol 3.2.3, with S2
c and R2
c acting as SIH and RIH respectively.
Let circuit C(2): {0,1}k → {0,1}q be the common output and d(2) ∈ {0,1}k be
SIH’s private output in (SIH(v),RIH)(1q,1k).
Second phase sender’s private output: String d(2) ∈ {0,1}k.
Second phase reveal:
S2
r sends the tuple γ(2) = (d(2),x,h2).
Receiver R2
r accepts if and only if f(x) = y and C(2)(d(2)) = (h2,h2(x)).
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THEOREM 3.4.7
If f is a regular one-way functions with known security s(n) = nω(1), then Protocol 3.4.6, with
setting of parameters t = H(f(Un)), k = O(logn), and ∆1 = ∆2 = 1
4 logs, is a 2-phase
commitment scheme that is statistically hiding and computationally 1-out-of-2 binding.
Because we do not know how to eﬃciently compute the correct value of t = H(f(Un)), we
are forced to try out all values of t = 1,2,...,n to get a collection of commitment schemes, as
stated in the next corollary. While having a collection of schemes instead of a single scheme
may seem disconcerting, it is possible to convert this collection of 2-phase commitments
into a single commitment scheme that is statistically hiding and computationally binding
(in the standard sense of binding); we show how to do this in Section 3.5.5 using the
Haitner & Reingold transformation [HR2].
COROLLARY 3.4.8
If regular one-way functions with known security s(n) = nω(1) exist, then on security parameter
1n, we can construct in time polynomial in n a collection of public-coin 2-phase commitment
schemes COM = {Com1,··· ,Comn}, such that:
I there exists an index i ∈ {1,2,...,n} such that scheme Comi is statistically hiding, and
I for every index i ∈ {1,2,...,n}, scheme Comi is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding.3.4 FROM REGULAR ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS WITH UNKNOWN PREIMAGE SIZE 57
We divide the proof of Theorem 3.4.7 into Lemma 3.4.9 and Lemma 3.4.10 that establish
the statistical hiding and computational 1-out-of-2 binding properties of Protocol 3.4.6,
respectively.
LEMMA 3.4.9
If f is a regular function, then Protocol 3.4.6, with setting of parameters t = H(f(Un)),
k < q(n), and ∆1 = ∆2 = ω(logn), is statistically hiding in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.3.
Proof. Since t = H(f(Un)), the Leftover Hash Lemma (Lemma 3.3.1) tells us that random
variable Z = (H1,H1(f(Un))) is 2−Ω(∆1)-close to the uniform. Then by the hiding property
of interactive hashing (Deﬁnition 3.2.1), the ﬁrst commitment phase is 2−Ω(∆1)-hiding, which
in turn is statistically hiding since ∆1 = ω(logn).
Let τ be the transcript of the ﬁrst phase and y the string sent in the ﬁrst reveal phase.
Let random variable X represent selecting at random a string from the set f−1(y). Since
X is a ﬂat source with entropy n − H(f(Un)) = n − t, and h2 maps to strings of length
n−t−∆2, we apply the Leftover Hash Lemma once more to conclude that random variable
W = (H2,H2(X)) is 2−Ω(∆2)-close to the uniform, even given τ. By the hiding property
of interactive hashing, the second commitment phase is 2−Ω(∆2)-hiding, which in turn is
statistically hiding since ∆2 = ω(logn). 
LEMMA 3.4.10
If f is a s(n)-secure one-way function (not necessarily regular), then for any value of t ∈
{1,2,...,n}, Protocol 3.4.6, with setting of parameters k = O(logn), ∆1 = ∆2 ≤ 1
4 log(s(n)),
is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.4.
The proof of Lemma 3.4.10 will be broken into Claim 3.4.11 and 3.4.12 that establish
the binding property for the ﬁrst and second phase, respectively. Before stating the claims,
we deﬁne the binding set B as follows:
For every t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, deﬁne the set of light strings to be Lt = {y ∈ {0,1}n :
Pr[f(Un) = y] ≤ 2−t−∆3}, for a parameter ∆3 that we will set at the end of the
proof. Deﬁne the binding set B to be the set of transcripts where the sender
reveals y ∈ Lt.
CLAIM 3.4.11
For the binding set B deﬁned above, if there exists a (nonuniform) PPT S∗ that succeeds with
probability ε in the game in Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 3.4.4, then there exists a nonuniform PPT
B that can invert f with success probability at least
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Proof. We deﬁne a relation W as follows:
W = {(v,x) : ∃h1 such that both v = (h1,h1(f(x))) and f(x) / ∈ Lt} .
Suppose we have a PPT S∗ that succeeds with probability greater than ε in the game
of in Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 3.4.4. In particular, this means that S∗ after interacting
with RIH will, with probability greater than ε, produce pairs (d
(1)
0 ,x0) and (d
(1)
1 ,x1) such
that d
(1)
0 6= d
(1)
1 , (C(1)(d0),x0) ∈ W, and (C(1)(d1),x1) ∈ W. By the binding property of
interactive hashing (Condition 3 of Deﬁnition 3.2.1), there exists a nonuniform PPT A such
that
Pr
v←{0,1}q[A(v) ∈ Wv] > 2−k

ε
q
O(1)
. (3.1)
Without loss of generality, we may assume A to be deterministic since it can nonuni-
formly ﬁx the random coins that maximize its success probability in (3.1). Hence, the
probability in (3.1) is just taken over a random v ← {0,1}q.
Let v = (h1,η) for some h1 ∈ H1 and η ∈ {0,1}t−∆1, and let x = A(v) = A(h1,η). If
x ∈ W(h1,η), then it is the case that η = h1(f(x)) and
Pr[h1(f(Un)) = η] ≥ Pr[f(Un) = f(x)] > 2−t−∆3 , (3.2)
with the last inequality following from f(x) / ∈ Lt.
Consider an algorithm B that on input y, picks a random hash function h1 ← H1, and
outputs A(h1,h1(y)). Observe that B successfully ﬁnds a preimage of y if A(h1,h1(y)) ∈
W(h1,h1(y)). We let η = h1(y), and compute the probability that B inverts f as follows:
Pr[B(f(Un)) ∈ f−1(f(Un))]
= E
h1←H1


X
η s.t. A(h1,η)∈W(h1,η)
Pr[h1(f(Un)) = η]


> E
h1←H1


X
η s.t. A(h1,η)∈W(h1,η)
2−t−∆3

 (by 3.2)
= 2−t−∆3 · 2t−∆1 · Pr
(h1,η)←H1×{0,1}t−∆1
[A(h1,η) ∈ W(h1,η)]
> 2−(∆1+∆3) · 2−k

ε
q
O(1)
(by 3.1)
= εO(1) · 1/poly(n) · 2−(k+∆1+∆3) (since q = poly(n)) . 
CLAIM 3.4.12
For the binding set B deﬁned above, Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 3.4.4 is satisﬁed with ε =
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Proof. Let y ∈ Lt be the string sent in the ﬁrst reveal phase. This means that Pr[f(Un) =
y] ≤ 2−t−∆3, or equivalently

f−1(y)

 ≤ 2n−t−∆3. Deﬁne set Γ = {(h2,h2(x)) : h2 ∈
H2,x ∈ f−1(y)}, and let µ(Γ) denote the density of the subset Γ. Since h2 maps {0,1}n to
{0,1}n−t−∆2, we have
µ(Γ) ≤

f−1(y)


2n−t−∆2 ≤
2n−t−∆3
2n−t−∆2 = 2(∆2−∆3) .
Applying Lemma 3.2.5, we have
Pr[(w0,w1) = output(S∗,RIH) satisﬁes w0,w1 ∈ Γ] < 2−Ω(∆3−∆2) · poly(q) ,
which then concludes our proof since q is a ﬁxed polynomial in n. 
Proof of Lemma 3.4.10. Set ∆3 = 1
2 logs(n), and we are given that k = O(logn), and ∆1 =
∆2 ≤ 1
4 log(s(n)). With this setting, Claim 3.4.12 shows that Condition 2 in Deﬁnition 3.4.4
is satisﬁed with ε(n) = poly(n) · 2−Ω(logs(n)) = neg(n), since s(n) = nω(1). Condition 1 of
Deﬁnition 3.4.4 is also satisﬁed with negligible probability ε(n) because otherwise f can be
inverted with probability
εO(1) · 1/poly(n) · 2−(k+∆1+∆3) ≥ εO(1) · 1/poly(n) · 2−(O(logn)+(3/4)·(logs(n)))
= εO(1) · 1/poly(n) · s(n)−3/4 ,
which is greater than 1/s(n) if ε is nonnegligible. 
3.5 From Any One-Way Function
Our ﬁnal hurdle is to remove the regularity assumption. It turns out that this is the most
technically challenging step. Similar to our construction from regular one-way functions
(with unknown preimage size) in Section 3.4, our construction based on any one-way func-
tion yields a collection 2-phase commitments, as stated below.
THEOREM 3.5.1
If one-way functions exist, then on security parameter 1n, we can construct in time polynomial
in n a collection of public-coin 2-phase commitment schemes COM = {Com1,··· ,Comm},
where m = poly(n), such that:
I there exists an index i ∈ {1,2,...,m} such that scheme Comi is statistically hiding, and
I for every index i ∈ {1,2,...,m}, scheme Comi is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding.
The above collection of 2-phase commitment schemes suﬃces for obtaining statistical
zero-knowledge arguments for all of NP (cf., [Ngu, Chap.6]). Hence, Theorem 3.5.1 suﬃces60 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
to establish Theorem 1.2.5, which states that statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all
of NP can be based on any one-way function.
We prove Theorem 3.5.1 in Sections 3.5.1 through 3.5.3. In Section 3.5.5, we present a
transformation technique, due to Haitner and Reingold [HR2], that takes the above collec-
tion of 2-phase commitment schemes and converts it into a single commitment scheme that
is statistically hiding and computationally binding (in the standard sense of binding). Do-
ing so would establish Theorem 3.0.4, one of the main theorems of this present chapter, and
would also provide an alternative way to establish Theorem 1.2.5 (since by Corollary 2.5.3,
statistically-hiding commitments imply statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all of NP).
3.5.1 Overview
We now present an overview of how we generalize our construction for regular one-way
functions with unknown preimage size (Protocol 3.4.6) to arbitrary one-way functions. As
shown in Lemma 3.4.10, this protocol already achieves 1-out-of-2 binding when f is any
one-way function (for every value of t). Thus the challenge is the hiding property. (Another
issue is that Protocol 3.4.6 requires a one-way function with known security. It turns out
that our method for handling the hiding property also eliminates the need to know the
security.)
As discussed in Section 3.4, for regular one-way functions with unknown preimage size,
Protocol 3.4.6 has a hiding ﬁrst phase when the parameter t satisﬁes t < ∼ H(f(Un)) and has
a hiding second phase when t satisﬁes t > ∼ H(f(Un)). Intuitively, when f is not regular, we
should replace the ﬁxed value H(f(Un)) with the dynamic value Hf(y)
def = log(1/Pr[f(Un) =
y]), where y = f(x) is the value chosen by the sender in the pre-processing step, because
Hf(y) can be viewed as measuring the amount of entropy in y. The approximable preimage-
size one-way functions studied by Haitner et al. [HHK+] come equipped with an algorithm
that estimates Hf(y), but for general one-way functions, this quantity may be infeasible to
compute.
A weakly-hiding scheme (details in Section 3.5.2). One natural approach is to have
the sender choose t at random and hope that it is close to Hf(y). When we choose t too
small, only the ﬁrst phase will be hiding, and when we choose t too large, only the second
phase will be hiding. But we have a nonnegligible probability of δ = 1/n that t ≈ Hf(y),
and thus both phases will be hiding. Thus we have a 1-out-of-2-binding commitment scheme
satisfying a weak hiding property, where with probability δ = 1/n, both phases are hiding,
and it is always the case that at least one phase is hiding. Actually, in order to simplify
our analysis, we will include t as a parameter to the protocol. Then there exists a choice
of t such that the protocol is weakly hiding in the sense above, and for all choices of t the
protocol is 1-out-of-2 binding. At the end, we will enumerate over all values of t, resulting
in a collection of commitment schemes as claimed in Theorem 3.5.1, albeit with a weak
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Unfortunately, we do not know how to directly construct zero-knowledge arguments
from weakly-hiding 1-out-of-2-binding commitments. Thus instead, much of the eﬀort in
this paper is devoted to amplifying the weak hiding property, where δ = 1/n, into a strong
hiding property, where δ = 1 − neg(n), while maintaining the 1-out-of-2 binding property.
Amplifying the hiding property (details in Section 3.5.3). We do not amplify the
hiding probability from δ = 1/n to δ = 1 − neg(n) in one shot, but instead perform a
sequence of logn iterations, each one of which increases δ by a roughly factor of 2. This
results in δ = Ω(1), and then we are able to get δ = 1−neg(n) in just one more ampliﬁcation
step.
How do we double δ? A natural idea is to consider several executions of the previous
weakly-hiding scheme. Speciﬁcally, if we take m = O(1) executions, the probability that at
least one of the executions has both phases hiding is roughly m · δ. Moreover, each of the
remaining m − 1 executions have either the ﬁrst phase hiding or the second phase hiding.
Thus for some value of β, there are β+1 ﬁrst phases that are hiding and m−β second phases
that are hiding. It turns out that we can choose β so that this exact (β+1,m−β) breakdown
given that one execution has both phases hiding occurs with probability Ω(1/
√
m). Thus
we are in the situation described with probability m · δ · Ω(1/
√
m) = Ω(
√
m · δ) > 2δ, for a
large enough constant m.
Now our aim is to combine the outcomes of the weakly-hiding schemes in such a way
that when the above-described situation occurs, which happens with probability at least
2δ, both phases are hiding. Notice that the secret values σ1,...,σm ∈ {0,1}k to which the
sender commits in the ﬁrst commit phases have entropy (even min-entropy) at least (β+1)·k
conditioned on the receiver’s view (because (β + 1) of them are hiding), and similarly the
sender’s secrets in the second commit phases have entropy at least (m−β)·k conditioned on
the receiver’s view. Let us compare this to the situation with binding. Since each execution
is 1-out-of-2 binding, a cheating polynomial-time sender can break the binding property for
either at most β of the ﬁrst phases or at most m − β − 1 of the second phases. Thus the
number of possible values to which the sender can open in each case is at most 2m · 2k·β in
the ﬁrst phase or at most 2k·(m−β−1), where the 2m factor in the ﬁrst bound comes from
the sender’s ability to choose which subset of executions to break (and it is this factor that
limits us to taking m to be a constant). We can view these as strong forms of entropy upper
bounds m + kβ and k · (m − β − 1). In at least one phase, there will be an entropy gap of
at least k − m.
How can we exploit these entropy gaps? It turns out that interactive hashing, again,
is a useful tool. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst phase we have the sender choose a random
pairwise-independent hash function h1 mapping to approximately (β + 1) · k bits and use
(h1,h1(σ1,...,σm)) as the input to the interactive hashing protocol, and analogously for
the second phase. By the Leftover Hash Lemma, this pairwise-independent hashing con-
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the interactive hashing hiding property applies. As for the binding property, the bound
on the number of the sender’s choices gets translated to saying that the sender’s input (in
the ﬁrst phase) comes from a set Γ of density 2−(k−m), so the interactive hashing binding
property applies. The analyses for the second phase are similar. Formalizing these ideas,
we get a new 1-out-of-2-binding commitment scheme in which both phases are hiding with
probability at least 2δ.
When we try to iterate this ampliﬁcation step O(logn) times, we run into a new diﬃculty.
Speciﬁcally, the above sketch hides the fact that we pay entropy losses of ω(logn) in both
the hiding and binding analyses. The entropy loss of ω(logn) in the hiding property comes
from the Leftover Hash Lemma, in order to ensure that (h1,h1(σ1,...,σm)) has negligible
statistical distance from uniform. The entropy loss of ω(logn) in the binding property
comes from needing the µ(Γ) · 2k factor to be negligible when applying Lemma 3.2.5. This
forces us to go, in one step of ampliﬁcation, from a commitment scheme for secrets of length
k to a scheme for secrets of length k − m − ω(logn). As in Lemma 3.4.10, we can take the
initial secret length to be k = Θ(logs(n)) = ω(log(n)) if the one-way function has known
security s(n) = nω(1). But to tolerate logn losses of ω(logn), we would need s(n) = nω(logn)
(i.e., at least quasipolynomial security).
To get around this diﬃculty, in the ampliﬁcation, we work with more relaxed, average-
case measures of entropy for both the hiding and binding analyses. Speciﬁcally, for hiding,
we keep track of the expected collision probability of the sender’s secret, conditioned on
the receiver’s view. (Actually, we use the expected square root of the collision probability.)
For binding, we work with the expected number of values to which the sender can open. In
both cases, we only require these expectations to be within a constant factor of the ideal
values, which are 2−k and 1 respectively. With these measures, it turns out that we need
only lose O(m) = O(1) bits in the entropy gap with each ampliﬁcation step. Moreover, once
we amplify δ to a constant, we can aﬀord to take the number of executions m to equal the
security parameter n and get an Ω(n)-bit entropy gap in the ﬁnal ampliﬁcation step. This
allows us to achieve exponentially strong statistical hiding even when we do not know the
security and start with secret length of k = O(logn).
The hiding analysis of the above construction works only for certain values of t in the
weakly-hiding scheme, and for certain values of the β’s in the ampliﬁcation steps. We try
out all possible values of t and β’s, thus obtaining a collection of poly(n) schemes, at least
one of which is strongly hiding and all of which are 1-out-of-2 binding. Notice that the
number of possible choices of t and the β’s are polynomial in n since t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, the
β’s in the each step except for the last is in the range {0,1,...,m − 1}, for some constant
m, and the last β is in the range {0,1,...,n}.
Converting 1-out-of-2-binding commitments to standard commitments (details
in Section 3.5.5). Having obtained this collection of poly(n) schemes, we use convert it
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using a transformation provided by Haitner and Reingold [HR2], henceforth called the
Haitner & Reingold transformation.
3.5.2 Weakly-hiding and 1-out-of-2-binding commitments
As discussed in Section 3.4, for the case of regular one-way functions with unknown preimage
size, Protocol 3.4.6 has a hiding ﬁrst phase when the parameter t satisﬁes t < ∼ H(f(Un)) and
has a hiding second phase when t satisﬁes t > ∼ H(f(Un)). When f is not regular, then there
will be one value of t ∈ {1,2,...,n} such that H(f(Un)) ≈ t with probability 1/n. This is
the case because there are only n possible choices for the value of t.
With this observation in mind, our 2-phase commitment scheme from general one-way
functions will be the same as the scheme in Protocol 3.4.6, with setting of parameters t = t0,
k = O(logn), and ∆1 = ∆2 = 2logn, for some t0 ∈ {1,2,...,n}. In other words, the same
scheme—with slightly diﬀerent setting of parameters—used in the case of regular one-way
functions is also applicable to general one-way functions.
This commitment scheme (using general one-way functions), as we will show, is compu-
tationally 1-out-of-2 binding, but only statistically hiding in both phases with probability
at least 1/n (hence, called weakly hiding). In order to obtain a tighter analysis when we
amplify this scheme, we depart from the standard measures of hiding and binding used in
Section 3.4. Instead, we measure the statistical hiding property of our 2-phase commitments
using the expected square root of the collision probability of the sender’s secret, denoted as
CP1/2, and deﬁned in Section 3.5.2. We measure the binding property by analyzing the
expected number of values to which an adversarial sender can open.
Later in Section 3.5.3, we show how to boost the statistical hiding probability to 1 −
2−Ω(n) while maintaining the computational 1-out-of-2 binding property.
Properties of collision probability
DEFINITION 3.5.2
For any random variable A, we deﬁne its collision probability as the probability that two
independent samples from A are equal. In other words,
CP(A)
def =
X
a∈Supp(A)
(Pr[A = a])
2 = E
a←A
[Pr[A = a]] .
Measuring the collision probability of a random variable is equivalent to measuring its
Renyi entropy of order 2, deﬁned as
H2(A) = log
1
Ea←A [Pr[A = a]]
= log
1
CP(A)
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DEFINITION 3.5.3
For any random variable A, we deﬁne its expected square root of the collision proba-
bility as
CP1/2(A)
def =
p
CP(A) .
For any two (possibly correlated) random variables A and B, we deﬁne
CP1/2(A|B)
def = E
b←B
h
CP1/2(A|B=b)
i
.
We think of CP1/2(A|B) ≤
√
2k as saying that A has conditional Renyi entropy of
at least k given B. We use the expected square root of the collision probability (as our
measure of hiding) instead of just expected collision probability in order to ensure that
conditioning on a random variable Z can only decrease the conditional Renyi entropy by at
most log(|Supp(Z)|) bits. (See Lemma 3.5.7 below for details.)
The following lemmas show that CP1/2 behaves nicely as an entropy measure. Proofs
are in Appendix A.2.
LEMMA 3.5.4
For independent pairs of random variables (X1,Y1),...,(Xm,Ym),
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym)) =
m Y
i=1
CP1/2(Xi|Yi) .
Note that Xi and Yi can be correlated, it is only required that the pair (Xi,Yi) be independent
from the other tuples.
In terms of conditional Renyi entropy, Lemma 3.5.4 states that the entropy is additive
for independent random variables. We will actually need a generalization of Lemma 3.5.4
to deal with somewhat dependent random variables, as stated in the next lemma.
LEMMA 3.5.5
Suppose random variables (X1,Y1),...,(Xm,Ym) satisfy the following conditions for some val-
ues of α1,...,αm ∈ R+ and all i = 1,2,...,m:
1. For every (y1,...,yi−1) ∈ Supp(Y1,Y2,...,Yi−1),
CP1/2(Xi|Y1=y1,...,Yi−1=yi−1 | Yi|Y1=y1,...,Yi−1=yi−1) ≤ αi .
2. For every (y1,...,yi) ∈ Supp(Y1,Y2,...,Yi), the i+1 random variables X1,X2,...,Xi,
and Yi+1 are independent, even if we condition on Y1 = y1,...,Yi = yi.3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 65
Then,
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym)) ≤
m Y
i=1
αi .
The next lemma shows that pairwise-independent randomness extraction (h,h(x)) pre-
serves the CP1/2 measure.
LEMMA 3.5.6
(Randomness Extraction Lemma.) Let (X,Y ) be any (possibly correlated) pair of random
variables, and let random variable H denote a random hash function from a family of pairwise-
independent hash functions H with range {0,1}α. Suppose the hash functions from H are
represented by (q − α)-bit strings and CP1/2(X|Y ) ≤
√
2−(α+3). If H is independent from
(X,Y ), then
CP1/2((H,H(X))|Y ) ≤
p
2−(q−1) .
In other words, if X has at least α+3 bits of conditional Renyi entropy given Y , then we
can extract α bits from X that have conditional Renyi entropy at least α − 1. Notice that
this entropy loss is only 4 bits, as compared to 2log(1/ε) if we require that the output be
ε-close to uniform as in the Leftover Hash (Lemma 3.3.1). This constant loss of conditional
Renyi entropy allows us to do a tighter hiding analysis in Section 3.5.3.
LEMMA 3.5.7
For any triple of (possibly correlated) random variables X, Y and Z,
CP1/2(X|Y ) ≤ CP1/2(X|(Y,Z)) ≤
p
|Supp(Z)| · CP1/2(X|Y ) .
This says that conditioning on random variable Z can only decrease the conditional
Renyi entropy, but does so by at most log(|Supp(Z)|) bits. The ﬁnal lemma is a stronger
variant of the previous Leftover Hash Lemma of Lemma 3.3.1, with its hypothesis stated in
terms of collision probability.
LEMMA 3.5.8
(A stronger variant of the Leftover Hash Lemma [BBR, ILL].) Let random variable H denote
a random hash function from a family of pairwise-independent hash functions H with range
{0,1}α. For any ε > 0, if CP(X) ≤ ε2 · 2−α and H is independent from X, then random
variable (H,H(X)) is ε-close in statistical distance to uniform.66 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Average-case hiding and binding properties of interactive hashing
We now analyze the interactive hashing protocol, namely Protocol 3.2.3, in terms of average-
case measures. For hiding, we use the CP1/2 measure introduced in the previous section.
For the binding property, we present an average-case variant of Lemma 3.2.5, where we look
at the expected number of outputs that lies in any set Γ, rather than bound the probability
that there is more than one output in Γ.
LEMMA 3.5.9
(Hiding of interactive hashing in CP1/2 measure.) Let (SIH,RIH) be the interactive hashing
protocol in Protocol 3.2.3. If the sender SIH’s input comes from a random variable Y over
{0,1}q and W is any (possibly correlated) random variable (representing the receiver’s a priori
information about Y ), then for any receiver R∗,
CP1/2(Z|(W,V )) ≤
√
2q−k · CP1/2(Y |W) ,
where Z = outputSIH(SIH(Y ),R∗)(1q,1k) and V = viewR∗(SIH(Y ),R∗)(1q,1k).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that R∗ is deterministic. (The ran-
domized case then follows by taking expectation over R∗’s coins.) Now that since R∗
is deterministic, the hash functions sent h0,...,hq−k−1 are fully determined by SIH’s re-
sponses c0,...,cq−k−1 ∈ {0,1} (refer to Protocol 3.2.3). Hence, the number of possible
diﬀerent receiver’s view is bounded by 2q−k. This implies that |Supp(V )| ≤ 2q−k, where
V = viewR∗(SIH(Y ),R∗)(1q,1k). By Lemma 3.5.7,
CP1/2(Y |(W,V )) ≤
p
|Supp(V )| · CP1/2(Y |W) ≤
√
2q−k · CP1/2(Y |W) .
Observe that given any particular instantiation of W = w and V = v, the distri-
butions outputSIH(SIH(Y ),RIH)(1q,1k)|W=w,V =v has the same collision probability with
Y |W=w,V =v (indeed they are in bijective correspondence). Hence, CP1/2(Z|(W,V )) =
CP1/2(Y |(W,V )) ≤
√
2q−k · CP1/2(Y |W). 
LEMMA 3.5.10
(Binding of interactive hashing in expected measure.) Let (SIH,RIH) be the interactive hashing
protocol in Protocol 3.2.3. For any ﬁxed subset Γ ⊆ {0,1}q, and for any sender S∗, setting
C = output((S∗,RIH)(1q,1k)), we have
E[|{z : C(z) ∈ Γ}|] < max{24,2k+1 · µ(Γ)} ≤ 24 + 2k+1 · µ(Γ) ,
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This lemma and its proof are inspired by the work of Goldriech, Goldwasser, and
Linial [GGL], who studied a protocol similar to interactive hashing for a diﬀerent purpose
(namely, random selection protocols).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that R∗ is deterministic. (Else, we can
ﬁx its coins to maximize the expectation.) Note that for iteration j = 0,...,q −k −1, RIH
will send a random hj, partitioning the set of possible outputs into two sets {y : hj(y) = 0}
and {y : hj(y) = 1}, and S∗ chooses a side of the partition by sending a bit cj. Let Γ0 = Γ,
and for all j > 0, Γj = {y ∈ Γ : hi(y) = ci ∀i < j} denote the set of compatible elements at
iteration j. Let µj = E[|Γj| · 2−(q−j)], where the expectation is taken over random choices
of h0,...,hj−1. For convenience of notation, assume that the hash function hi’s range is
{±1}, instead of {0,1}.
Consider a particular set Γj, and a particular hash function hj. Observe that for every
y 6= y0 ∈ Γj, Prhj[hj(y) = hj(y0)] ≤ 1/2. Hence,
E
hj
[hj(y)hj(y0)] ≤ 0 ∀y 6= y0 ∈ Γj . (3.3)
Observe that the set Γj+1 = {y ∈ Γj : hj(y) = cj}. Therefore,
E
hj
[µ(Γj+1)] = µ(Γj) + 2−(q−j) · E
hj








X
y∈Γj
hj(y)








≤ µ(Γj) + 2−(q−j) ·
v u
u
u
tE
hj




X
y∈Γj
hj(y)


2
 (Cauchy-Schwartz/Jensen)
= µ(Γj) + 2−(q−j) ·
s
|Γj| +
X
y6=y0
E
hj
[hj(y)hj(y0)]
≤ µ(Γj) + 2−(q−j) ·
q
|Γj| (by 3.3)
= µ(Γj) +
q
2−(q−j) · µ(Γj) .
Consequently,
µj+1 = E
h0,...,hj
[µ(Γj+1)]
= E
h0,...,hj−1
[E
hj
[µ(Γj+1)]]
≤ E
h0,...,hj−1

µ(Γj) +
q
2−(q−j) · µ(Γj)

≤ E
h0,...,hj−1
[µ(Γj)] +
r
2−(q−j) · E
h0,...,hj−1
[µ(Γj)] (Cauchy-Schwartz/Jensen)
= µj +
q
2−(q−j) · µj .68 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Assume that the µj’s are monotonically increasing (otherwise, we can make it so). This
gives us
µq−k ≤ µ0 +
q−k−1 X
j=0
q
2−(q−j) · µj
≤ µ0 +
√
µq−k ·
q−k−1 X
j=0
p
2−(q−j) (µj’s are monotonically increasing)
< µ0 +
√
µq−k ·
q
6/2k
≤ µ0 +
µq−k
2
(if µq−k ≥ 24 · 2−k) ,
giving us µq−k < 2µ0 = 2µ(Γ) if µq−k ≥ 24 · 2−k. This means that µq−k is either less than
24 · 2−k or less than 2µ(Γ). Therefore, we can conclude that
E
h
|{z : C(z) ∈ Γ}| : C = output((S∗,RIH)(1q,1k))
i
= µq−k · 2k
< max{24,2k+1 · µ(Γ)} . 
Protocol 3.4.6 is hiding in CP1/2 measure
We are now ready to analyze the hiding property of Protocol 3.4.6 in terms of the CP1/2
measure. To do so, we say what it means for a scheme to be δ-hiding in CP1/2 measure
in Deﬁnition 3.5.11 below. But before going into that deﬁnition, we ﬁrst establish some
notations that are used throughout this part of the section.
With the sender’s input being x, we let random variable viewR∗(S1
c(x),R∗) denote the
view of receiver R∗ in the ﬁrst commit phase, let random variable outputS(S1
c(x),R∗) denote
the sender’s private output in the ﬁrst phase, and let random variable transcript(S1(x),R∗)
denote the ﬁrst (commit and reveal) phase transcript.
Using similar notations, with the transcript being τ and sender’s input being x, we let
random variable viewR∗(S2
c(x),R∗)(τ) denote the view of receiver R∗ in the second commit
phase, let random variable outputS(S2
c(x),R∗)(τ) denote the sender’s private output in the
second phase, and let random variable transcript(S2(x),R∗)(τ) denote the second (commit
and reveal) phase transcript. We write Γ1 in viewR∗(S1
c(Γ1),R∗)—and similarly for others—
to mean that the sender’s private input is chosen uniformly from a set Γ1.
DEFINITION 3.5.11
For a parameter δ ∈ [0,1], 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) is said to be δ-hiding in
CP1/2 measure if there exists two sets Γ1,Γ2 ⊆ {0,1}n such that the following three
properties hold.
(H.1) Γ1 ∪ Γ2 = {0,1}n and µ(Γ1 ∩ Γ2) ≥ δ.3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 69
(H.2) When the sender’s private input x is chosen uniformly from Γ1, the sender’s pri-
vate output in the ﬁrst phase has low collision probability given the receiver’s view.
Formally, for any adversarial receiver R∗,
CP1/2(A|V ) ≤
p
2−(k−1) ,
for (A,V ) = (outputS(S1
c(Γ1),R∗),viewR∗(S1
c(Γ1),R∗)).
(H.3) When the sender’s private input x is chosen uniformly from Γ2, the sender’s pri-
vate output in the second phase has low collision probability given the receiver’s
view. Formally, for every adversarial receiver R∗ and every τ ∈ Supp(T), where
T = transcript(S1(Γ2),R∗), we have
CP1/2(Bτ|Wτ) ≤
p
2−(k−1) ,
for (Bτ,Wτ) = (outputS(S2
c(Γ2),R∗),viewR∗(S2
c(Γ2),R∗))|T=τ.
REMARK 3.5.12
Being δ-hiding in CP1/2 measure in the above Deﬁnition 3.5.11 roughly means that the
scheme is always hiding in at least one phase, and hiding in both phases occurs with prob-
ability δ.
LEMMA 3.5.13
(Protocol 3.4.6 is (1/n)-hiding in CP1/2 measure.) Let f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n be any function,
not necessarily one-way. There exist an integer t0 ∈ {1,2,...,n} such that Protocol 3.4.6, with
setting of parameters t = t0, k ≤ q(n), ∆1 ≥ logn + 4, and ∆2 ≥ 3, is (1/n)-hiding in CP1/2
measure.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that R∗ is deterministic since we can
ﬁx the coins of R∗ that maximizes the above collision probabilities. We prove that (S,R)
satisﬁes the above three properties of Deﬁnition 3.5.11 as follows:
Property (H.1). Deﬁne p(y) = Pr[f(Un) = y], and let A1 = {y ∈ {0,1}n : 1/2 ≤
p(y) ≤ 1}, and for t ∈ {2,3,...,n}, let At = {y ∈ {0,1}n : 2−t ≤ p(y) < 2−t+1}. Since
∪tAt = f({0,1}n), there exists an index t0 such that Pr[f(Un) ∈ At0] ≥ 1/n. Deﬁne sets
Γ1 and Γ2 as follows:
Γ1 = {x : p(f(x)) < 2−t0+1}
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By the deﬁnition of Γ1 and Γ2, we have that µ(Γ1 ∩Γ2) = Pr[f(Un) ∈ At0] ≥ 1/n, and also
Γ1 ∪ Γ2 = {0,1}n.
Property (H.2). In the case when the sender’s private input x ∈ Γ1, we bound the
collision probability of the ﬁrst phase secret as follows:
CP(f(Γ1)) =
X
y∈f(Γ1)

p(y)
µ(Γ1)
2
≤

max
y∈f(Γ1)
p(y)

·


X
y∈f(Γ1)
p(y)

 ·
1
µ(Γ1)2
< 2−t0+1 · µ(Γ1) · µ(Γ1)−2
≤ 2−(t0−logn−1) (since µ(Γ1) ≥ 1/n) .
Observe that CP(f(Γ1)) ≤ 2−(t0−logn−1) ≤ 2−(t0−∆1+3). Therefore we can apply Ran-
domness Extraction Lemma 3.5.6 to get CP1/2(Q) ≤
√
2−(q−1), where Q = (H1,H1(f(Γ1)))
and H1 is an independent random hash from H1.
Next, let A = outputS(S1
c(Γ1),R∗) denote the private output of the sender S in the ﬁrst
phase of Protocol 3.4.6, which in turn is equal to the output of SIH in the interactive hashing
protocol, so equivalently A = outputSIH(SIH(Q),R∗). Similarly, let V = viewR∗(S1
c(Γ1),R∗)
denote the view of the adversarial receiver R∗ in the ﬁrst phase, which in turn is equal to
the view of R∗ in the interactive hashing protocol, so equivalently V = viewR∗(SIH(Q),R∗).
The ﬁnal step is to use the hiding property of interactive hashing given by Lemma 3.5.9
to bound the collision probability of A (the private output of the sender S) given V (the
view of the adversarial receiver R∗) as follows:
CP1/2(A|V ) ≤
√
2q−k ·
p
CP(Q) ≤
√
2q−k ·
p
2−(q−1) =
p
2−(k−1) .
Property (H.3). In the case when the sender’s private input x ∈ Γ2, we analyze the
collision probability of the second phase secret as follows. First we observe that for any
x,x0 ∈ {0,1}n such that f(x) = f(x0), the ﬁrst phase transcripts for both x and x0 are
identically distributed, that is transcript(S1(x),R∗) ≡ transcript(S1(x0),R∗). Thus, if we
ﬁx a ﬁrst phase transcript τ ∈ transcript(S1(x),R∗) containing a value y = f(x) in the
reveal phase, any element in Γ2,y = f−1(y) ⊆ Γ2 is equally likely to have generated τ. Also
observe that the Γ2,y’s form a partition of Γ2.
Note that by deﬁnition, |Γ2,y| ≥ 2n−t0, and hence CP(Γ2,y) ≤ 2−(n−t0) ≤ 2−(n−t0−∆2+3).
Therefore we can apply Randomness Extraction Lemma 3.5.6 to get CP1/2(Q0) ≤
√
2−(q−1),
for Q0 = (H2,H2(Γ2,y)).
Next, let Bτ = outputS(S2
c(Γ2,y),R∗)(τ) denote the private output of the sender S in the
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so equivalently Bτ = outputSIH(SIH(Q0),R∗). Similarly, let Wτ = viewR∗(S2
c(Γ2,y),R∗)(τ)
denote the view of the adversarial receiver R∗ in the second phase, which in turn is equal to
the view of R∗ in the interactive hashing protocol, so equivalently Wτ = viewR∗(SIH(Q0),R∗).
The ﬁnal step is to use the hiding property of interactive hashing given by Lemma 3.5.9
to bound the collision probability of Bτ (the private output of the sender S) given Wτ (the
view of the adversarial receiver R∗) as follows:
CP1/2(Bτ|Wτ) ≤
√
2q−k ·
p
CP(Q0) ≤
√
2q−k ·
p
2−(q−1) =
p
2−(k−1) . 
Protocol 3.4.6 is 1-out-of-2 binding in expected measure
The deﬁnition of 1-out-of-2 binding in Deﬁnition 3.4.4 considers the ﬁrst phase (resp., second
phase) to be broken if the sender S∗ produces valid decommitments to two diﬀerent values
after the ﬁrst commit stage (resp., second commit stage). In this section and Section 3.5.3,
we will work with a relaxed notion where we simply bound the expected number of values to
which the sender can open. To this end, we deﬁne openings(S∗,R1) [resp., openings(S∗,R2)]
to be a random variable denoting the number of values to which the sender successfully opens
in phase 1 [resp., phase 2], where ‘successfully’ opens is deﬁned for each phase analogously to
Deﬁnition 3.4.4. More formally, for a two-phase commitment scheme (S,R) and a ‘binding’
set B, we deﬁne openings(S∗,R1)(B) as follows:
I S∗ and R1
c interact to get ﬁrst phase commitment c(1).
I After the interaction, S∗ outputs a sequence of values d
(1)
1 ,...,d
(1)
` and corresponding
full transcripts λ1,...,λ` of both phases. Recall that λi = (τi,κi), where τi and κi are
the ﬁrst-phase and second-phase transcripts, respectively.
I We let openings(S∗,R1)(B) be the set of distinct values d
(1)
i whose opening λi is valid,
where by valid we mean that λi begins with preﬁx c(1), λi contains a decommitment
of c(1) to the value d
(1)
i with ﬁrst-phase transcript τi / ∈ B, and both R1
r and R2
r accept
in λi.
Analogously, we deﬁne openings(S∗,R2)(τ), where τ is a ﬁrst-phase transcript, as follows:
I S∗ and R2
c interact to get second phase commitment c(2).
I After the interaction, S∗ outputs a sequence of values d
(2)
1 ,...,d
(2)
` and corresponding
second-phase transcripts κ1,...,κ`.
I We let openings(S∗,R2)(τ) be the set of distinct values d
(2)
i whose opening κi is valid,
where by valid we mean that κi starts with preﬁx c, κi contains a decommitment of
c(2) to the value d
(2)
i , and R2
r accepts in κi.
Now, we can describe the binding property of Protocol 3.4.6 in this language (even when
the underlying one-way function has unknown security).72 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
LEMMA 3.5.14
(Protocol 3.4.6 is 1-out-of-2 binding in expected measure.) For every integer t ∈ {1,2,...,n},
k = O(logn), ∆1 = O(logn), and ∆2 = O(logn), the following holds for the 2-phase commit-
ment scheme (S,R) in Protocol 3.4.6 based on one-way function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n:
There exists a binding set B for (S,R) where:
(B.1) No (nonuniform) PPT adversary S∗ can break the ﬁrst phase binding with
nonnegligible probability in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.4. That is, for any
nonuniform PPT S∗, we have |openings(S∗,R1)(B)| ≤ 1 with probability
1 − neg(n) over the coins of S∗ and R1
c.
(B.2) For all τ ∈ B and any adversarial sender S∗,
E

openings(S∗,R2)(τ)


< 2 ,
where the above expectation is taken over the coins of S∗ and R2.
Proof. We follow the proof of the binding property in Lemma 3.4.10, using both Claims 3.4.12
and 3.4.11 from that proof. Let B = {y ∈ {0,1}n : Pr[f(Un) = y] ≤ 2−t−∆3} be the same
binding set as deﬁned in both claims. We set ∆3 = ∆2+O(logn) to be large enough so that
the binding parameter poly(n) · 2−Ω(∆3−∆2) in Claim 3.4.12 is at most 2−k. (This can be
done since k = O(logn).) Now, Claim 3.4.12 states that if τ ∈ B, then the second commit-
ment phase is not binding—i.e.,

openings(S∗,R2)(τ)

 ≥ 2—with probability at most 2−k.
Since

openings(S∗,R2)(τ)

 ≤ 2k (the commitment is to a k-bit string), taking expectations
we have
E

openings(S∗,R2)(τ)


≤ 2k · 2−k + 1 · (1 − 2−k) < 2 .
To see why property (B.1) holds, let ε be the probability for which PPT S∗ breaks the
ﬁrst phase binding. Observe that the inversion success probability of f from Claim 3.4.11
is
εO(1) · 1/poly(n) · 2−(k+∆1+∆3) = εO(1) · 1/poly(n) · 2−(k+∆1+∆2+O(logn))
=
εO(1)
poly(n)
,
since all k,∆1,∆2 = O(logn). This forces ε to be a negligible function. 
3.5.3 Converting weakly-hiding to strongly-hiding commitments
In the previous section, we established that Protocol 3.4.6, with appropriate choice of pa-
rameters, is 1/n-hiding in CP1/2 measure (hence, only weakly hiding), and 1-out-of-2 binding
in expected measure. Our goal in this section is to show how to boost the hiding probabil-
ity to δ = 1 − neg(n), therefore making the scheme strongly hiding, while maintaining the
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We ﬁrst show how to double the hiding probability by combining a constant number
of schemes to obtain a new scheme. We then repeat this doubling ampliﬁcation process
O(logn) times to boost the hiding probability from 1/n to a constant c > 0, hence obtain-
ing an Ω(1)-hiding scheme. Finally we boost it all the way to 1 − neg(n) by combining
polynomial number of Ω(1)-hiding schemes. This is all achieved via a hiding ampliﬁcation
procedure stated next.
ALGORITHM 3.5.15                                      
Hiding ampliﬁcation procedure, denoted as Amplify.
Input: 2-phase commitment (S,R)
Additional Input Parameters: These are given in unary, and listed below:
1. Security parameter n.
2. Number m of schemes (S,R) to be combined.
3. Integer r denoting S’s private input length.
4. Integer k denoting S’s private output length.
5. Integer k0 denoting S’s private output length.
6. Integer thresholds α1 and α2, for the ﬁrst and second commit phases respectively.
Output: 2-phase commitment (S,R), as described by Protocol 3.5.16.
                                                               
To reduce unnecessary clutter, we write (S,R) = Amplify(S,R) when the rest of the
parameters are clear from context.
PROTOCOL 3.5.16                                       
Ampliﬁed scheme (S,R) from hiding ampliﬁcation of base scheme (S,R).
Sender’s private input: x = (x1,...,xm) ∈ {0,1}mr.
First phase commit:
1. (S1
c,R1
c) does m sequential executions of (S1
c,R1
c), using xi for S1
c’s secret in the
i-th execution. Let (S1
c[i](xi),R1
c[i]) denote the i-th execution of (S1
c,R1
c). Deﬁne
ai = outputS(S1
c[i](xi),R1
c[i]) ∈ {0,1}k, and let a = (a1,...,am).
2. Let H1 = {h1: {0,1}mk → {0,1}α1} be a family of pairwise independent hash
functions. S1 chooses a random hash h1 ← H1, and computes y(1) = (h1,h1(a)) ∈
{0,1}q.
3. (S1
c,R1
c) runs the interactive hashing protocol (S1
IH(y(1)),R1
IH)(1q,1k), given by
Protocol 3.2.3, with S1 and R1 acting as S1
IH and R1
IH, respectively.
Let circuit C: {0,1}k0
→ {0,1}q be the common output, and d(1) ∈ {0,1}k0
be
S1
IH’s private output in (S1
IH(y(1)),R1
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First phase sender’s private output: String d(1) ∈ {0,1}k0
.
First phase reveal:
S1
r sends tuple γ(1) = (d(1),a,h1) ◦ (γ
(1)
1 ,...,γ
(1)
m ), where γ
(1)
i is the ﬁrst phase reve-
lation string of S1
r[i] in the above execution of (S1
r[i](xi),R1
r[i]).
Receiver R1
r accepts if only if C(d(1)) = (h1,h1(a)) and R1
r[i] accepts (γ
(1)
i ,ai) for all
i ∈ {1,2,...,m}.
Second phase commit:
Second phase common input: Transcript τ = (τ1,...,τm), where each
τi = transcript(S1
i (xi),R1
i).
1. (S2
c,R2
c) does m sequential executions of (S2
c,R2
c), using xi for S2’s secret and
transcript τi in the i-th execution. Let (S2
c[i](xi),R2
c[i])(τi) denote the i-th ex-
ecution of (S2,R2). Deﬁne bi = outputS(S2
c[i](xi),R2
c[i])(τi) ∈ {0,1}k, and let
b = (b1,...,bm).
2. Let H2 = {h2: {0,1}mk → {0,1}α2} be a family of pairwise independent hash
functions. S2 chooses a random hash h2 ← H2, and computes y(2) = (h2,h2(b)) ∈
{0,1}q.
3. (S2
c,R2
c) runs the interactive hashing protocol (S2
IH(y(2)),R2
IH)(1q,1k), given by
Protocol 3.2.3, with S2
c and R2
c acting as S2
IH and R2
IH, respectively.
Let circuit C: {0,1}k0
→ {0,1}q be the common output, and d(2) ∈ {0,1}k0
be
S2
IH’s private output in (S2
IH(y(2)),R2
IH)(1q,1k).
Second phase sender’s private output: String d(2) ∈ {0,1}k0
.
Second phase reveal:
S2
r sends tuple γ(2) = (d(2),b,h2) ◦ (γ
(2)
1 ,...,γ
(2)
m ), where γ
(2)
i is the second phase
revelation string of S2
r[i] in the above execution of (S2
r[i](xi),R2
r[i]).
Receiver R2
r accepts if only if C(2)(d(2)) = (h2,h2(b)) and R2
r[i] accepts (γ
(2)
i ,bi) for
all i ∈ {1,2,...,m}.
                                                               
Starting from a weakly-hiding scheme (S0,R0) of Protocol 3.4.6, we iteratively apply
the ampliﬁcation process Amplify, in a way described by Algorithm 3.5.17 below, to achieve
a new scheme (S,R) that we will show to be statistically-hiding. Let D > 1 denote a large
enough integer constant. We will set the number of schemes to be combined to be m = D
in all but the last iteration, in which we set m = n.3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 75
ALGORITHM 3.5.17                                      
Iterative ampliﬁcation procedure.
Input: Security parameter n, constant integer D > 1, and thresholds t ∈ {1,2,...,n},
β1,...,β` ∈ {0,1,...,D − 1}, β`+1 ∈ {0,1,...,n}.
1. Let k0 = (16D) · logn, ` = logn, and (S0,R0) be the 2-phase commitment
scheme based on one-way function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n from Protocol 3.4.6
using parameters t, k = k0, and ∆1 = ∆2 = 2logn.
2. For j = 1,2,...,`, repeat the following:
(a) Set kj = kj−1 − 8D − 8.
(b) Set (Sj,Rj) = Amplify(Sj−1,Rj−1) for settings of parameters m = D, r =
n · Dj−1, k = kj−1, k0 = kj, α1 = (βj + 1)(kj−1 − 1) − 3 and α2 = (D −
βj)(kj−1 − 1) − 3.
3. Set (S,R) = Amplify(S`,R`) for settings of parameters m = n, r = n·D`, k = k`,
k0 = 1, α1 =

(β`+1 + 1
3δn)k

and α2 =

(n − β`+1 + 1
3δn)k

, where δ = 1/(2D).
Output: 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R).
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LEMMA 3.5.18
If scheme (S0,R0) used by Algorithm 3.5.17 runs in polynomial time, then scheme (S,R), the
output of Algorithm 3.5.17, also runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Scheme (S,R) consists of n · D` = n · DO(logn) = poly(n) executions of (S0,R0). In
addition, each ampliﬁcation procedure Amplify adds an overhead time of poly(n) since both
the sender and receiver are doing interactive hashing. Since there are only 1 + n + nD +
nD2 + ··· + D`−1 = poly(n) ampliﬁcations steps, the overhead time is polynomial. Hence,
scheme (S,R) runs in polynomial time if (S0,R0) does too. 
The rest of this section, which is technically involved, is devoted to proving the hiding
and binding properties of the ﬁnal scheme (S,R). (In process of doing so, we also analyze
the the hiding and binding properties of intermediate schemes (Sj,Rj).)
Hiding ampliﬁcation
The following two lemmas, Lemma 3.5.19 and 3.5.20, provide us a way to understand the
hiding property (in the CP1/2 measure) of ampliﬁed scheme (S,R), in terms of its base
scheme (S,R). Lemma 3.5.19 basically say that the hiding probability doubles when we go
from (Sj−1,Rj−1) to (Sj,Rj) = Amplify(Sj−1,Rj−1) (refer to Step 2b in Algorithm 3.5.17).
So if we start up with 1/n-hiding scheme (S0,R0), in ` = logn iterations, we will get a76 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
scheme (S`,R`) with Ω(1)-hiding. Lemma 3.5.20 essentially argues that the ﬁnal ampliﬁ-
cation step boost the hiding probability all the way to 1 − neg(n) (in both phases) when
starting from a scheme that is Ω(1)-hiding. With these two lemmas, we can establish that
the ﬁnal scheme (S,R) = Amplify(S`,R`) is statistically hiding in both phases.
LEMMA 3.5.19
(Intermediate step hiding ampliﬁcation.) For any suﬃciently large constant D ∈ Z+, the
following holds:
If scheme (S,R) is δ-hiding, then there exist an integer β ∈ {0,1,...,D − 1} such
that scheme (S,R) = Amplify(S,R), with parameters m = D, k0 = k − 8D − 8,
α1 = (β + 1)(k − 1) − 3, and α2 = (D − β)(k − 1) − 3, is δ0-hiding, for δ0 =
min{2δ,1/D}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that R∗ is deterministic since we can ﬁx
the coins of R∗ that maximizes the collision probability. Throughout this proof, the value
of m will be ﬁxed to D, although we will keep writing m. Let the δ-hiding properties, as
stated in Deﬁnition 3.5.11, of (S,R) be (H.1), (H.2) and (H.3), respectively. We will prove
that (S,R) satisﬁes Deﬁnition 3.5.11 with Properties (H’.1), (H’.2) and (H’.3) by showing
that Property (H.1) implies (H’.1), and so forth.
Property (H.1) implies (H’.1). Let Γ1 and Γ2 be the corresponding sets for (S,R).
Deﬁne the sets Γ0
1 and Γ0
2 in terms as follows (the value of β will be determined later).
Γ0
1 = {(x1,...,xm) : ∃ i1,...,iβ+1 such that xi1,...,xiβ+1 ∈ Γ1} ,
Γ0
2 = {(x1,...,xm) : ∃ i1,...,im−β such that xi1,...,xim−β ∈ Γ2} .
By the way we deﬁned Γ0
1 and Γ0
2 together with the fact that Γ1 ∪Γ2 = {0,1}r, it is the
case that Γ0
1 ∪ Γ0
2 = {0,1}mr. This is because either at least β + 1 of the xi are in Γ1 (in
which case, (x1,...,xm) ∈ Γ0
1) or else at most β of the xi are in Γ1, which implies that at
least m − β of the xi are in Γ2 (in which case, (x1,...,xm) ∈ Γ0
2).
We are given that µ(Γ1 ∩ Γ2) ≥ δ. Deﬁne δ0 = min{δ,1/(2m)}. What we need to show
is that µ(Γ0
1 ∩ Γ0
2) ≥ δ0. Choose any subset S ⊆ Γ1 ∩ Γ2 such that µ(S) = δ0. Hence, we
have
Pr
x1,...,xm←{0,1}r[exactly one xi ∈ S] = mδ0(1 − δ0)m−1 ≥ mδ0(1 − 1/(m − 1))m−1 = Ω(mδ0) .
Given that exactly one xi ∈ S, assume without loss of generality that xm ∈ S. Let pt
denote the conditional probability that exactly t of the rest of the m−1 xi’s are in Γ1 \Γ2.
Choose β ∈ [0,m−1] to maximize pt, i.e., β = argmaxt pt. Let Ii, for i = 1,2,...,m−1, be a
binary random variable indicating whether xi ∈ Γ1 or not; note that these are independent3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 77
random variables conditioned on the fact that xm ∈ S. Let the µ the mean of the Ii’s. By
a Chernoﬀ bound,
Pr
"




X
i
Ii − µ · (m − 1)





> 3
√
m − 1
#
≤ 2e((m−1)/3)·(3/
√
m−1)2
< 1/2 .
This means that greater 1/2 of the weight is centered around µ·(m−1)±3
√
m − 1. Since
we chose β = argmaxt pt in a maximal way, we have
Pr
x1,...,xm←{0,1}r[exactly β of xi’s are in Γ1 \ S | exactly one xi ∈ S] = Ω

1
√
m

.
Knowing that Γ1 ∪ Γ2 = {0,1}r, if exactly β of xi’s in Γ1 \ S and exactly one xi ∈ S,
then there must be at least m − 1 − β of xi’s in Γ2 \ S. Consequently,
Pr
x1,...,xm←{0,1}r[(x1,...,xm) ∈ Γ0
1 ∩ Γ0
2] = Ω(mδ0) · Ω

1
√
m

= Ω(
√
mδ0)
> 2δ0 = min{2δ,1/m},
where the last inequality holds when m = D is a large enough constant.
Property (H.2) implies (H’.2). In the ﬁrst commitment phase (S1
c,R∗), the cheating
receiver R∗ interacts with m sequential executions of S1
c. Here we must analyze the case
when S1
c’s private input in these m executions, given by x = (x1,...,xm), are distributed
uniformly in Γ0
1. We let Ai(x) denote the private output of the sender and Vi(x) the view
of the receiver in the i’th execution, for x being the private input for S1
c. That is, for
i = 1,...,m,
Ai(x) = outputS(S1
c(xi),R∗(V1,...,Vi−1));
Vi(x) = viewR∗(S1
c(xi),R∗(V1,...,Vi−1)).
Note that while the sender’s behavior in the i’th execution is independent of the previous
executions, the cheating receiver may base its strategy on its previous views. We want to
bound CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1)|V 00(Γ0
1)), where A00(Γ0
1) = (A1(Γ0
1),...,Am(Γ0
1)) represents the com-
bined ﬁrst-phase private outputs of the m senders, and V 00(Γ0
1) = (V1(Γ0
1),...,Vm(Γ0
1))
represents the view of R∗ when interacting with these m senders. Note that random vari-
able Γ0
1 represents an independent random element from the set Γ0
1. To do this, we consider,
for each I ⊆ [m] of size at least β + 1, the random variable Γ0
1|I for private input of the
sender S, where Γ0
1|I represents choosing xi uniformly in Γ1 for i ∈ I, and uniformly in Γ1
for i / ∈ I. To get a bound on CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1|I)|V 00(Γ0
1|I)), we will have to refer to Lemma 3.5.5
and see why the (Ai,Vi)’s satisfy the two conditions of the lemma.78 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Conditioned on the any previous view—namely, V1(Γ0
1|I) = v1,...,Vi−1(Γ0
1|I) = vi−1
for any v1,...,vi−1—it is the case that CP1/2(Ai(Γ0
1|I)|Vi(Γ0
1|I)) ≤
√
2−(k−1) if i ∈ I.
This follows from Property (H.2) because the (unbounded) receiver R∗ can incorporate
the previous view v1,...,vi−1 as nonuniform advice, and then the only randomness in the
deﬁnition of Ai and Vi is the sender’s coins xi ← (Γ0
1|I)i, which are uniform in Γ1 (even
conditioned on v1,...,vi−1). This shows that the ﬁrst condition of Lemma 3.5.5 is satisﬁed.
For the second condition, what we need to show is that conditioned on V1(Γ0
1|I) =
v1,...,Vi(Γ0
1|I) = vi, the random variables A1(Γ0
1|I),...,Ai(Γ0
1|I),Vi+1(Γ0
1|I) are indepen-
dent. This can be seen by induction on i as follows. It is vacuously true for i = 0. Assuming
it is true for i = j − 1, we prove it for i = j as follows. First condition on v1,...,vj−1. By
inductive hypothesis, A1,...,Aj−1,Vj are independent (omitting Γ0
1|I from the notation for
readability). Moreover, since we have conditioned on v1,...,vj−1, Aj and Vj are functions of
only (Γ0
1|I)j, the sender’s coins in the j’th execution, which is independent of A1,...,Aj−1
(because we have only used (Γ0
1|I)1,...,(Γ0
1|I)j−1 so far). Thus, if we condition on Vj = vj,
Aj remains independent of A1,...,Aj−1. Vj+1 is independent of A1,...,Aj because now it
is only a function of (Γ0
1|I)j+1, which has not been used yet.
Applying Lemma 3.5.5, we have
CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1|I)|V 00(Γ0
1|I)) ≤
p
2−(β+1)(k−1), (3.4)
since from property (H.2), it is the case that for all i ∈ I, CP1/2(Ai|Vi) ≤
√
2−(k−1) (even
conditioned on the previous views), and |I| ≥ β + 1.
Now, to bound CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1)|V 00(Γ0
1)) where X is uniform in Γ0
1, we observe that Γ0
1 =
Γ0
1|I, where I is the random variable on subsets I of size at least β + 1 given by
Pr[I = I] = Pr
(x1,...,xm)←Γ0
1
[{i : xi ∈ Γ1} = I].
In other words, sampling from Γ0
1 can be broken into two steps; ﬁrst sampling an I ← I,
and then sampling xi ← Γ1 for i ∈ I, and xi ← Γ1 for i / ∈ I. Therefore, we have
CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1|I)|V 00(Γ0
1|I)) ≤ CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1|I)|(V 00(Γ0
1|I),I)) (by Lemma 3.5.7)
= E
I←I
h
CP1/2(A00(Γ0
1|I)|V 00(Γ0
1|I)
i
≤
p
2−(β+1)(k−1) (3.5)
=
p
2−(α1+3),
with the last inequality following from (3.4). Therefore we can apply Randomness Ex-
traction Lemma 3.5.6 to get CP1/2(H1,H1(A00(Γ0
1))|V 00(Γ0
1)) ≤
√
2−(q−1), where H1 is an
independent random hash from H1.
Next, let A0 = outputS(S1(Γ0
1),R∗) denote the private output of the sender S in the
ﬁrst phase, which in turn is equal to the output of SIH in the interactive hashing protocol,3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 79
so equivalently A0 = outputSIH(SIH(Q),R∗
IH), where Q = (H1,H1(A00(Γ0
1))). Similarly, let
V 0 = viewR∗(S1(Γ0
1),R∗) denote the view of the adversarial receiver R∗ in the ﬁrst phase,
which in turn is equal to the view of R∗ in the interactive hashing protocol, so equivalently
V 0 = (viewR∗
IH(SIH(Q),R∗
IH),V 00), for the same Q = (H1,H1(A00(Γ0
1))).
The ﬁnal step is to use the hiding property of interactive hashing given by Lemma 3.5.9
to bound the collision probability of A0 (the private output of the sender S) given V 0 (the
view of the adversarial receiver R∗) as follows:
CP1/2(A0|V 0) ≤
√
2q−k0 · CP1/2(Q|V 00) ≤
√
2q−k0 ·
p
2−(q−1) =
p
2−(k0−1) .
Property (H.3) implies (H’.3). Fix a transcript τ0 ∈ Supp(T0), where random variable
T0 = transcript(S1(Γ0
2),R∗). Transcript τ0 contains ﬁrst-phase transcripts (τ1,...,τm) for
the m executions of (S,R). Similarly to the above proof of Property (H’.2), we deﬁne the
following random variables:
Bi(x) = outputS(S2
c(xi),R∗(W1,...,Wi−1)(τi));
Wi(x) = viewR∗(S2
c(xi),R∗(W1,...,Wi−1)(τi)),
where xi are the coins of the sender in the i’th execution of the the (S,R). For nota-
tional simplicity, we omit the sender’s coin-tosses from the ﬁrst-phase interactive hash-
ing (they can be considered ﬁxed for the analysis below). As above, we want to bound
CP1/2(B00(Xτ0)|W00(Xτ0)), where random variable B00(Xτ0) = (B1(Xτ0),...,Bm(Xτ0)) rep-
resents the combined second-phase private outputs of the m senders, and random variable
W00(Xτ0) = (W1(Xτ0),...,Wm(Xτ0)) represents the view of R∗ when interacting with these
m senders, with Xτ0 being a shorthand for Γ0
2|T(Γ0
2)=τ0. To do this, we consider, for each
subset J ⊆ [m] of size at least m−β, the random variable XJ for private input of the sender
S, where XJ represents choosing xi uniformly in Γ2 for i ∈ J, and uniformly in Γ2 for i / ∈ J.
It is important to note that even when we condition on T0(XJ) = τ0, the components
(X1,...,Xm) of XJ remain independent, and the distribution of Xi|T0(XJ)=τ0 is equivalent
to Xi|T(Xi)=τi, where only condition on the transcript of the i’th execution. (Similarly to
the inductive proof above, it can be shown that (X1,...,Xm) are independent given the
receiver’s view Vm of the m executions of S1
c. The only additional information revealed
about the Xi’s in the ﬁrst phase is (A1,...,Am), where Ai is a function only of Xi once we
condition on Vm.)
Thus from property (H.3), we have for all i ∈ J, CP1/2(Bi(XJ,τ0)|Wi(XJ,τ0)) ≤
√
2−(k−1),
where XJ,τ0 = Γ0
2|J|T0(Γ0
2|J)=τ0, and this holds even conditioned on the previous views.
Similar to the ﬁrst phase, we apply Lemma 3.5.5 to show that
CP1/2(B00(XJ,τ0)|W00(XJ,τ0)) ≤
p
2−(m−β)(k−1) .
Again analogous to the ﬁrst phase, we observe that Xτ0 = XJ,τ0 for an appropriate80 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
random variable J on sets of size at least m − β, and thus
CP1/2(B00(Xτ0)|W00(Xτ0)) ≤
p
2−(m−β)(k−1) (3.6)
=
p
2−(α2+3).
By the Randomness Extraction Lemma 3.5.6, we get CP1/2(H2,H2(B00(Xτ0))|W00(Xτ0)) ≤ √
2−(q−1).
The ﬁnal step is to use the hiding property of interactive hashing given by Lemma 3.5.9
to bound the collision probability of Bτ (the private output of the sender S) given Wτ (the
view of the adversarial receiver R∗) as follows:
CP1/2(B0
τ0|W0
τ0) ≤
√
2q−k0 ·
p
2−(q−1) =
p
2−(k0−1) . 
LEMMA 3.5.20
(Final step hiding ampliﬁcation.) The following statement holds for every constant δ > 0 and
every integer k ≥ 100/δ:
If scheme (S,R) is δ-hiding, then there exist an integer β ∈ [0,n] such that scheme
(S,R) = Amplify(S,R), with parameters m = n, k0 = 1, α1 =

(β + 1
3δn)k

and
α2 =

(n − β + 1
3δn)k

, is statistically hiding in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.3.
Proof. Let the δ-hiding properties, as stated in Deﬁnition 3.5.11, of (S,R) be (H.1), (H.2)
and (H.3), respectively. To prove that scheme (S,R) is statistically hiding, it suﬃces to show
that there exists sets Γ0
1,Γ0
2 ⊆ {0,1}nr such that the following holds for every adversarial
receiver R∗:
(H’.1) Both µ(Γ0
1),µ(Γ0
2) ≥ 1 − 2−Ω(n).
(H’.2) (A0,V 0) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,V 0), where A0 = outputS(S1
c(Γ0
1),R∗) de-
notes the private output of the sender S in the ﬁrst phase, and V 0 =
viewR∗(S1
c(Γ0
1),R∗) denotes the view of the adversarial receiver R∗ in the
ﬁrst phase.
(H’.3) For all τ0 ∈ Supp(T0), (B0
τ0,W0
τ0) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,W0
τ0), where random
variable (B0
τ0,W0
τ0) = (outputS(S2
c(Γ0
2),R∗),viewR∗(S2
c(Γ0
2),R∗))|T0=τ0, and
random variable T0 = transcript(S1(Γ0
2),R∗). We view B0
τ0 as representing
the private output of the sender S in the second phase given that the ﬁrst-
phase transcript is τ0. Similarly, we view W0
τ0 as representing the view of
the adversarial receiver R∗ in the second phase given that the ﬁrst-phase
transcript is τ0.
Property (H.1) implies (H’.1). Let Γ1 and Γ2 be the corresponding sets for (S,R),
and let p = µ(Γ1). Set β =

pn − 1
2δn

, γ1 =

pn − 1
12δn

and γ2 =

(1 − p + δ)n − 1
12δn

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Note that β ∈ [0,n] since p ∈ [δ,1].
Deﬁne the sets Γ0
1 and Γ0
2 as follows:
Γ0
1 = {(x1,...,xn) : ∃ i1,...,iγ1 such that xi1,...,xiγ1 ∈ Γ1},
Γ0
2 = {(x1,...,xn) : ∃ i1,...,iγ2 such that xi1,...,xiγ2 ∈ Γ2}.
To lower bound µ(Γ0
1), note that µ(Γ1)−γ1/n = p−

pn − 1
12δn

/n ≥ 1
12δ = Ω(1) since
δ = Ω(1). Using a Chernoﬀ bound, we get
µ(Γ0
1) = 1 − Pr
(x1,...,xn)
[less than γ1 of the xi’s are in Γ1]
= 1 − 2−Ω(n).
To analyze µ(Γ0
2), we note that µ(Γ2)−γ2/n = (1−p+δ)−

(1 − p + δ)n − 1
12δn

/n ≥
1
12δ = Ω(1). Using a similar analysis as above, we get µ(Γ0
2) = 1 − 2−Ω(n).
Property (H.2) implies (H’.2). Using the same notations and analysis as in the proof
of Lemma 3.5.19, we let Ai(x) denote the private output of the sender and Vi(x) the view
of the receiver in the i’th execution, for x being the private input for S1
c. That is, for
i = 1,...,n,
Ai(x) = outputS(S1
c(xi),R∗(V1,...,Vi−1));
Vi(x) = viewR∗(S1
c(xi),R∗(V1,...,Vi−1)).
Let A00(Γ0
1) = (A1(Γ0
1),...,An(Γ0
1)) represent the combined ﬁrst-phase private outputs of
the n senders, and V 00(Γ0
1) = (V1(Γ0
1),...,Vn(Γ0
1)) represent the view of R∗ when interacting
with these n senders, before interactive hashing is done. From now on, we simplify notation
by making A00 = A00(Γ0
1) and V 00 = V 00(Γ0
1).
Similar to (3.5) as in the proof of Lemma 3.5.19, we obtain
CP1/2(A00|V 00) ≤
p
2−γ1·(k−1) .
And by a Markov bound, we know that with probability greater than 1−2−n over v00 ← V 00,
CP(A00|V 00=v00) ≤ 2−γ1(k−1) · 22n ≤ 2−α1−(1/24)δkn+3n ≤ 2−(α1+n), (3.7)
with the last inequality following from k ≥ 100/δ.
Consider v00 ∈ V 00 such that the above (3.7) holds. Let Q = (H1,H1(A00)), where
H1 is an independent random hash from H1. Because H1 is independent, Q|V 00=v00 =
(H1,H1(A00|V 00=v00)), and we can apply the Leftover Hash Lemma 3.5.8 to obtain that
Q|V 00=v00, the input to the interactive hashing protocol, is 2−Ω(n)-close to uniform.
Next, let A0 = outputS(S1(Γ0
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which in turn is equal to the output of SIH in the interactive hashing protocol, so equivalently
A0 = outputSIH(SIH(Q),R∗). Similarly, let V 0 = viewR∗(S1
c(Γ1),R∗) denote the view of the
adversarial receiver R∗ in the ﬁrst phase, and let VIH = (viewR∗
IH(SIH(Q),R∗
IH) denote the
view of receiver R∗ during the interactive hashing execution only. Observe that V 0 =
(V 00,VIH), recalling that V 00 is the view of R∗ when interacting with these n senders, before
interactive hashing is done.
Because Q|V 00=v00, the input to interactive hashing, is 2−Ω(n)-close to uniform, we know
that (A0|V 00=v00,VIH|V 00=v00) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,VIH|V 00=v00), as guaranteed by the hiding
property of interactive hashing (see Deﬁnition 3.2.1). So the S’s private output A0|V 00=v00
is hidden for any v00 ∈ V 00 satisfying the above (3.7). Finally note that (3.7) is satisﬁed for
all but a 2−n fraction of v00 ← V 00, so it follows that (A0,V 0) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,V 0), as
required.
Property (H.3) implies (H’.3). Using similar ideas in the proof of Lemma 3.5.19, we
can proceed as above and obtain that Property (H’.3) holds assuming (H.3). 
Binding preservation
In the execution of Algorithm 3.5.17, we obtained ` intermediate commitment schemes
[(Sj,Rj)]1≤j≤` , and one ﬁnal commitment scheme (S,R). Our goal is to prove that the
ﬁnal scheme (S,R) satisﬁes the 1-out-of-2 binding property of Deﬁnition 3.4.4. To achieve
our goal, we inductively show that the expected number of openings a sender can produce
in the intermediate schemes is bounded by some constant, namely 32. (This is captured by
Lemma 3.5.22 below.) Then in the ﬁnal step, for scheme (S,R), we show how to shrink this
expectation to value that is very close to 1, eﬀectively proving that scheme (S,R) is satisﬁes
the 1-out-of-2 binding property. (This in turn is captured by Lemma 3.5.24.)
In the deﬁnition of the computational 1-out-of-2 binding property (Deﬁnition 3.4.4),
we stipulated that the adversarial sender in the second phase can be computationally un-
bounded, whereas the adversarial sender in the ﬁrst phase must be probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT). It will be rather messy to work with PPT senders, hence we will ﬁrst ab-
stract away the PPT requirement by showing, in the next section, how to convert any PPT
sender violating the 1-out-of-2 binding property in the ﬁrst phase into a computationally
unbounded sender with a special unique binding property. A sender with the unique binding
property, intuitively, will not break the (ﬁrst-phase) binding property of any execution of
the initial schemes (S0,R0), but might still break the binding property of the intermediate
schemes (Sj,Rj) (or ﬁnal scheme (S,R)). Intuitively, we can restrict to such senders because
of the computational 1-out-of-2 binding property of the initial scheme (S0,R0). Once we
have a sender with the unique binding property, the analysis of the ampliﬁcation steps is
entirely information theoretic.
To formally deﬁne the unique binding property for senders, we observe that schemes
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when a cheating sender S∗ interacts with Rj, it is actually also interacting with the i-th
execution of R0, for each i = 1,2,..., which we will denote by R0[i]. Formally, we obtain a
(computationally unbounded) cheating sender strategy S∗[i] that interacts with this single
execution of R0[i] (more precisely, the ﬁrst commit stage R1
0,c[i]), by simulating all of the
other messages of Rj on its own until the end of the ﬁrst commit stage of R0[i]. Then
it enumerates over all choices for the subsequent messages of Rj and outputs all of the
resulting transcripts of S∗’s interactions with R0[i] together with the corresponding ﬁrst-
phase decommitment values.
DEFINITION 3.5.21
(Unique binding property of sender.) For intermediate schemes [(Sj,Rj)]1≤j≤` and ﬁnal
scheme (S,R), a (deterministic) sender S∗ has the unique binding property if for all i,
we have |openings(S∗[i],R0[i])| ≤ 1 with probability 1 (over the coins of S∗[i]11 and R0[i])
where openings(·) is deﬁned as in Section 3.5.2.
The following two lemmas, Lemma 3.5.22 and 3.5.24, provide us a way to understand
the binding property (in an average case sense) of (S,R), the ampliﬁed hiding scheme as
presented in Protocol 3.5.16, in terms of (S,R). We might occasionally drop the superscript
notations (1) and (2) from the notations if it is clear which phase we are referring to.
LEMMA 3.5.22
(Intermediate step binding preservation.) For some constant D ∈ N and any integers t ∈ [1,n],
β1,...,β` ∈ {0,1,...,D − 1}, and β`+1 ∈ [0,n], letting [(Sj,Rj)]1≤j≤` be the intermediate
commitment schemes obtained in the execution of Algorithm 3.5.17 with parameters D, t, and
(β1,...,β`+1), there exists a binding set B such that the following two conditions hold for each
j = 1,2,...,`:
(B.1) For every deterministic sender S∗ with the unique binding property,
E

openings(S∗,R1
j)(B)


< 32 ,
where the expectation is taken over the coins tosses of R1
j.
(B.2) For every τ ∈ B and for every deterministic sender S∗,
E

openings(S∗,R2
j)(τ)


< 32 ,
where the expectation is taken over the coins tosses of R2
j.
Proof. We proceed to prove by induction on j. In fact, we will start with a base case of
11Note that S
∗[i] is probabilistic even if S
∗ is deterministic, because it simulates all of the random choices
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j = 0, i.e., consider the scheme (S0,R0) from Section 3.5.2. By Lemma 3.5.14, we know
that scheme (S0,R0) satisﬁes both conditions (B.1) and (B.2). (Although Lemma 3.5.14
guarantees that (S0,R0) satisﬁes condition (B.1) only for PPT S∗, it is also trivially satisﬁed
for computationally unbounded S∗ with the unique binding property.)
For the inductive step, we assume (Sj,Rj) satisfy both (B.1) and (B.2), and show that
so does (Sj+1,Rj+1). Note that (Sj+1,Rj+1) is obtained by the ampliﬁcation procedure
(Protocol 3.5.16) that combines m sequential executions of (Sj,Rj), i.e., (Sj+1,Rj+1) =
Amplify(Sj,Rj). Hence, for convenience of notation we will denote (Sj,Rj) and (Sj+1,Rj+1)
as (S,R) and (S,R) respectively. The i-th execution of (S,R) in (S,R) is denoted as
(S[i],R[i]), not to be confused with the subscript indexing notation of (Sj,Rj).
Also throughout this proof, the value of m will be ﬁxed to D, although we will keep
writing m. Let B be the binding set for (S,R). We deﬁne our new binding set B0 for (S,R)
in terms of B as follows:
B0 = {(τ1,...,τm) : ∃ j1,...,jβ+1 such that τj1,...,τjβ+1 ∈ B} .
That is, a transcript τ0 = (τ1,...,τm) ∈ B0 if and only if at least β + 1 of τj’s are in B.
Conversely, τ0 / ∈ B0 if and only if at least m − β of the τj’s are not in B.
Property (B.1). Consider a deterministic S∗ with the unique binding property interact-
ing with R1. The random coins of R1 can be broken up into independent random coins of
R1[1],...,R1[m] and R1
IH, the receiver in the interactive hashing.
Recall that the m executions of (S,R) in (S,R) are sequential. We want to focus on
the interaction of S∗ with (the commit phase of) R1[i]. To do so, deﬁne S∗[i], the sender
interacting with R1[i], as follows: S∗[i] simulates S∗ using ﬁxed coins rj for all the previous
R1[j]’s (for all j < i) and after the interaction with R1[i], S∗[i] outputs all the valid openings
that occur in some continuation of S∗’s interaction with R[i] (by enumerating over all coins
of the future R[j]’s, j > i, the coins of R1
IH, and the coins of R2). Observe that S∗[i] inherits
the unique binding property from S∗. We will write S∗[i](r1,...,ri−1) to indicate the ﬁxed
coins rj that are used by S∗[i] in simulating R1[j].
Let Xi(r1,...,ri) =

openings(S∗[i](r1,...,ri−1,R1[i](ri))(B)

; in other words, count of
the number of valid decommitment in i-th execution, when the sender uses simulated coins
r1,...,ri−1 and R1[i] uses coins ri. Let U = (U1,...,Um), where Ui denotes the uniform
random variable on coins ri for R[i]; note that these are independent because the honest
receiver tosses independent coins for each execution. We now consider the random variables
Xi(U) = Xi(U1,...,Ui).
By our induction hypothesis, for all ﬁxed (r1,...,ri−1), we have
E[Xi(U)|U1 = r1,...,Ui−1 = ri−1] = E[Xi(r1,...,ri−1,Ui)] < 32 .
Because the previous Xj(U)’s, for j < i, only depend on U1,...,Uj, we have that
the expected value of Xi is less than 32 even given any previous values of Xj’s. That is,3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 85
E

Xi|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1

< 32 for any (x1,...,xi−1) ∈ Supp(X1,...,Xi−1). The following
claim allows us to bound the expectation of the product of these random variables.
CLAIM 3.5.23
Let Y1,...,Y` be nonnegative real-valued random variables such that for all i =
1,2,...,`, we have E[Yi|Y1=y1,...,Yi−1=yi−1] < αi ∈ R+, for every (y1,...,yi−1) ∈
Supp(Y1,...,Yi−1). Then,
E
"
` Y
i=1
Yi
#
<
` Y
i=1
αi .
Proof of Claim. Note that
E[Y1 ···Y`] = E

E[Y1 ···Y` | Y1 ···Y`−1]

= E

Y1 ···Y`−1 · E[Y` | Y1 ···Y`−1]

< E[Y1 ···Y`−1 · α`]
= α` · E[Y1 ···Y`−1] ,
and the claim follows by induction on `. 
As noted above, it is always the case that E [Xi] < 32, regardless of the instantiation of
previous Xj’s, for j < i. Note that Claim 3.5.23 also applies to computing the expectation
of
Q
i∈J Xi, for any subset J ⊂ [m], since any subset of the Xi’s (preserving the right order)
satisfy the condition of claim.
Once the m commitments R1[i] are complete, we can deﬁne a random variable A = A(U)
that denotes the set of values a = (a1,...,am)’s for which the sender S∗ produces a valid
opening with respect to B0 in some continuation of the protocol. By the deﬁnition of B0,
this means that a = (a1,...,am) is valid if at least m − β of those are ai’s correspond to
decommitments that are in B. For those ai’s corresponding to decommitments that are in
B, the number of possible values that ai can take on is Xi(U). And for those ai’s correspond
to decommitments that are not in B, we can only bound the number of possible values that
ai can take on by 2k (since ai is a k-bit string).
E
U
[|A(U)|] ≤ E
U


X
J⊆[m],|J|≥m−β
Y
i∈J
Xi(U)
Y
i/ ∈J
2k


=
X
J⊆[m],|J|≥m−β
E
U
"
Y
i∈J
Xi(U)
Y
i/ ∈J
2k
#
<
X
J⊆[m],|J|≥m−β
Y
i∈J
32 ·
Y
i/ ∈J
2k (by Claim 3.5.23)
≤ 2m · 32m−β · (2k)β (because 32 < 2k)
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Let random variable Γ1 = (H1,H1(A)). Since E[|A|] ≤ 2α1−(k−6m−4) and the range of
h1 ∈ H1 is α1, the expected density of Γ1 satisﬁes E[µ(Γ1)] ≤ E[|A|] · 2−α1 ≤ 2−(k−6m−4),
where the expectation is taken over the coins tosses U = (U1,...,Um). Note that Γ1 is inde-
pendent of the coins of R1
IH in the ﬁrst phase interactive hashing (though not independent
of the coins of R1).
Finally, we have
E
coins R1

openings(S∗,R1)(B0)


≤ E
coins R1
IH,Γ1
h

{d(1) : C(1)(d(1)) ∈ Γ1}



i
,
where in the second expectation, C = output(S∗,R1
IH). By Lemma 3.5.10,
E
coins R1
IH,Γ1
h

{d(1) : C(1)(d(1)) ∈ Γ1}



i
< 24 + 2k0+1 · E[µ(Γ1)] < 32 ,
with the last inequality following from k0 < k − 8m − 8.
Property (B.2). We use the same approach as above, except this time, we consider all
deterministic S∗, as opposed to only those with the unique binding property. Also we need
to ﬁx a binding transcript τ = (τ1,...,τm) ∈ B0. Let J be the set of indices such that
τi ∈ B.
As done previously, we deﬁne S∗[i] and set Xi =

openings(S∗[i],R2[i])(τi)

, where S∗[i].
By our induction hypothesis, for all i ∈ J, we have
E

Xi|X1=x1,...,Xi−1=xi−1

< 32 ,
for any (x1,...,xi−1) ∈ Supp(X1,...,Xi−1).
Let random variable B denote the denotes the set of values b = (b1,...,bm) for which
the sender S∗ produces a valid opening in some continuation of the protocol. Noting that
Xi can be as large as 2k for indices i / ∈ J, we have
E[|B|] ≤ E
coins R2[1],...,R2[m]
"
Y
i∈J
Xi
Y
i/ ∈J
2k
#
<
Y
i∈J
32 ·
Y
i/ ∈J
2k (by Claim 3.5.23))
≤ 32β+1 · (2k)m−β−1 (because 32 < 2k)
≤ 2(m−β)(k−1)−(k−6m) (because m > 5)
= 2α2−(k−6m−3).
Let random variable Γ2 = (H2,H2(B)). Since E[|B|] ≤ 2α2−(k−6m−3) and the range of
h2 ∈ H2 is α2, the expected density of Γ2 satisﬁes E[µ(Γ2)] ≤ E[|B|] · 2−α2 ≤ 2−(k−6m−3),
where the expectation is taken over the coins tosses of R2
1,...,R2
m. Note that Γ2 is indepen-3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 87
dent of the coins of R2
IH in the second phase interactive hashing (though not independent
of the coins of R2). Finally, we have
E
coins R2

openings(S∗,R2)(τ0)


≤ E
coins R2
IH,Γ2
h

{d(2) : C(2)(d(2)) ∈ Γ2}



i
,
where in the second expectation, C = openings(S∗(Γ2),RIH). By Lemma 3.5.10,
E
coins R2
IH,Γ2
h

{d(2) : C(2)(d(2)) ∈ Γ2}



i
< 24 + 2k0+1 · E[µ(Γ2)] < 32 ,
with the last inequality following from k0 < k − 8m − 8. 
LEMMA 3.5.24
(Final step binding preservation.) For some constant D ∈ N and any integers t ∈ [1,n],
β1,...,β` ∈ {0,1,...,D − 1}, and β`+1 ∈ [0,n], letting (S,R) be the ﬁnal output of Algo-
rithm 3.5.17 with parameters D, t, and (β1,...,β`+1), there exists a binding set B0 such that
the following two conditions hold:
(B.1) For every deterministic sender S∗ with the unique binding property, with prob-
ability 1 − 2−Ω(n) over the coins of R1,

openings(S∗,R1)(B0)

 ≤ 1 .
(B.2) For every τ ∈ B0 and for every deterministic sender S∗, with probability 1 −
2−Ω(n) over the coins of R2,

openings(S∗,R2)(τ)

 ≤ 1 .
Proof. From Lemma 3.5.22, we have scheme (S`,R`) with an associated binding set B sat-
isfying both conditions (B.1) and (B.2) in Lemma 3.5.22. Scheme (S,R) = Amplify(S`,R`),
and hence we will need to show that the ampliﬁcation boosts the binding by making sure
both

openings(S∗,R1)(B)

 ≤ 1 and

openings(S∗,R2)(τ)

 ≤ 1 with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n).
Throughout this proof, the value of m will be ﬁxed to n (as in Step 3 of Algorithm 3.5.17),
although we will keep writing m. We deﬁne our new binding set B0 for (S,R) in terms of B
as follows:
B0 = {(τ1,...,τm) : ∃ j1,...,jβ+1 such that τj1,...,τjβ+1 ∈ B} .
That is, a transcript τ0 = (τ1,...,τm) ∈ B0 if and only if at least β + 1 of τj’s are in B.
Conversely, τ0 / ∈ B0 if and only if at least m − β of the τj’s are not in B.88 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Property (B.1). Using the same analysis and notations as in the proof of Lemma 3.5.22,
we have that
E
coins R1[1],··· ,R1[m]
[|A|] ≤ 2m · 32m−β · (2k)β ≤ 2βk+6m ,
where A is the random variable denoting the set of values a = (a1,...,am)’s for which the
sender S∗ produces a valid opening with respect to B0 in some continuation of the protocol.
Since δ = Ω(1) and k` ≥ logn, observe that α1 =

(β + 1
3δn)k

> βk + 8n, for large
enough values of n. Let random variable Γ1 = (H1,H1(A)). Since the range of h1 ∈ H1 is
{0,1}α1, the density of Γ1 satisﬁes
E
coins R1[1],··· ,R1[m]
[µ(Γ1)] ≤ E[|A|] · 2−α1 < 2βk+6m · 2−(βk+8n) = 2−2n ,
since m = n. Thus, with probability at least 1−2−n over the coins tosses of R1[1],...,R1[m],
we have that
µ(Γ1) ≤ 2−2n · 2n = 2−n .
By Lemma 3.2.5, we can conclude that for such a Γ1 (with µ(Γ1) ≤ 2−n),
Pr
coins R1
IH
h

{d(1) : C(1)(d(1)) ∈ Γ1}


 > 1
i
= 2−Ω(n) .
Finally, we have:
Pr
coins R1

openings(S∗,R1)

 > 1

≤ Pr
coins R1
1,··· ,R1
m

µ(Γ1) > 2−n
+ Pr
coins R1
IH
h
|{d(1) : C(1)(d(1)) ∈ Γ1}| > 1

 µ(Γ1) ≤ 2−n
i
= 2−Ω(n) .
Property (B.2). Fix any τ0 ∈ B0. Again, we use the same analysis and notations as in
the proof of Lemma 3.5.22 to get:
E
coins R2[1],··· ,R2[m]
[|B|] ≤ 32β+1 · (2k)m−β−1 ≤ 2(m−β)k+5m ,
where B is the random variable denoting the set of values b = (b1,...,bm)’s for which the
sender S∗ produces a valid opening in some continuation of the protocol
Since δ = Ω(1) and k ≥ logn, observe that α2 =

(n − β + 1
3δn)k

> (n − β)k + 7n,
for large enough values of n. Let random variable Γ2 = (H2,H2(B)). Since the range of
h2 ∈ H2 is {0,1}α2, the density of Γ2 satisﬁes
E
coins R2[1],··· ,R2[m]
[µ(Γ2)] ≤ E[|B|] · 2−α2 < 2(m−β)k+5m · 2−((n−β)k+7n) = 2−2n ,
since m = n. Thus, with probability at least 1−2−n over the coins tosses of R2[1],...,R2[m],3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 89
we have that
µ(Γ2) ≤ 2−2n · 2n = 2−n.
By Lemma 3.2.5, we can conclude that for such a Γ2 (with µ(Γ2) ≤ 2−n),
Pr
coins R2
IH
h

{d(2) : C(2)(d(2)) ∈ Γ2}


 > 1
i
= 2−Ω(n) .
Finally, we have:
Pr
coins R2

openings(S∗,R2)(τ0)

 > 1

≤ Pr
coins R2
1,··· ,R2
n

µ(Γ2) > 2−n
+ Pr
coins R2
IH
h
|{d(2) : C(2)(d(2)) ∈ Γ2}|

 µ(Γ2) ≤ 2−n
i
= 2−Ω(n) . 
3.5.4 A collection of 1-out-of-2-binding commitments
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.5.1 restated below.
RESTATEMENT OF THEOREM 3.5.1
If one-way functions exist, then on security parameter 1n, we can construct in time polynomial
in n a collection of public-coin 2-phase commitment schemes COM = {Com1,··· ,Comm},
where m = poly(n), such that:
I There exists an index i ∈ {1,2,...,m} such that scheme Comi is statistically hiding.
I For every index i ∈ {1,2,...,m}, scheme Comi is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
To obtain the desired collection of 2-phase commitment schemes, we apply Algorithm 3.5.17
to the weakly-hiding scheme (S0,R0), which can be constructed based on any one-way
function. More precisely, we obtain a collection of commitments by enumerating over all
the polynomially many choices of the integers t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, β1,...,β` ∈ {0,1,...,D−1},
and β`+1 ∈ {0,1,...,n}. Note that the number of choices is n·D`·(n+1) = poly(n), as D =
O(1) and ` = logn. By Lemma 3.5.18, the resulting commitment schemes Com1,··· ,Comm
all run in polynomial time. The hiding and binding properties of these schemes are given
by Lemmas 3.5.25 and 3.5.26, which together establish Theorem 3.5.1.
LEMMA 3.5.25
There exists a constant D ∈ N, integers t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, β1,...,β` ∈ {0,1,...,D − 1},
and β`+1 ∈ {0,1,...,n} such that the 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) produced by Al-
gorithm 3.5.17 with parameters D, t, and (β1,...,β`+1) is statistically hiding in the sense90 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Deﬁnition 3.4.3 (regardless of whether the function f on which the scheme is based on is
one-way or not).
Proof. We prove by induction on the properties of (Sj,Rj) for j = 0,1,...,`. The induction
hypothesis is that (Sj,Rj) has two associated sets Γ1,j,Γ2,j ⊆ {0,1}nmj
such that for all
R∗, the following holds:
1. Γ1,j ∪ Γ2,j = {0,1}nmj
and µ(Γ1,j ∩ Γ2,j) ≥ min{2j/n,1/2D}.
2. CP1/2(A|V ) ≤
√
2−(kj−1), where A = outputS(S1
c,j(Γ1,j),R∗) and V =
viewR∗(S1
c,j(Γ1,j),R∗).
3. CP1/2(Bτ|Wτ) ≤
√
2−(k−1), where the joint distribution (Bτ,Wτ) =
(outputS(S2
c(Γ2,j),R∗),viewR∗(S2
c(Γ2,j),R∗))|T=τ, for every τ ∈ Supp(T),
for T = transcript(S1(Γ2,j),R∗).
where kj is deﬁned as in Algorithm 3.5.17.
The base case of j = 0 follows from the fact that Protocol 3.4.6 is (1/n)-hiding as estab-
lished by Lemma 3.5.13. The induction step is provided by the Intermediate Step Hiding
Ampliﬁcation Lemma 3.5.19. Finally, observe that µ(Γ1,` ∩ Γ2,`) ≥ min{2`/n,1/(2D)} =
Ω(1) since ` = logn.
By the Final Step Hiding Ampliﬁcation Lemma 3.5.20, there exists two sets Γ1,`+1 and
Γ2,`+1 such that for all R∗, the following three conditions holds:
1. µ(Γ1,`+1),µ(Γ2,`+1) > 1 − 2−Ω(n);
2. (A,V ) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,V ), where A = outputS(S1
c(Γ1,`+1),R∗) and
V = viewR∗(S1
c(Γ1,`+1),R∗);
3. for all τ0 ∈ Supp(T0), (B0
τ0,W0
τ0) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,W0
τ0), where
(B0
τ0,W0
τ0) = (outputS(S2
c(Γ2,`+1),R∗),viewR∗(S2
c(Γ2,`+1),R∗))|T0=τ0, and
T0 = transcript(S1(Γ2,`+1),R∗).
Since both µ(Γ1,`+1),µ(Γ2,`+1) > 1−2−Ω(n), we can substitute random variables Γ1,`+1
and Γ2,`+1 with an independent uniform random variable UN, where N = nm`and get the
following desired hiding properties.
I (A,V ) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,V ), where A = outputS(S1
c(UN),R∗) and
V = viewR∗(S1
c(UN),R∗).
I (B0,W0,T0) is 2−Ω(n)-close to (U1,W0,T0), where B0 = outputS(S2
c(UN),R∗), W0 =
viewR∗(S2
c(UN)), and T0 = transcript(S1(UN),R∗).
The above two conditions are the requirements for being statistical hiding in the sense
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LEMMA 3.5.26
There exists a constant D ∈ N such that for all integers t ∈ {1,2,...,n}, β1,...,β` ∈
{0,1,...,D − 1}, and β`+1 ∈ {0,1,...,n}, the 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) produced
by Algorithm 3.5.17 with parameters D, t, and (β1,...,β`+1) is computationally 1-out-of-2
binding in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.4.4. (Here the function f for which the scheme is based on
needs to be hard to invert.)
Proof. By Lemma 3.5.24, we have established that the 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R)
produced by Algorithm 3.5.17 satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 3.4.4. In addition,
it also satisﬁes the second condition for all S∗ with the unique binding property. Stated
formally, for every deterministic (and computationally unbounded) S∗ with the unique
binding property,
Pr

openings(S∗,R1)

 ≤ 1

= 1 − 2−Ω(n), (3.8)
where the probability is taken over the coins of R1.
Thus, it suﬃces to prove is that any PPT S∗ breaking the second condition of Deﬁni-
tion 3.4.4 with probability ε will either (i) yield a PPT ˆ S that violates the computational
1-out-of-2 binding property of (S0,R0) with probability at least εO(1)/poly(n), or (ii) yield
a computationally unbounded ˆ S that has the unique binding property and succeeds with
probability greater than ε/2. In both cases, ε needs to be negligibly small in order to avoid
a contradiction. Without loss of generality, we may assume adversarial PPT sender S∗ to
be deterministic since we can set its coins to maximizes its success probability.
From now on, let ε be the probability that the deterministic S∗ breaks the second
condition of Deﬁnition 3.4.4 with respect to scheme (S,R). By the way we deﬁned (S,R),
it contains polynomially many executions of (S0,R0). Let N = n·D` denote such number.
Let z denote the transcript of (S∗,R). Contained in z is also a ﬁrst-phase commitment
z[i] for the i-th execution of R0, denoted R0[i] (for all i = 1,2,...,N). Let ˆ z[i] be the
partial transcript of z up to and including the ﬁrst commit stage of R0[i]. Note that z[i] is
a suﬃx of ˆ z[i], and ˆ z[i] is a preﬁx of z.
For all index i ∈ [N], partial transcripts ˆ z[i] ending with the ﬁrst commit stage of R0[i]
and d ∈ {0,1}k0, deﬁne
pi,ˆ z[i],d = Pr
z←(S∗,R1)
[z contains a valid opening of z[i] to value d|z begins with ˆ z[i]] ,
where as usual by a valid opening, we mean that the transcript τ[i] of S∗’s interaction with
R0[i] contains an opening of z[i] to the value d, the ﬁrst phase of τ[i] is not in the binding
set B0, and R0[i] accepts in both phases of τ[i].
Let K = 2k0, where k0 is the message length in (S0,R0). We have two cases to consider.92 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Case 1. There exists an i ∈ [N] such that with probability at least ε
4NK over ˆ z[i], there
exists d 6= d0 with both pi,ˆ z[i],d,pi,ˆ z[i],d0 > ε
4NK.
In this case, we violate the computational 1-out-of-2 binding property of (S0,R0) by
considering the following sender ˆ S interacting with R0[i].
1. Select a random i ← [N].
2. Run S∗ with R1, simulating all of the messages of R1 internally except for
those of R0[i]. Halting after the ﬁrst commit stage of R0[i], we obtain a
partial transcript ˆ z[i]. From ˆ z[i], we get z[i], the ﬁrst-phase commitment
of R0[i].
3. Record the current state ψ of S∗ and R1.
4. Continue the execution of S∗ with R1 from ψ to obtain a decommitment
to a value d in the interaction with R0[i].
5. Repeat Step 4 with independent randomness in continuing the execution
of S∗ with R1 to obtain a decommitment to a value d0. (This can be done
since R is public coin, i.e., just sends independent random coins at each
round, and S∗ is deterministic.)
Because our goal is to violate the computational 1-out-of-2 binding property of (S0,R0),
we succeed in the above algorithm if d 6= d0 and decommitments produced are valid. We
calculate our success probability as follows: We guess correct index i ∈ [N] with probability
1/N. Given that we guess the correct i, we get the desired ˆ z[i] with probability at least
ε
4NK. Now, when we do two independent continuations of ˆ z[i] we arrive at two diﬀerent
decommitted values with probability greater than ( ε
4NK)2. Consequently, we violate the
computational 1-out-of-2 binding property of (S0,R0) (i.e., win the game in Condition 2 of
Deﬁnition 3.4.4) with probability greater than
1
N
·
ε
4NK
·
 ε
4NK
2
=
1
N
·
 ε
4NK
3
=
ε
n
O(1)
,
since K = 2k0 = 2O(logn) = poly(n) and N = n·D` = n·O(1)O(logn) = poly(n). This forces
ε to be a negligible function.
Case 2. For all i ∈ [N], with probability greater than 1 − ε
4NK over ˆ z[i], there is at most
one d such that pi,ˆ z[i],d > ε
4NK.
Deﬁne d∗(ˆ z[i]) to be the value of d that maximizes pi,ˆ z[i],d. Taking a union bound over3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 93
all the rest of the pi,ˆ z[i],d0 < ε
4NK, we have that
Pr
z←(S∗,R)
[S∗ opens some z[i] to a value other than d∗(ˆ z[i])]
≤
N X
i=1

ε
4NK
· K + Pr
ˆ z[i]
h
exists more than one d such that pi,ˆ z[i],d >
ε
4NK
i
< N ·
 ε
4NK
· K +
ε
4NK

<
ε
2
.
Let ˆ S be the adversary that mimics S∗ except that it halts and fails if S∗ attempts to
open some z[i] to a value other than d∗(ˆ z[i]), for all i ∈ [N] and all ˆ z[i]. By the way we
deﬁned ˆ S, the ﬁnal outcome of (ˆ S,R1) will only diﬀer with the original ﬁnal outcome of
(S∗,R1) with probability at most ε/2 over the coins of R1. In addition, ˆ S has the unique
binding property. By (3.8) above,


openings(ˆ S,R1)


 > 1 occurs with at most negligible
probability over the coins of R1. Hence,

openings(S∗,R1)

 > 1 occurs with probability at
most neg(n)+ε/2. We started oﬀ assuming that S∗ breaks property (B.1) of scheme (S,R)
with probability at least ε, that is to say

openings(S∗,R1)

 > 1 with probability at least ε.
Thus ε ≤ neg(n) + ε/2, which implies that ε = neg(n). 
3.5.5 Standard commitments from 1-out-of-2-binding commitments
In the previous sections, we constructed statistically-hiding and computationally 1-out-of-
2-binding commitment schemes from any one-way function. In this section, we present a
result of Haitner and Reingold [HR2] that transforms these 1-out-of-2-binding commitments
into commitment schemes that are statistically hiding and computationally binding (in the
standard sense of binding). They accomplished this using a novel application of a universal
one-way hash family, whose existence can be based on any one-way function [Rom] (see
also [KK]). Thus, the Haitner & Reingold transformation can be based on any one-way
function. We state their transformation techniques in Algorithm 3.5.28 and Protocol 3.5.29,
but ﬁrst we give an overview of their techniques.
Overview of the Haitner & Reingold transformation
The 1-out-of-2 binding property of 2-phase commitment schemes states that it is infeasible
for an adversarial sender S∗ to break both phases of the commitment, but nonetheless it
might be possible for S∗ to break one of the two phases of its choice. With this in mind,
suppose that after the ﬁrst commitment phase, receiver R ﬂips a coin phase ← {1,2}. If
phase = 1, the ﬁrst commitment phase is used to do the commitment. On the other hand,
if phase = 2, the second commitment phase is used to do the commitment (this is done by
S∗ revealing its ﬁrst-phase commitment, and then proceeding to the second phase with R).
Intuitively, this would make the scheme binding (with probability 1/2) if S∗ chooses which94 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
of the two phases it wants to break in advance. The problem, however, is that S∗ could
choose the phase that it wants to break after seeing the value of phase.
A way to overcome this problem is to force the adversary S∗ to decide which of the
two phases it wants to break before seeing the value of phase. Haitner and Reingold [HR2]
achieved this by having S∗ send back a value y = f(σ) before the value of phase is announced
by the receiver R, where σ is the message committed to by S∗ in the ﬁrst phase, and f
is a random hash function from a universal one-way hash family. A universal one-way
hash family is a family of hash functions such that it is hard to ﬁnd collisions with any
particular value of x speciﬁed in advance.12 In other words, for a value of x announced
before a random hash function f is selected from that family, any eﬃcient algorithm will
not be able to ﬁnd another x0 such that f(x0) = f(x). This property of a universal one-way
hash family is termed target collision resistance by Bellare and Rogaway [BR].
We ﬁrst argue the hiding property of this new scheme. Before y is sent, the value of
σ, the message committed in the ﬁrst phase, is hidden. If hash function f is compressing
enough, then the value of y = f(σ) leaks at most a few bits of information about σ, so the
entropy of σ given y is still large. This means that we can apply a pairwise-independent
hash on σ to get an almost uniform value (recall the Leftover Hash Lemma 3.3.1). Thus,
this new scheme is hiding when phase = 1. When phase = 2, the sender reveals σ and
proceeds on to the second phase, which is used for the commitment. In this case, the hiding
property of this new scheme follows from the hiding property of the second commitment
phase.
Next, we argue the binding property of this new scheme by making the following obser-
vation: the 1-out-of-2 binding property says that after the ﬁrst commitment phase, there
exists at most one value of σ∗ that allows an adversarial sender S∗ to cheat in the second
phase. In other words, if S∗ reveals to a value other than σ∗, the second phase will be
binding.
When it is the sender’s turn to send y, after receiving a random hash function f from
receiver R, sender S∗ could decide to either send y = f(σ∗) or send y 6= f(σ∗). If it
decides to send y = f(σ∗), and if R selects phase = 1 following that, then S∗ is bound to
a single value, since to decommit to two diﬀerent values it will have to reveal a σ0 6= σ∗
with f(σ0) = y = f(σ∗), and this is infeasible by the target collision resistance property
of f. (The value of σ∗ is determined by the ﬁrst-phase commitment, which is completed
before a random f is selected.) Instead if it decides to send y 6= f(σ∗), and if R selects
phase = 2 following that, then S∗ will have to reveal to a value other than σ∗ for its ﬁrst-
phase commitment. In this case, the commitments are done in the second phase, and by
the 1-out-of-2 binding property, this phase is guaranteed to be binding. Since the value of
phase is independent of y, both cases happen with probability 1/2, which would make our
scheme binding with probability close to 1/2.
12See Deﬁnition 3.5.31 for the deﬁnition of a universal one-way hash family.3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 95
The Haitner & Reingold transformation
The Haitner & Reingold transformation [HR2], to be stated in Algorithm 3.5.28, requires a
2-phase commitment with message lengths (k1,k2) = (n,1): that is to say, the ﬁrst phase
deals with commitment to an n-bit message, and the second phase deals with commitment
to a 1-bit message. Next, we show how to obtain these commitments.
Obtaining 2-phase commitments with suitable message lengths. The 2-phase
commitments that we constructed based on any one-way function, as stated in Theo-
rem 3.5.1, has message lengths (k1,k2) = (1,1). Nevertheless, it is possible to convert
these scheme to one with message lengths (k1,k2) = (n,1).
CLAIM 3.5.27
(From [HR2, Lem.2.14].) If there exists a 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) with message
lengths (k1,k2) = (1,1), then there exists another 2-phase commitment scheme (S0,R0) with
message lengths (k1,k2) = (n,1) such that:
I if (S,R) is statistically hiding, then (S0,R0) is also statistically hiding, and
I if (S,R) is statistically [resp., computationally] 1-out-of-2 binding, then (S0,R0) is also
statistically [resp., computationally] 1-out-of-2 binding.
Proof Sketch. Here, we present an informal description of the new scheme (S0,R0) with
message lengths (k1,k2) = (n,1); the detailed construction of (S0,R0), and the proof of
Claim 3.5.27 is in [HR2]:
1. In the ﬁrst phase, scheme (S0,R0) commits to a message σ = (σ1,...,σn) ∈ {0,1}n by
running n independent executions of the ﬁrst phase of (S,R) in parallel, committing
to σi in the i-th execution of (S,R).
2. In the second phase, scheme (S0,R0) commits to a bit b ∈ {0,1} by also running
n independent executions of the second phase of (S,R) in parallel, but this time
committing to the same bit b in all executions of (S,R).
Intuitively, scheme (S0,R0) should be hiding since it is only running multiple executions of
scheme (S,R), all of which are hiding. The 1-out-of-2 binding property of (S0,R0) can be
informally argued as follows: If we break the ﬁrst phase of (S0,R0), we will have to break
the i-th ﬁrst phase execution of (S,R), for some i ∈ {1,2,...,n}. By the 1-out-of-2 binding
property of (S,R), the i-th execution of the second phase of (S,R) will be binding, and
because we are committing to the same bit b in all executions, this will force the second
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The Haitner & Reingold transformation algorithm. We present the transformation
algorithm using an arbitrary family of functions F, and will only require F to be a universal
one-way hash family when we want to prove the hiding and binding security properties.
Separating the security properties from the protocol description enables us to prove that
the transformation also works in settings of instance-dependent cryptographic primitives,
as later considered in Section 3.6.
ALGORITHM 3.5.28                                      
The Haitner & Reingold transformation, denoted as HR-Transform.
Input: 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) with message lengths (k1,k2) = (n,1), and a
family of functions F =
S
n Fn = {f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m}.
Output: Commitment scheme (S,R) as described by Protocol 3.5.29.
                                                               
Hence, we write the commitment scheme obtained as (S,R) = HR-Transform((S,R),F).
PROTOCOL 3.5.29                                       
Standard commitment scheme (S,R) from 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R).
Security parameter: 1n, given as common input to both S and R.
Sender’s private input: Bit b ∈ {0,1}.
Commit stage:
1. S selects a uniform σ ← {0,1}n.
2. S and R engages in (S1
c(σ),R1
c)(1n), with S acting as S1
c and R acting as R1
c. Let
c(1) be the common output of S1
c and R1
c after the interaction.
3. R chooses f ← Fn and sends it to S.
4. S sends y = f(σ) to R.
5. R ﬂips a random coin, represented by phase ← {1,2}.
If phase = 1, then proceed as follows:
(a) S selects a random hash h ← H, where H is a family of pairwise-independent
hash functions with domain {0,1}n and range {0,1}, and sends (h,b⊕h(σ))
to R.
(b) S and R both output (c(1),f,y,phase = 1,h,b ⊕ h(σ)) as the commitment.
If phase = 2, then proceed as follows:
(a) S runs S1
r to obtain the decommitment message γ(1) and ﬁrst-phase transcript
τ corresponding to both σ and c(1). S sends (σ,γ(1),τ) to R.
(b) S and R engage in (S2
c(b),R2
c)(1n,τ), with S acting as S2
c and R acting as R2
c.
Let c(2) be the common output of S2
c and R2
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(c) S and R both output (c(1),f,y,phase = 2,c(2)) as the commitment.
Reveal stage:
To decommit to bit b, do the following depending the value of phase.
If phase = 1, then:
1. S sends (b,σ) to R;
2. If y = f(σ) and the last component of the commitment equals b ⊕ h(σ), then R
accepts. Otherwise, R rejects.
If phase = 2, then:
1. S runs S2
r to obtain the decommitment message γ(2), and sends (b,γ(2)) to R;
2. If y = f(σ) and both R1
r and R2
r accept (c(1),σ,γ(1)) and (c(2),b,γ(2)), respectively,
then R accepts. Otherwise, R rejects.
                                                               
Analyzing the Haitner & Reingold transformation
The hiding and binding security properties of Protocol 3.5.29 will rely on properties of
F being a universal one-way hash family. In fact, we will analyze these security proper-
ties separately so that Protocol 3.5.29 will be applicable in settings of instance-dependent
cryptographic primitives, as later considered in Section 3.6.
Our plan for the remaining of this section is as follows: (i) we present the deﬁnition of a
universal one-way hash family due to Naor and Yung [NY]; (ii) we separate the properties
of a universal one-way hash family into two parts; and ﬁnally, (iii) we prove the hiding and
binding properties of Protocol 3.5.29 based on these two separate properties.
Universal one-way hash family. In order to deﬁne a universal one-way hash family,
we need to understand what it means for a family of functions to be polynomial-time com-
putable.
DEFINITION 3.5.30
A family of functions F =
S
n Fn = {f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m} is polynomial-time com-
putable if
I for every n, the description of a function f ∈ Fn is bounded by a polynomial in n,
and
I there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm F such that for every n and
every f ∈ Fn, given the description of the function f and a string x ∈ {0,1}n, F
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DEFINITION 3.5.31
A polynomial-time computable family of functions F =
S
n Fn = {f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m} is
a universal one-way hash family if m < n and there exists a negligible function ε such
that for all nonuniform PPT A the following holds for all values of n and all x∗ ∈ {0,1}n:
Pr
f←Fn
[A(1n,f) = x such that f(x) = f(x∗) and x 6= x∗] ≤ ε(n) .
REMARK 3.5.32
I The original deﬁnition by Naor and Yung [NY] required the PPT adversary A to
output a string x∗ before a random hash f ← Fn is chosen. The deﬁnition presented
above, which considers all strings x∗, is equivalent to the Naor–Yung deﬁnition when
considering nonuniform PPT adversaries. This is because this adversary can be given
as advice the value of x∗ that maximizes its chance to produce a collision.
I Although it is more natural for the security be parameterized in terms of the output
length, namely m, our applications do not require hash functions that are shrinking
by more than a polynomial factor. Hence for this reason, and in part for consistency,
we keep n as our security parameter.
I Naor and Yung [NY] showed that starting with a universal one-way hash family that
is compressing by only one bit, namely m = n−1, more compression can be achieved,
say m ≤ n/2, by iterative application several hash functions chosen from the family.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that our universal one-way hash
family will have the feature that m ≤ n/2.
Two properties of a universal one-way hash family. A universal one-way hash family
satisfying Deﬁnition 3.5.31 has the following two main properties.
Large preimages: most of the preimages have a large size. This follows from the com-
pressing nature of hash functions: the output length m is much shorter than the input
length n. (Recall that we can get a universal one-way hash family with m ≤ n/2.)
We formalize this in property in Deﬁnition 3.5.33.
Target collision resistance: it is hard to ﬁnd collisions for a pre-speciﬁed value of x∗.
We formalize this in property in Deﬁnition 3.5.34.
DEFINITION 3.5.33
A family of functions F =
S
n Fn = {f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m} has the large preimages
property if for every f ∈ F, most elements in the range of f have large preimage sizes.
Stated precisely, there exists a function α(n) = ω(1) and a negligible function ε, such that3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 99
for all values of n, the following holds:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
h
f−1(f(x))

 ≥ nα(n)
i
≥ 1 − ε(n) ,
for every function f ∈ Fn.
DEFINITION 3.5.34
A family of functions F =
S
n Fn = {f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m} has the statistical [resp.,
computational] target collision resistance property if there exists a negligible function
ε such that for every [resp., nonuniform PPT] A, the following holds for all values of n and
every x∗ ∈ {0,1}n:
Pr
f←Fn
[A(1n,f) = x such that f(x) = f(x∗) and x 6= x∗] ≤ ε(n) .
Large preimages and target collision resistance are opposing properties. Speciﬁcally, it
is impossible for a single family of functions to have large preimages and have statistical
target collision resistance.13 The power of a universal one-way hash family comes from
the fact that it has the large preimages property and has computational target collision
resistance.
LEMMA 3.5.35
If F =
S
n Fn = {f : {0,1}n → {0,1}m}, for m ≤ n/2, is a universal one-way hash family, then
F has both the large preimages and the computational target collision resistance properties.
Proof. The computational target collision resistance property follow directly from Deﬁni-
tion 3.5.31. Hence, all we need to show is that the compressing nature of F, when m ≤ n/2,
implies the large preimages property.
Group the elements with small preimages into a set S = {y ∈ {0,1}m :

f−1(y)

 <
2
3
4n−m}. Since m ≤ n/2, every element y / ∈ S has a preimage of size

f−1(y)

 ≥ 2
3
4n−m ≥
2n/4 = nω(1). To complete, we bound the probability of landing in S, which we do by a
union bound over the elements in S (for which, there are at most 2m):
Pr
x←{0,1}n [f(x) ∈ S] = Pr[∃y ∈ S with f(Un) = y] <
2
3
4n−m
2n · 2m = 2−n/4 = neg(n) . 
Hiding. Having separated the properties of a universal one-way hash family into hav-
ing large preimages and having target collision resistance, we now show that the large
13As we will see later in Section 3.6, it is possible for an instance-dependent family of functions to have
large preimages and have statistical target collision resistance, albeit each property holds on diﬀerent set of
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preimages property of F translates to the hiding property of the commitment scheme
(S,R) = HR-Transform((S,R),F) obtained from the Haitner & Reingold transformation.
LEMMA 3.5.36
If the family of functions F has the large preimages property, and the 2-phase commitment
scheme (S,R) is statistically hiding, then scheme (S,R) = HR-Transform((S,R),F) is statisti-
cally hiding.
Proof. What we need to show is that for any adversarial receiver R∗, the views of R∗ in
(S(0),R∗) and (S(1),R∗) are statistically indistinguishable. (In this proof, we drop the
security parametrization of 1n because it is clear from context.) We can, without loss of
generality, only consider deterministic R∗ because we can ﬁx the adversary’s coin tosses to
maximize its distinguishing advantage. In the rest of this proof, we use indistinguishability
and hiding to mean those of the statistical variant.
Let P denote the value of phase sent by R∗, and we break our hiding analysis to cases
when P = 1 and P = 2. To formalize this case analysis, we say that random variables X and
Y are indistinguishable on event E if for all D, |Pr[D(X) = 1 ∧ E] − Pr[D(X) = 0 ∧ E]|
is negligible (in the security parameter n). What we will show is that the random variables
viewR∗(S(0),R∗) and viewR∗(S(1),R∗) are indistinguishable on both events P = 1 and
P = 2, thus allowing us to conclude that the scheme is hiding.
First, we analyze the case when P = 2. Let random variable Σ and F denote S’s
choice of σ and the value of f sent by R∗, respectively. Observe that P is a deterministic
function of the random variables V1 = viewR∗(S1
c(Σ),R∗) and Y = F(Σ). In turn, V1 and
Y are deterministic functions of the ﬁrst-phase transcript T = transcript(S1(Σ),R∗), which
includes both the commit and reveal stages. This is because we can compute the view of
the receiver from the ﬁrst-phase transcript, and the ﬁrst-phase transcript also contains the
value of σ, from which we can compute y = f(σ). For bit b ∈ {0,1}, let random variable
V2(b) = viewR∗(S2
c(b),R∗)(T), recalling that T = transcript(S1(Σ),R∗). Because (S,R) is
hiding, its 2-phase commitments is hiding even given the ﬁrst-phase transcript: this means
that (V2(0),T) is indistinguishable from (V2(1),T). Since P is a deterministic function of
T, random variables (V2(0),T) and (V2(1),T) are indistinguishable on event P = 2. Since
viewR∗(S(b),R∗)|P=2 is a deterministic function of (V2(b),T)|P=2, for b ∈ {0,1}, we have
that viewR∗(S(0),R∗) and viewR∗(S(1),R∗) are indistinguishable on event P = 2.
Next, we analyze the case when P = 1. The hiding property of the ﬁrst phase gives us
(V1,Σ) ≈s (V1,Un) ,
where Un represent a uniform random variable over {0,1}n, and is independent from V1
and Σ. Recall that random variable F denotes the function f sent by R∗. Since F is a3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 101
deterministic function of V1, we get
(V1,F,F(Σ),Σ) ≈s (V1,F,F(Un),Un) .
Now, let random variable H represent the hash function h selected by S when phase = 1.
Note that H is independent of V1, F, Σ, and Un, so
(V1,F,Y,H,H(Σ)) ≈s (V1,F,F(Un),H,H(Un)) , (3.9)
recalling that Y = F(Σ).
What we need to establish is that H(Un) is close to uniform so that we have hiding.
The next claim does this for us.
CLAIM 3.5.37
Suppose family of functions F =
S
n Fn has the large preimages property. Let
random variable H denote a random hash function from a family of pairwise-
independent hash functions with domain {0,1}n and range {0,1}, random vari-
able Un denote a uniform string in {0,1}n, random variable U0
1 denote a uniform
string in {0,1}, and that H, Un, and U0
1 are all independent. For every f ∈ Fn,
(f(Un),H,H(Un)) is indistinguishable from (f(Un),H,U0
1).
Proof of Claim. The large preimages property of F guarantees that with prob-
ability 1−neg(n) over y ← f(Un), the min-entropy H∞(Un|f(Un)=y) ≥ ω(logn).
For y satisfying this condition, we apply the Leftover Hash Lemma 3.3.1 to get
that (y,H,H(Un|f(Un)=y)) is indistinguishable from (y,H,H(Un|f(Un)=y)). 
Because H and Un are independent from the rest of the random variables (and are
independent from each other), Claim 3.5.37 states that
(V1,F,F(Un),H,H(Un)) ≈s (V1,F,F(Un),H,U0
1) , (3.10)
where U0
1 is an independent random variable representing a uniform random variable over
{0,1}. Combining (3.9) and (3.10), we get
(V1,F,Y,H,H(Σ)) ≈s (V1,F,F(Un),H,U0
1) ,
which leads to:
(V1,F,Y,H,0 ⊕ H(Σ)) ≈s(V1,F,F(Un),H,0 ⊕ U0
1)
≡ (V1,F,F(Un),H,1 ⊕ U0
1)
≈s(V1,F,Y,H,1 ⊕ H(Σ)) .102 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Since P is a deterministic function of V1 and Y , random variables (V1,F,Y,H,0⊕H(Σ)) and
(V1,F,Y,H,1 ⊕ H(Σ)) are indistinguishable on event P = 1. Since viewR∗(S(b),R∗)|P=1
is a deterministic function of (V1,F,Y,H,b ⊕ H(Σ))|P=1, for b ∈ {0,1}, we have that
viewR∗(S(0),R∗) and viewR∗(S(1),R∗) are indistinguishable on event P = 1. 
Binding. We show that the target collision resistance property of F translates to the
binding property of the commitment scheme (S,R) = HR-Transform((S,R),F) obtained
from the Haitner & Reingold transformation. Because we will only be able to show that
(S,R) is binding with probability close to 1/2, we ﬁrst deﬁne what it means to for a scheme
to be binding with probability δ, for some δ ∈ [0,1].
DEFINITION 3.5.38
Commitment scheme (S,R) is statistically [resp., computationally] δ(n)-binding if
for all [resp., nonuniform PPT] S∗ and every large enough values of n, sender S∗ succeeds
in the following game with probability at most δ(n):
On security parameter 1n, S∗ interacts with R in the commit stage obtaining
commitment c. Then S∗ outputs pairs (0,d0) and (1,d1), and succeeds if in the
reveal stage, R(0,d0,c) = R(1,d1,c) = accept.
The standard notion of binding as given in Deﬁnition 2.4.4 corresponds to being (1 −
neg(n))-binding in the above deﬁnition.
LEMMA 3.5.39
If the family of functions F is statistically [resp., computationally] universal one-way, and the
2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) is statistically [resp., computationally] 1-out-of-2 binding,
then scheme (S,R) = HR-Transform((S,R),F) is statistically [resp., computationally] (1/2 −
neg(n))-binding.
Proof. For this proof, we take probabilities over the entire interaction between S∗ and R
in both the commit and reveal stages, unless stated otherwise. Since S∗ is nonuniform, we
can assume without loss of generality that reveal stage is noninteractive, and the message
sent by S∗ in the reveal stage is a deterministic function of its view in the commit phase.
So naturally, we say that S∗ breaks commitment Υ = output(S∗,R) if it is able to produce
decommitments to two diﬀerent messages for commitment Υ in the reveal phase. (In this
proof, we drop the security parametrization of 1n because it is clear from context.)
We need to upper bound the probability that S∗ breaks the commitment Υ. To help us
do so, we establish several useful random variables. Let random variable C = output(S∗,R1
c)
denote the ﬁrst-phase commitment of S∗ interacting with R1
c. For each ﬁrst-phase commit-
ment c ∈ C, we will need to deﬁne a value of σ∗ that will be interpreted as the commitment3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 103
of S∗ in the ﬁrst phase such that only if S∗ reveals to σ∗, will S∗ be able to cheat in the
second phase. To do so, deﬁne the following measure for each ﬁrst-phase commitment c ∈ C:
pσ[c] = Pr
"
S∗ produces an accepting full transcript λ = (τ,κ)
such that τ / ∈ B and τ contains c and σ
#
, (3.11)
where we say full transcript λ is accepting if both R1
r and R2
r accept in λ. With this
measure, we deﬁne σ∗[c] = argmaxσ pσ[c], breaking ties arbitrarily (say, by choosing the
lexicographic smallest σ). We deﬁne the random variables P, F, Σ∗, Σ1, and Σ2 as follows:
I P represents the value of phase;
I F represents the function f from the family F;
I Σ∗ = σ∗[C]. Note that Σ∗ is a deterministic function of C;
I Σ1 represents the value of σ 6= Σ∗ given by S∗ when P = 1 (if no such value exists,
then the value of Σ1 defaults to Σ∗);
I Σ2 represents the value of σ revealed when P = 2.
We use the notation Σ2 / ∈ B to denote the event of P = 2 and S∗ completing an accepting
full transcript λ = (τ,κ) such that τ / ∈ B and τ contains c and Σ2. In addition, we use the
notation Σ2 ∈ B to denote the complementary event of Σ2 / ∈ B not happening.
Having established the appropriate random variables, we turn our attention back to
bounding the probability that S∗ breaks the commitments as follows:
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ] ≤ Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ] + Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ]
≤
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 1] + Pr[F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 2]
+Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 2] + Pr[F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 1]
=
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 1]
+Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 2] + 1/2
(3.12)
with the last equality following from the fact that P is independent of Y , F, and Σ∗.
Therefore, all we need to do is to bound both Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 1] and
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 2] by negligible functions, and we are done.
To bound Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 1], we will use the property of F having
target collision resistance. For that, let εuow be the negligible function for F given by
Deﬁnition 3.5.34. Since F is chosen independent of Σ∗, we have
Pr[F(Σ1) = F(Σ∗) ∧ Σ1 6= Σ∗] ≤ εuow. (3.13)
For S∗ to break commitment Υ when F(Σ∗) = Y and P = 1, S∗ needs to produce a104 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
σ 6= Σ∗, and hence it must be the case that Σ1 6= Σ∗. With this in mind, we bound:
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 1]
≤ Pr[F(Σ1) = Y ∧ Σ1 6= Σ∗ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ]
= Pr[F(Σ1) = F(Σ∗) ∧ Σ1 6= Σ∗]
≤ εuow (from 3.13).
To bound Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 2], we will exploit the 1-out-of-2 binding
property of (S,R). The way we do so is stated in the next claim.
CLAIM 3.5.40
The following holds:
Pr[Σ2 6= Σ∗ ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B] = O((εbind)1/3),
where εbind is the negligible function for 1-out-of-2-binding scheme (S,R) given by
Deﬁnition 3.4.4.
Proof of Claim. Let ε = Pr[Σ2 6= Σ∗ ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B]. Taking probability over C =
output(S∗,R1
c), we get
Pr
c←C

Pr[Σ2 6= σ∗[c] ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B | C = c] ≥ ε/2

≥ ε/2.
Call c good if Pr[Σ2 6= σ∗[c] ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B | C = c] ≥ ε/2. This means that the
probability of choosing a good c ← C is at least ε/2.
Now, for a good c, we claim that with nonnegligible probability, we can ﬁnd
two accepting full transcripts λ = (τ,κ) and e λ = (e τ,e κ), such that both τ,e τ / ∈ B
and τ and e τ contains σ and e σ 6= σ, respectively. Call this event break ﬁrst
phase binding.
From (3.11), we have
pσ[c] = Pr
"
S∗ produces an accepting full transcript λ = (τ,κ)
such that τ / ∈ B and τ contains c and σ
#
,
so for a good c, it must be the case that
X
σ
pσ[c] = pσ∗[c] + Pr[Σ2 6= σ∗[c] ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B | C = c] > ε/2.
After obtaining ﬁrst-phase commitment c, we run two independent executions of
S∗ that continues from c. Because σ∗ is maximal in the sense that pσ∗[c] ≥ pσ[c]
for all other σ’s, the probability that we land in the event break ﬁrst phase3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 105
binding conditioned that c is good is at least Ω(ε2). Consequently, we break the
ﬁrst-phase binding property of (S,R) with probability:
Pr[c is good] · Pr[break ﬁrst phase binding | c is good ≥ (ε/2) · Ω(ε2) = Ω(ε3) ,
and hence, this forces ε = O((εbind)1/3). 
Having established the above claim, we bound:
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 2]
= Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ F(Σ2) = Y ]
= Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ Σ2 6= Σ∗]
=
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ Σ2 6= Σ∗ ∧ Σ2 ∈ B]
+Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ Σ2 6= Σ∗ ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B]
≤
Pr[S∗ breaks second phase of R2 ∧ Σ2 ∈ B]
+Pr[Σ2 6= Σ∗ ∧ Σ2 / ∈ B]
≤ Pr[S∗ breaks second phase of R2 ∧ Σ2 ∈ B] + O((εbind)1/3) (by Claim 3.5.40)
≤ εbind + O((εbind)1/3)
= O((εbind)1/3) .
Finally, we continue from where we left at (3.12) to bound the success probability of S∗
breaking the binding property of the commitment.
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ] =
Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) = Y ∧ P = 1]
+Pr[S∗ breaks Υ ∧ F(Σ∗) 6= Y ∧ P = 2] + 1/2
(from 3.12)
≤ εuow + O((εbind)1/3) + 1/2
= 1/2 + ε0 ,
for a negligible function ε0 = εuow + O((εbind)1/3). 
Boosting the binding. The commitment scheme (S,R) from Lemma 3.5.39 is only (1/2−
neg(n))-binding. Nonetheless, we can boost its binding probability to 1−neg(n) as follows:
to commit to bit b, run n independent executions of (S(b),R) in parallel. Intuitively, this new
scheme is (1−neg(n))-binding, because to cheat, one will need to cheat in all n independent
executions, and the probability of succeeding in that is bounded by (1/2+neg(n))n = neg(n).
CLAIM 3.5.41
(Folklore, cf., [HR2, Prop.2.9].) There exists an eﬃcient procedure that converts a statistically
[resp., computationally] (1/2 − neg(n))-binding commitment scheme (S,R) into commitment106 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
scheme (S,R) that is statistically [resp., computationally] binding. Furthermore, if (S,R) is
statistically hiding, so is (S,R).
Putting it all together
Having established the appropriate claims and lemmas, we now state what is achievable
from the Haitner & Reingold transformation [HR2].
PROPOSITION 3.5.42
There exist an eﬃcient procedure, call it HR-FullTransform, that takes as inputs a 2-phase
commitment scheme (S,R) and a family of functions F, and outputs a commitment scheme
(S,R) = HR-FullTransform((S,R),F) satisfying the following properties:
I If (S,R) is statistically hiding and F has the large preimages property, then (S,R) is
statistically hiding.
I If (S,R) is statistically [resp., computationally] 1-out-of-2 binding and F has statistical
[resp., computational] target collision resistance, then (S,R) is statistically [resp., com-
putationally] binding (in the standard sense of binding).
I If (S,R) is public coin, then (S,R) is also public coin.
Proof. We describe the HR-FullTransform algorithm, recapping what we have done thus far,
as follows.
1. On input 2-phase commitment scheme (S,R) and family of functions F, convert (S,R)
to 2-phase commitment scheme (S0,R0) that has appropriate message lengths (k1,k2) =
(n,1). This step follows from Claim 3.5.27.
2. Next, apply Algorithm 3.5.28 on (S0,R0) and F to obtain a (standard) commitment
scheme (S,R). Lemmas 3.5.36 and 3.5.39 state that for the right properties of both
(S0,R0) and F (see the ﬁrst two items in Proposition 3.5.42 above), (S,R) is hiding
and (1/2 − neg(n))-binding.
3. Finally, using Claim 3.5.41, boost the binding of (S,R) to obtain a scheme (S,R) that
is (1 − neg(n))-binding while not aﬀecting the hiding property. Output (S,R) as our
desired scheme.
As for the preservation of the public coin property, observe that the messages sent by R
that are speciﬁc to the Haitner & Reingold transformation are choosing f ← F and selecting
phase ← {0,1}, both of which are public coin operations. 
With Proposition 3.5.42 in hand, let us see how we can construct statistically hiding
and computationally binding commitments from any one way function; this is captured by
Theorem 3.0.4, restated as follows.3.5 FROM ANY ONE-WAY FUNCTION 107
RESTATEMENT OF THEOREM 3.0.4
(First appeared in [HR2, Thm.1.1].) If one-way functions exist, then there exist commitment
schemes that are statistically hiding and computationally binding. Moreover, the commitment
schemes obtained are public coin.
Proof of Theorem 3.0.4. We start oﬀ by constructing a collection of 2-phase commitment
schemes from any one-way function; this is given by Theorem 3.5.1 which states that if one-
way functions exist, then on security parameter 1n, we can construct in time polynomial
in n a collection of public-coin 2-phase commitment schemes COM = {Com1,··· ,Comm},
where m = poly(n), such that:
I there exists an index i ∈ {1,2,...,m} such that scheme Comi is statistically hiding,
and
I for every index i ∈ {1,2,...,m}, scheme Comi is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding.
Now we apply Proposition 3.5.42 to each 2-phase commitment Comi in the collection
with a universal one-way hash function family F, which can be constructed from any one-
way function [Rom] (see also [KK]). Let the resulting (standard) commitment schemes be
Com0
i = HR-FullTransform(Comi,F). By Proposition 3.5.42 and Lemma 3.5.35, we know
that:
I Com0
i is statistically hiding if Comi is statistically hiding,
I Com0
i is computationally binding if Comi is computationally 1-out-of-2 binding, and
I Com0
i is public coin if Comi is public coin.
This means that we now have a collection of public-coin (standard) commitment schemes
COM0 =

Com0
1,··· ,Com0
m
	
, where m = poly(n), such that:
I there exists an index i ∈ {1,2,...,m} such that scheme Com0
i is statistically hiding,
and
I for every index i ∈ {1,2,...,m}, scheme Com0
i is computationally binding (in the
standard sense of binding).
We are almost done, except that we are still left with a collection of commitments
instead of a single commitment scheme. To obtain that, we combine these schemes using
a technique of secret sharing the committed bit. That is, to commit to bit b, we ﬁrst
secret share b into m shares b1,...,bm such that each share bi is uniform in {0,1}, and
b = b1 ⊕b2 ⊕···⊕bm. We then use Com0
i to commit to each bit bi, with the m independent108 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
executions of Com0
1,...,Com0
m done in parallel (to save on round complexity). Intuitively,
this would be hiding since at least one scheme Com0
i will hide the value of bi, and knowing
even m−1 shares will not reveal the value of b. The binding property follows from the fact
that all schemes Com0
i are binding. And this new scheme will be public coin if the all Com0
i
are. Our above observation is captured by the following claim.
CLAIM 3.5.43
(Folklore, cf., [HR2, Prop.2.8].) There is an eﬃcient procedure that converts a
polynomial collection of commitment schemes, at least one of which is statistically
hiding and all are computationally binding, into a single commitment scheme that
is statistically hiding and computationally binding. In addition, if we start oﬀ with
public-coin schemes, we also end up with a public-coin scheme.
Our proof is now complete since we now have a single commitment scheme that is
statistically hiding and computationally binding, and the only complexity assumption made
is the existence of one-way functions. 
We end this section with the following observation: the statistical hiding property of the
commitment scheme constructed in the above proof of Theorem 3.0.4 does not depend on
the one-way security of the function that the scheme is based on. Thus, we can construct an
instance-dependent commitment scheme from any instance-dependent function such that
the scheme is always statistically hiding, but is guaranteed to be computationally binding
only on the instances where the function is hard to invert. This is stated in the following
proposition, which can be viewed as an instance-dependent formulation of Theorem 3.0.4.
PROPOSITION 3.5.44
For every set K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if there is an instance-dependent one-way function on K, then
problem (K,K) has an instance-dependent commitment that is statistically hiding on the YES
instances (namely, instances in K), and computationally binding on the NO instances (namely,
instances in K). Moreover, the instance-dependent commitment scheme obtained is public coin.
3.6 Instance-Dependent Variant
Having constructed statistically-hiding and computationally-binding commitments from any
one-way function, our theme in this section is to eliminate unproven assumptions—like the
existence of one-way functions—and construct instance-dependent commitments that are
based on special properties of certain class of problems. Recall that instance-dependent
commitments are commitment schemes where both sender and receiver strategies can de-
pend on the speciﬁc instance x of a problem Π. (Refer back to Section 2.4.4 if needed.)3.6 INSTANCE-DEPENDENT VARIANT 109
The results presented in this section will show that every problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) ∈ SZKP
having statistical zero-knowledge proofs yield instance-dependent commitments for Π that
are statistically hiding on the YES instances (meaning, instances in ΠY), and statisti-
cally binding on the NO instance (meaning, instances in ΠY). Note that this statement
is unconditional—in that it does not rely on any unproven assumptions—and the instance-
dependent commitments constructed have statistical security for both hiding and binding,
a feature that is impossible for standard commitments.
Prior works have constructed instance-dependent commitments for certain speciﬁc prob-
lems in SZKP or a limited subclass of SZKP, such as Graph Isomorphism [BMO, IOS],
Quadratic Residuosity [IOS], approximate versions of lattice problems [MV], and ran-
dom self-reducible problems [TW, DDPY1, KMS]. But it was not until the seminal work of
Vadhan did we know how to construct instance-dependent commitments for all problems in
SZKP, even allowing for certain relaxations in the notion of commitments. Vadhan [Vad3]
showed that every problem Π ∈ SZKP has instance-dependent commitments, albeit with an
ineﬃcient sender algorithm. These instance-dependent commitments suﬃce for some ap-
plications like converting honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge proofs into zero knowledge proofs
secure against any adversarial veriﬁer, without relying on unproven assumptions, but the
downside is that we are left with a protocol having an ineﬃcient prover strategy.
To obtain eﬃcient-prover zero-knowledge proofs for NP, we need commitment schemes
whose both sender and receiver strategies are eﬃcient. Nguyen and Vadhan [NV] overcame
this problem by constructing instance-dependent commitments for SZKP whose sender and
receiver algorithms are eﬃcient, but they paid a price in that their commitments are only
1-out-of-2 binding. It turns out that 1-out-of-2-binding commitments suﬃce for obtaining
eﬃcient-prover zero-knowledge proofs for all languages in SZKP∩NP, but applications of 1-
out-of-2 binding are still limited to settings where only the prover does the commitments, not
to mention the complications that arise when dealing with 1-out-of-2-binding commitments.
(Look back at Section 3.5 if you’re not convinced of the intricacies of 1-out-of-2-binding
commitments!)
Our goal in this section is to extend the result of Nguyen and Vadhan to prove that
every problem in SZKP has instance-dependent commitments with the standard binding
property, and with eﬃcient sender and receiver strategies. Because these are standard
notions for commitments (with the exception of being instance dependent), they have a
much wider applicability—for example, we can now let the veriﬁer do commitments too—
and they are used throughout to establish the results in Chapter 4. Two nice features of
our commitments are that they are very round eﬃcient and are public coin, in addition to
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3.6.1 Instance-dependent commitments for statistical zero-knowledge
proofs
An initial attempt
Consider the SZKP-complete problem Statistical Difference [SV], deﬁned as SD =
(SDY,SDN) with:
SDY = {(X,Y ) : ∆(X,Y ) ≤ 1/3};
SDY = {(X,Y ) : ∆(X,Y ) ≥ 2/3},
where X and Y are represented by circuits encoding these random variables, and recall
that ∆(X,Y ) is the statistical diﬀerence between X and Y (see Section 2.2.1). Here, and
throughout this section, a circuit encoding a random variable X is a Boolean circuit
whose output on a uniformly random input string is identically distributed to X. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that the circuit encoding a random variable X have size
at most n2, where n is the number of inputs to that circuit. (This can be done by padding
dummy input variables to the circuit.)
The ﬁrst approach one might think of in constructing instance-dependent commitments
for all of SZKP is to start with the Statistical Difference problem. This is because
there is a natural and simple instance-dependent scheme for Statistical Difference as
follows.
To commit to bit b = 0, sender S sends a random sample from X to R, and to
commit to bit b = 1, sender S send a random sample from Y to R. To decommit,
sender S just reveals its random coins used in sampling from either X or Y .
This scheme is somewhat hiding considering that the statistical distance between X and Y
is less than 1/3 for the YES instances, and also seems to be somewhat binding considering
the statistical distance between X and Y is greater than 2/3 for the NO instances. It
turns out that we can boost the bounds to be ∆(X,Y ) ≤ neg(n) for YES instances, and
∆(X,Y ) ≥ 1 − neg(n) for NO instances; this seems to further suggest that this technique
might work. On further inspection, however, a fundamental problem of binding arises with
our simple commitment scheme when the NO instances have ∆(X,Y ) < 1. This is because
a cheating sender S∗ could possibly ﬁnd a string z ∈ Supp(X)∩Supp(Y ), and always send
z as its commitments. If S∗ knows how to ﬁnd inverses of z under both X and Y , then it
can decommit to both 0 and 1.
Nonetheless, as shown by Micciancio and Vadhan [MV], this simple commitment scheme
is an instance-dependent commitment scheme for a restricted version of Statistical Dif-
ference, where the NO instances are such that X and Y have disjoint supports (i.e.,
∆(X,Y ) = 1). We do still do not know if this restricted version of Statistical Dif-
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scheme to get instance-dependent commitments for all of SZKP. Vadhan [Vad3], however,
managed to work a way around this problem of binding by designing an alternative scheme
that works for (the non-restricted version of) Statistical Difference, albeit with an
ineﬃcient sender.
The Nguyen & Vadhan approach
To obtain eﬃcient senders, Nguyen and Vadhan [NV] started oﬀ from a diﬀerent SZKP-
complete problem, namely the Entropy Difference [GV] problem ED = (EDY,EDN),
deﬁned as:
EDY = {(X,Y ) : H(X) ≥ H(Y ) + 1};
EDN = {(X,Y ) : H(X) ≤ H(Y ) − 1},
where X and Y are represented by circuits encoding these random variables, and H(·)
denotes the entropy measure (see Section 2.2.1). Their construction of instance-dependent
schemes for ED is not a commitment scheme in the standard sense, but are commitments
with the weaker 1-out-of-2 binding property.14 These commitments, even though with a
weaker binding property, suﬃce for getting eﬃcient-prover statistical zero-knowledge proofs
for all of SZKP ∩ NP [NV].
Our construction of instance-dependent commitments for all of SZKP will follow closely
the Nguyen & Vadhan approach, except at the part where they get stuck with 1-out-of-2-
binding commitments, we convert them into commitments with the standard binding prop-
erty using techniques from Section 3.5.5. Speciﬁcally, we use an instance-dependent variant
of the Haitner & Reingold transformation to convert 1-out-of-2-binding commitments into
commitments with the standard binding property.
Let us trace back the Nguyen & Vadhan approach. First, they did not construct their
schemes directly from ED, but instead ﬁrst established a Cook reduction from ED to a
restricted version of the Entropy Approximation [GSV2] problem, denoted as EA’ =
(EA’Y,EA’N), and deﬁned below:
EA’Y = {(X,t) : H(X) ≥ t + 1};
EA’N = {(X,t) : t − 1/n14 ≤ H(X) ≤ t},
where the circuit encoding the random variable X has input length n. The problem EA’ is
considered a restricted version of Entropy Approximation because (unrestricted version
of) the Entropy Approximation problem EA = (EAY,EAN) does not lower-bound the
142-phase commitments scheme (Deﬁnition 3.4.1), and its corresponding hiding and 1-out-of-2 binding
properties (Deﬁnitions 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, respectively), can be extended to instance-dependent analogues in a
similar fashion as done for standard commitments in Section 2.4.4.112 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
entropy in the case of the NO instances. EA is deﬁned as follows:
EAY = {(X,t) : H(X) ≥ t + 1};
EAN = {(X,t) : H(X) ≤ t}.
The Cook reduction from ED to EA’ is established by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.6.1
(Cook Reduction from ED to EA’; from [NV, Lem.4.9], which builds on [GSV2].) Let (X,Y )
be an instance of the Entropy Difference problem ED = (EDY,EDN), where the circuits
encoding the random variables X and Y both have input length n. The Cook reduction from
ED to EA’ is as follows:
(X,Y ) ∈ EDY ⇒
n·k _
i=0

(Y,i/k) ∈ EA’Y ∧
i ^
j=0
(X,j/k) ∈ EA’Y

 ;
(X,Y ) ∈ EDN ⇒
n·k ^
i=0

(Y,i/k) ∈ EA’N ∨
i _
j=0
(X,j/k) ∈ EA’N

 ,
where k = n14.
With this proposition, Nguyen and Vadhan noted that it suﬃces to construct instance-
dependent commitments for both EA’ and its complement EA’ in order to obtain instance-
dependent commitments for ED (and hence, all of SZKP).
LEMMA 3.6.2
If both the special case of the Entropy Approximation problem EA’ and its complement
EA’ have instance-dependent commitments, namely:
I there exists instance-dependent commitments that are statistically hiding on instances in
EA’Y and statistically binding on instances in EA’N, and
I there exists instance-dependent commitments that are statistically hiding on instances in
EA’N and statistically binding on instances in EA’Y.
Then the Entropy Difference problem ED (and hence, every problem in SZKP) has an
instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding on the YES instances and
statistically binding on the NO instances.
Proof. Let Comx and Com0
x be the instance-dependent commitments for EA’ and EA’,
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On instance (X,Y ) and an input bit b, ﬁrst secret share b into n·k = n15 secrets
shares b1,...,bnk with b = b1 ⊕···⊕bnk. Then for each share bi, commit to bi a
total of (i+2) times as follows: run Com0
(Y,i/k)(bi), and for each j = 0,1,...,i, run
Com(X,j/k)(bi). The executions are done in parallel to save on round complexity.
The hiding and binding properties of the above scheme follows from Proposition 3.6.1. 
Indeed, Nguyen and Vadhan [NV] constructed instance-dependent schemes for both EA’
and EA’. Their scheme for EA’ is a commitment with the standard binding property, but
for EA’, they only managed to only get 1-out-of-2-binding commitments. This deﬁciency
is what that makes their overall scheme only 1-out-of-2 binding.
LEMMA 3.6.3
(From [NV, Thm.4.4].) The special case of the entropy approximation problem EA’ has an
instance-dependent commitment that is statistically hiding on YES instances (namely, instances
in EA’Y) and statistically binding on NO instances (namely, instances in EA’N). Moreover,
their scheme is public coin and constant round.
LEMMA 3.6.4
(From [NV, Thm.4.5].) The complement of the special case of the entropy approximation prob-
lem EA’ = (EA’Y,EA’N) = (EA’N,EA’Y) has an instance-dependent 2-phase commitment
that is statistically hiding on the YES instances (namely, instances in EA’N) and statistically
1-out-of-2 binding on NO instances (namely, instances in EA’Y). Moreover, their scheme is
public coin and constant round.
Instance-dependent commitments for EA’
To obtain instance-dependent commitments (with the standard binding property) for EA’,
we use an instance-dependent variant of the Haitner & Reingold transformation [HR2] (from
Section 3.5.5). The main diﬀerence here is that we are now dealing with instance-dependent
cryptographic primitives, but nonetheless the techniques from Section 3.5.5 will still apply.
With instance-dependent primitives, the security is measured in terms of the length of the
instance. In the case of EA’, the instance is (X,t), and the length of the instance is the
size of the circuit encoding X, which in turn is bounded by n2, where n is the input length
to that circuit. Therefore, we can view the security parameter in terms of n.
With this in mind, we generalize the notion of large preimages property in Deﬁni-
tion 3.5.33 and the target collision resistance property in Deﬁnition 3.5.34 to accommodate
instance-dependent family of functions F =
S
x Fx = {f : {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x)|}, where
n(·) and m(·) are polynomials. We present our deﬁnition of an instance-dependent uni-
versal one-way hash family, which will be used in the Haitner & Reingold transformation
in order to convert instance-dependent 1-out-of-2-binding commitments into corresponding114 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
commitments with the standard binding property.
DEFINITION 3.6.5
Problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) has an instance-dependent universal one-way hash fam-
ily if there exists a polynomial-time computable family F =
S
x Fx = {f : {0,1}n(|x|) →
{0,1}m(|x|)}, where n(·) and m(·) are polynomials, such that the following two conditions
hold.
I The family FY =
S
x∈ΠY Fx has the large preimages property in the sense of Deﬁni-
tion 3.5.33. That is, there exists a function α(·) = ω(1) and a negligible function ε,
such that the following holds for all x ∈ ΠY and every function f ∈ Fx:
Pr
y←{0,1}n(|x|)
h
f−1(f(y))

 ≥ |x|
α(|x|)
i
≥ 1 − ε(|x|) .
I The family FN =
S
x∈ΠN Fx has statistical target collision resistance in the sense of
Deﬁnition 3.5.34. That is, there exists a negligible function ε such that for every A,
the following holds for all x ∈ ΠY and every y∗ ∈ {0,1}n(|x|):
Pr
f←Fx
h
A(1|x|,f) = y such that f(y) = f(y∗) and y 6= y∗
i
≤ ε(|x|) .
REMARK 3.6.6
In the above deﬁnition of an instance-dependent universal one-way hash family, we allow
m(|x|) > n(|x|), and only insist that the family has the large preimages property on the
YES instances. In fact, our construction of an instance-dependent universal one-way hash
family for EA’ will be such that m(|x|) is much larger than n(|x|).
In addition, we insist that FN to have statistical target collision resistance because we
want to achieve instance-dependent commitments that are statistically binding (in addition
to being statistically hiding). As mentioned previously in Section 3.5.5, it is impossible for
a single family of functions F (i.e., one that is not instance-dependent) to achieve both the
the large preimages and the statistical target collision resistance properties.
Proposition 3.5.42 from Section 3.5.5 can be extended to account for instance-dependent
primitives as follows.
PROPOSITION 3.6.7
Let HR-FullTransform be the algorithm stated in Proposition 3.5.42. For any problem Π =
(ΠY,ΠN), if the following two conditions hold:
I Family of functions F =
S
x Fx is an instance-dependent universal one-way hash family
for Π;3.6 INSTANCE-DEPENDENT VARIANT 115
I Scheme (Sx,Rx) is an instance-dependent 2-phase commitment scheme for Π that is sta-
tistically hiding on the YES instances, and statistically 1-out-of-2 binding on NO instances.
Then, scheme (Sx,Rx) = HR-FullTransform((Sx,Rx),Fx) is an instance-dependent commit-
ment scheme for Π that is statistically hiding on the YES instances, and statistically binding on
NO instances. Moreover, (Sx,Rx) is public coin if (Sx,Rx) is.
Based on the above proposition, it suﬃces to construct an instance-dependent universal
one-way hash family for EA’ in order to get instance-dependent commitments for EA’.
Instance-dependent universal one-way hash family for EA. Although we just need
an instance-dependent universal one-way hash family for EA’, we will construct one for the
slightly more general problem of EA (note that EA’ is polynomial-time reducible to EA).
Working directly with EA is diﬃcult since we do not know any structure of the random
variable X, other than its entropy bound. So to get more structure out of the random
variable, we will ﬂatten random variable X by taking multiple copies of X and outputting
all of them—in other words, we are taking a direct product of multiple independent copies
of X. Let X0 denote this new random variable. Doing this would make the probability
mass of X0 concentrated around 2−H(X0), and this is why we call it ﬂattening the random
variable. (This is also known as the Asymptotic Equipartition Property in the information
theory literature; see [CT].) Following Goldreich and Vadhan [GV], we give a deﬁnition of
ﬂatness as follows:
DEFINITION 3.6.8
Random variable X is δ-ﬂat if for every t ≥ 1,
Pr
x←X

2−t·δ <
Pr[X = x]
2H(X) < 2t·δ

> 1 − 2−t2
.
Consider the ﬂattened version of the Entropy Approximation problem, denoted as
FlatEA = (FlatEAY,FlatEAN), and deﬁned as follows:
FlatEAY = {(X,t) : H(X) ≥ t + n14/15 and X is n8/15-ﬂat}
FlatEAN = {(X,t) : H(X) ≤ t and X is n8/15-ﬂat}
It is clear that FlatEA is polynomial time reducible to EA, and the reverse reduction
from EA to FlatEA follows from the Flattening Lemma of Goldreich and Vadhan [GV,
Lem.3.5]. Hence, constructing an instance-dependent universal one-way hash family for
EA is equivalent to constructing one for FlatEA, and we do this next.116 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
THEOREM 3.6.9
The complement of the ﬂattened version of the Entropy Approximation problem, namely
FlatEA = (FlatEAY,FlatEAN) = (FlatEAN,FlatEAY) has an instance-dependent
universal one-way hash family.
In the remaining of this section, we abuse notation by denoting the circuit encoding
random variable X as X: {0,1}n → {0,1}m.
Proof Idea of Theorem 3.6.9
For problem FlatEA, we will need to construct an instance-dependent (family of) functions
that have target collision resistance on the YES instances and large preimages property
on the NO instances. These are reversed properties because we want to prove that the
complement FlatEA has an instance-dependent universal one-way hash family.
For the YES instances of FlatEA, X has entropy at least t + γ, where γ = n14/15.
Since X is a nearly-ﬂat random variable, most of its preimages are small, i.e., their sizes
are < ∼ 2n−t−γ. So with high probability over a random y ← {0,1}n, the preimage size of
X(y) is < ∼ 2n−t−γ. By applying a pairwise-independent hash h: {0,1}n → {0,1}β to y, for
β > ∼ n − t − γ, it would make the function gh(y) = (X(y),h(y)) almost injective, in that
for almost every element in the range has a unique preimage. (An injective function is, by
deﬁnition, collision resistant.)
The adversary, however, need not choose y uniformly at random; in particular, it could
choose an element y such that X−1(X(y)) is large, making f(y) = (X(y),h(y)) no longer
injective. To prevent the adversary from gaining, we add a shift s ∈ {0,1}n to the circuit
X. Speciﬁcally, let the new function be fs,h(y) = (X(y⊕s),h(y)). Since y is now randomly
shifted by s, the preimage size of X(y ⊕ s) is small with high probability over a random
s ← {0,1}n. Thus, we can conclude that fs,h(y) is almost injective even for an adversarially
chosen y. This will give us the desired target collision resistance property for β > ∼ n−t−γ.
For the NO instances of FlatEA, X has entropy at most t. Since X is a nearly-ﬂat
random variable, most of its preimages are large, i.e., their sizes are > ∼ 2n−t. Restricting to a
hash h: {0,1}n → {0,1}β will shrink the size of the preimages by a factor of approximately
2−β. So if β < ∼ n − t, the size of the preimages will still be large enough to satisfy the large
preimages property.
The entropy gap of γ = n14/15 between the YES and NO instances allows us to ﬁnd an
appropriate value of β between n − t − γ and n − t that satisﬁes both cases.3.6 INSTANCE-DEPENDENT VARIANT 117
Proof of Theorem 3.6.9
Based on the proof idea presented above, our instance-dependent universal one-way hash
family for FlatEA is as follows:
F =
[
(X,t)
F(X,t) =
n
fs,h: {0,1}n → {0,1}m+β
o
,
where s ∈ {0,1}n, β = n − t − 3n9/15, h is from a pairwise-independent hash family
H = {h: {0,1}n → {0,1}β}, and fs,h(y) = (X(y ⊕ s),h(y)) for all y ∈ {0,1}n.
We divide the proof of Theorem 3.6.9 into Lemmas 3.6.10 and 3.6.12 that establish the
large preimages and the statistical target collision resistance properties of F, respectively.
LEMMA 3.6.10
For every (X,t) ∈ FlatEAN, the family F(X,t) has the large preimages property in the sense
of Deﬁnition 3.5.33.
Proof. For the NO instances of FlatEA, that is when (X,t) ∈ FlatEAN, we know that
H(X) ≤ t and X is n8/15-ﬂat. Deﬁne a new circuit Xs(y) = X(y ⊕ s), and since Xs(Un)
and X(Un) are identically distributed, Xs inherits all its statistical properties from X.
Therefore, for any ﬁxed s ∈ {0,1}n, we have that
Pr
y←{0,1}n
h
X−1
s (Xs(y))

 ≥ 2n−t−n9/15i
≥ 1 − 2−n2/15
= 1 − neg(n). (3.14)
Bounding the size of

X−1
s (Xs(y))

 is not suﬃcient since fs,h leaks the value of h(y) too.
Thus what we need is to bound the size of h−1(h(y))∩X−1
s (Xs(y)) = f−1
s,h(fs,h(y)), and the
following claim provides us a way to do so.
CLAIM 3.6.11
For any set S ⊆ {0,1}n, any function h: {0,1}n → {0,1}β, and any c > 0,
Pr
y←S
"
h−1(h(y)) ∩ S


|S|
≤ 2−β−c
#
≤ 2−c.
Proof of Claim. The above probability can be written as:
X
γ∈{0,1}β
Pr
y←S
h
h(y) = γ and

h−1(γ) ∩ S

 ≤ 2−β−c |S|
i
≤ 2β · 2−β−c = 2−c. 
To apply the above claim, observe that instead of picking y ← {0,1}n, an equivalent
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and then pick a random preimage of x (namely, sample a uniform element from X−1(x)).
Now we can apply Claim 3.6.11 to (3.14) and obtain
Pr
y←{0,1}n
h
h−1(h(y)) ∩ X−1(X(y ⊕ s))

 ≥ 2n−t−n9/15−β−c
i
≥ 1 − neg(n) − 2−c,
for any ﬁxed s ∈ {0,1}n and h ∈ H. Since β = n − t − 3n9/15, and we set c = n9/15,
the size of f−1
s,h(fs,h(y)) = h−1(h(y)) ∩ X−1(X(y ⊕ s)) is at least 2n9/15
with probability
1 − neg(n). 
LEMMA 3.6.12
For every (X,t) ∈ FlatEAY, the family F(X,t) has the statistical target collision resistance
property in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.5.34.
Proof. For the YES instances of FlatEA, that is when (X,t) ∈ FlatEAY, we know that
H(X) ≥ t + n14/15 and X is n8/15-ﬂat. Therefore, for any y ∈ {0,1}n chosen in advance,
Pr
s←{0,1}n
h
X−1(X(y ⊕ s))

 ≤ 2n−t−n14/15+n9/15i
≥ 1 − 2−n2/15
= 1 − neg(n). (3.15)
The value of X(y ⊕ s) alone does not bind y, but since the number of its preimages
is small (with high probability), a pairwise independent hash would uniquely determine y.
The next claim captures this fact.
CLAIM 3.6.13
Let random variable H denote a random hash function from a family of pairwise-
independent hash functions H mapping {0,1}n to {0,1}β. For any subset S ⊆
{0,1}n and any element y ∈ {0,1}n, we have:
Pr

∃y0 ∈ S \ {y} such that H(y0) = H(y)

≤ |S| · 2−β.
Proof of Claim. The pairwise independent property of H guarantees that for
any y0 6= y, we have Pr[H(y0) = H(y)] ≤ 2−β. Taking a union bound over all
possible values of y0 ∈ S \ {y} yields our claim. 
We say X−1(X(y ⊕ s)) is large if

X−1(X(y ⊕ s))

 > 2n−t−n14/15+n9/15
, and small
otherwise. Because fs,h(y) = fs,h(y0) if only if both X(y ⊕s) = X(y0 ⊕s) and h(y) = h(y0),
applying Claim 3.6.13 to (3.15), we have that for any ﬁxed y,
Pr

X−1(X(y ⊕ Un)) is large

= neg(n) . (3.16)3.6 INSTANCE-DEPENDENT VARIANT 119
Thus, we can bound the probability of ﬁnding a collision with any ﬁxed y as follows:
Pr[∃y0 6= y such that fUn,H(y) = fUn,H(y0)]
≤
Pr

X−1(X(y ⊕ Un)) is large

+Pr

∃y0 6= y such that fUn,H(y) = fUn,H(y0) | X−1(X(y ⊕ Un) is small

≤ neg(n) + 2n−t−n14/15+n9/15
· 2−β (by 3.16)
= neg(n) + 2−n14/15+4n9/15
,
with the ﬁnal equality following from setting β = n − t − 3n9/15. Since 2−n14/15+4n9/15
is
negligible, our proof is complete. 
Because EA’ polynomial-time reduces to EA, which in turn is polynomial-time equiva-
lent to FlatEA, we arrive at the following corollary of Theorem 3.6.9.
COROLLARY 3.6.14
Both problems EA and EA’ have instance-dependent universal one-way hash families.
Putting it all together
We restate Theorem 3.0.5 and prove it.
RESTATEMENT OF THEOREM 3.0.5
For every problem Π ∈ SZKP, problem Π has an instance-dependent commitment scheme
that is statistically hiding on the YES instances and statistically binding on the NO instances.
Moreover, the instance-dependent commitment scheme obtained is public coin and is constant
round.
Proof of Theorem 3.0.5. Proposition 3.6.1 informs us that to construct instance-dependent
commitment schemes for all problems in SZKP, it suﬃces to construct instance-dependent
commitment schemes for EA’ and its complement EA’, recalling that EA’ is the restricted
version of Entropy Approximation.
Lemma 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 provides instance-dependent commitments for EA’ and instance-
dependent 1-out-of-2-binding commitment schemes for EA’, respectively. (Both these
schemes are due to Nguyen and Vadhan [NV].) We also know that EA’ has an instance-
dependent universal one-way hash family, given by Corollary 3.6.14. Therefore, Proposi-
tion 3.6.7 tells us that we can use the Haitner & Reingold transformation [HR2] to convert
the instance-dependent 1-out-of-2-binding commitments for EA’ into instance-dependent
commitments (with the standard binding property) for EA’.
The public coin property of our ﬁnal scheme follows from the fact that the both schemes
for EA’ and EA’ are public-coin schemes (refer to Lemmas 3.6.3 and 3.6.4, respectively).120 CHAPTER 3 / STATISTICALLY-HIDING COMMITMENTS
Finally, observe that we obtain a constant-round scheme because both schemes for EA’
and EA’ are constant round (refer to Lemmas 3.6.3 and 3.6.4, respectively), and the added-
on round complexity due to the Haitner & Reingold transformation is only a constant. 
Conclusion. We have shown how to construct instance-dependent commitment schemes
for all of SZKP that are statistically hiding on the YES instances and statistically binding
on the NO instances. In the next chapter, we extend our result to the other three variants
of zero knowledge—namely, computational zero-knowledge proofs (CZKP), statistical zero-
knowledge arguments (SZKA), and computational zero-knowledge arguments (CZKA)—
showing that all of them have instance-dependent commitments with corresponding security
properties. This means that we can obtain instance-dependent commitments from zero-
knowledge protocols, and having this ability allows us to establish various unconditional
relationships between the diﬀerent formulations of zero knowledge, as done in Chapter 4.4
                             
UNCONDITIONAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF
ZERO KNOWLEDGE
In this chapter, we give unconditional characterizations of classes of problems having zero-
knowledge argument systems using the Vadhan condition. These characterizations would,
among other things, allow us to establish the main unconditional results of this disserta-
tion, which are equivalences between instance-dependent commitments and zero-knowledge
protocols (Theorem 1.2.4), symmetry between computational zero knowledge and compu-
tational soundness (Theorem 1.2.2), and a method of transforming any honest-veriﬁer zero-
knowledge argument system into a malicious-veriﬁer zero-knowledge argument system for
the same problem. Recall that all these results were highlighted in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.
For context, we restate the Vadhan condition from Section 1.2 in the terms of instance-
dependent one-way functions (Deﬁnition 2.4.6).
RESTATEMENT OF DEFINITION 1.2.3
A promise problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) satisﬁes the Vadhan condition if there exists a set of
instances I ⊆ ΠY ∪ ΠN such that:
I the promise problem (ΠY \ I,ΠN \ I) is in SZKP, and
I there exists an instance-dependent one-way function on I.
We call I the set of OWF instances, I∩ΠY the set of OWF YES instances, and I∩ΠN
the set of OWF NO instances.
Chapter organization. In the next section, we present our main characterization theo-
rems, which expands upon Theorem 1.2.4. The steps involved in proving these characteriza-
tion theorems are outlined in the beginning of Section 4.2, and lemmas needed to establish
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these theorems are given in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3. Finally, in Section 4.3, we
prove our Symmetry Theorem (Theorem 1.2.2) between computational zero knowledge and
computational soundness, and show an interesting consequence of our Symmetry Theorem.
4.1 The Characterization Theorems
In this section, we expand upon the characterizations of zero-knowledge protocols in terms
of the Vadhan condition given by Theorem 1.2.4, and the equivalences between instance-
dependent commitments and zero-knowledge protocols given by Theorem 1.2.1. Speciﬁcally,
we state four theorems giving a variety of equivalent characterizations of the zero-knowledge
complexity classes SZKP, CZKP, CZKA, and SZKA. The ones for zero-knowledge argu-
ments, namely CZKA and SZKA, are new; the other for zero-knowledge proofs, namely
CZKP and SZKP, contain results from previous work, but are given for comparison. In
addition to establishing Theorems 1.2.1 1.2.4, these theorems show an equivalence between
problems having only honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge protocols, problems satisfying the Vad-
han condition, and problems with (malicious-veriﬁer) zero-knowledge protocols having de-
sirable properties like an eﬃcient prover, perfect completeness, public coins, and black-box
simulation. It should be noted that these characterizations refer only to the classes of prob-
lems, and do not necessarily preserve other eﬃciency measures like round complexity, unless
explicitly mentioned.
The following two theorems give unconditional characterizations of zero-knowledge proofs.
THEOREM 4.1.1
(SZKP Characterization Theorem, containing results from [Oka, GSV1, NV].) For every problem
Π ∈ IP, the following conditions are equivalent.
1. Π ∈ HV-SZKP.
2. Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF instances.
3. Π has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding on the YES
instances and statistically binding on the NO instances. Moreover, the scheme is public
coin and constant round.
4. Π ∈ SZKP, and the statistical zero-knowledge proof system for Π has a black-box sim-
ulator, is public coin, and has perfect completeness. Furthermore, if Π ∈ NP, the proof
system has an eﬃcient prover and is constant round with a polynomially-small soundness
error.1
1To get negligible soundness error with ω(1) rounds, we repeat the protocol ω(1) times sequentially.4.1 THE CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS 123
THEOREM 4.1.2
(CZKP Characterization Theorem, containing results from [Vad3, NV].) For every problem
Π ∈ IP, the following conditions are equivalent.
1. Π ∈ HV-CZKP.
2. Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF NO instances.
3. Π has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computationally hiding on the
YES instances and statistically binding on the NO instances. Moreover, the scheme is
public coin and constant round.
4. Π ∈ CZKP, and the computational zero-knowledge proof system for Π has a black-box
simulator, is public coin, and has perfect completeness. Furthermore, if Π ∈ NP, the proof
system has an eﬃcient prover and is constant round with a polynomially-small soundness
error.1
REMARK 4.1.3
The new result in both Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 is the (2) ⇒ (3) direction, establishing
instance-dependent commitments (with an eﬃcient sender strategy and a regular binding
property) from the Vadhan condition. The previous works of Vadhan [Vad3], and Nguyen
and Vadhan [NV] result in an ineﬃcient sender strategy and a weaker 1-out-of-2 binding
property, respectively.
The (1) ⇒ (2) direction for the SZKP case (Theorem 4.1.1) and the CZKP case (The-
orem 4.1.2) follows from [Oka, GSV1] and [Vad3], respectively. The (2) ⇒ (4) direction, in
both the SZKP and CZKP cases, was established by [NV] using instance-dependent commit-
ments with the weaker 1-out-2-binding property. Because of this weaker binding property,
their zero-knowledge proof systems have polynomial number of rounds. We obtain constant-
round instance-dependent commitments with the standard binding property, based on the
(2) ⇒ (3) direction, and hence we are able to achieve constant-round zero-knowledge proofs
with a polynomially-small soundness error.
We give analogous characterizations for zero-knowledge arguments.
THEOREM 4.1.4
(SZKA Characterization Theorem.) For every problem Π ∈ NP, the following conditions are
equivalent.
1. Π ∈ HV-SZKA.
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3. Π has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding on the YES
instances and computationally binding on the NO instances. Moreover, the scheme is
public coin.
4. Π ∈ SZKA, and the statistical zero-knowledge argument system for Π has a black-box
simulator, is public coin, has perfect completeness, and an eﬃcient prover.
THEOREM 4.1.5
(CZKA Characterization Theorem.) For every problem Π ∈ NP, the following conditions are
equivalent.
1. Π ∈ HV-CZKA.
2. Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition.
3. Π has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computationally hiding on the
YES instances and computationally binding on the NO instances. Moreover, the scheme
is public coin.
4. Π ∈ CZKA, and the computational zero-knowledge proof system for Π has a black-box
simulator, is public coin, has perfect completeness, and an eﬃcient prover.
We prove Theorems 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5 using lemmas established in Sec-
tions 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3. Notice that in the theorems involving zero knowledge argu-
ments, we have restricted the problem Π to be in NP in contrast to the theorems involving
zero-knowledge proofs (Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.2), which are naturally restricted to IP.
The reason for this is that argument systems are mainly interesting when the honest prover
runs in polynomial time given a witness for membership (otherwise the protocol would not
even be sound against prover strategies with the same resources as the honest prover), and
such eﬃcient provers only make sense for problems in NP (or actually, MA, to which our
results generalize easily). In fact our theorems above show that for problems in NP, a zero-
knowledge protocol without an eﬃcient prover can be converted into one with an eﬃcient
prover (by the equivalence of Items 1 and 4 in Theorems 4.1.1 to 4.1.4 above).
4.2 Proof of the Characterization Theorems
We provide an outline of the steps involved in proving the characterization theorems stated
in the previous section.
1. In Section 4.2.1, we show that every problem Π possessing a (honest-veriﬁer) zero-
knowledge protocol satisﬁes the Vadhan condition. Depending on the zero knowledge
and soundness guarantee, the types of Vadhan condition that Π satisﬁes will dif-
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or nonempty). This result extends the unconditional characterization work of Vad-
han [Vad3] for zero-knowledge proof systems to the more general zero-knowledge ar-
gument systems.
2. Next, in Section 4.2.2, we show that every problem Π satisfying the Vadhan condition
yields an instance-dependent commitment scheme for Π.
3. Finally, in Section 4.2.3, we show that every problem Π ∈ NP having instance-
dependent commitments allow us to construct zero-knowledge argument systems for
Π with desirable properties like perfect completeness, black-box zero knowledge, pub-
lic coins, and an eﬃcient prover. This is achieved by substituting instance-dependent
commitments for standard commitments used in existing zero-knowledge protocols.
(This technique of substituting instance-dependent commitments for standard com-
mitments is detailed in Section 2.5.)
A summary of the steps involved in establishing our characterization theorems, together
with their corresponding lemmas, is given in Figure 4.1.
Honest-Veriﬁer Zero-Knowledge Protocol
Lemmas 4.2.1 and 4.2.2

Vadhan Condition
Lemma 4.2.9

Instance-Dependent Commitment
Lemma 4.2.12 + Π ∈ NP 
Zero-Knowledge Protocol
(with public coins, black-box simulator, etc.)
immediate
^^
Figure 4.1: Steps of our proof.
4.2.1 From zero-knowledge protocols to the Vadhan condition
In this subsection, we show that problems possessing (honest veriﬁer) zero-knowledge argu-
ments satisfy the Vadhan condition. Speciﬁcally, we prove that for every problem Π having
a zero-knowledge argument also satisﬁes the Vadhan condition. This involving establishing
a set of instances I ⊆ ΠY∪ΠN such that (ΠY\I,ΠN\I) ∈ SZKP, and from which instance-
dependent one-way functions can be constructed. The main diﬀerence from Vadhan [Vad3]
is that [Vad3] characterizes only zero-knowledge proofs and it without OWF NO instances,
namely I ∩ ΠN = ∅. In other words, the characterizations of [Vad3] satisfy the Vadhan
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We state a lemma establishing characterizations of (honest veriﬁer) zero-knowledge
proofs in terms of the Vadhan condition. This lemma follows from the works of [Oka,
GSV1, Vad3], but is given for comparison.
LEMMA 4.2.1
(Follows from [Oka, GSV1, Vad3].) If problem Π ∈ HV-CZKP, then Π satisﬁes the Vadhan
condition without OWF NO instances, namely I ∩ΠN = ∅. In addition, if Π ∈ HV-SZKP, then
Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF instances, namely I = ∅.
Next, we give analogous characterizations for (honest veriﬁer) zero-knowledge argu-
ments.
LEMMA 4.2.2
If problem Π ∈ HV-CZKA, then Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition. In addition, if Π ∈
HV-SZKA, then Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES instances, namely I∩ΠY =
∅.
Proof Idea of Lemma 4.2.2
Proving that Π ∈ HV-CZKA satisﬁes the Vadhan condition involves establishing a set I
with an instance-dependent one-way on I and (ΠY \ I,ΠN \ I) ∈ SZKP. To do so, we
provide a separate analysis for the YES and NO instances; namely, we show that there
exist sets IY ⊆ ΠY and IN ⊆ ΠN such that instance-dependent one-way functions can be
constructed on these sets, and that (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) ∈ SZKP. These instance-dependent
one-way functions fx and gx on IY and IN, respectively, can be combined into a single
instance-dependent one-way function on I
def = IY ∪IN by concatenating the functions fx and
gx.
The sets IY and IN are deﬁned based on the simulator S for the zero-knowledge pro-
tocol of Π ∈ HV-CZKA. Following Fortnow [For], we consider a simulation-based prover
PS and corresponding simulation-based veriﬁer VS. Informally, PS replies with the same
conditional probability as the prover in the output of S, and VS sends its messages with
the same conditional probability as the veriﬁer in the output of S. We make the following
observations.
1. The interaction between PS and VS is identical to the output of the simulator S, on
every x.
2. By the zero-knowledge condition, we have that hPS,VSi is computationally indistin-
guishable from hP,V i, when x ∈ ΠY.
3. By assuming, without loss of generality, that the simulator always outputs accepting
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We consider a statistical measure of how similar VS is to V (on instance x, when inter-
acting with simulation-based prover PS). Using this statistical measure (given in the full
proof below), we deﬁne sets IY and IN as follows:
I IY contains instances x ∈ ΠY for which VS is statistically diﬀerent from V , and
I IN contains instances x ∈ ΠN for which VS is statistically similar to V .
Now the proof that this gives a Vadhan condition proceed as follows:
1. On IY, we have that VS is statistically diﬀerent from V . Nevertheless, by the zero-
knowledge condition (as noted above), VS is computationally similar to V . This
enables us to construct one-way functions for instances in IY, as shown in [Vad3].
2. On IN, we have that VS is statistically similar to V . Combining this with the fact that
PS will always convince VS to accept (as noted above), we conclude that PS convinces
V to accept with high probability. By the computational soundness of (P,V ), it must
be the case that PS is not PPT. Using techniques from Ostrovsky [Ost], this allows us
to convert the simulator S into an instance-dependent distributional one-way function
gx.2 Then by Proposition 2.4.8, due to Impagliazzo and Luby [IL], we can obtain an
instance-dependent one-way function from gx.
3. To see that (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) ∈ SZKP, we observe the following: for those YES
instances not in IY (i.e., instances in ΠY\IY), the simulated veriﬁer VS is statistically
similar to V . And for those NO instances not in IN (i.e., instances in ΠN \ IN),
the simulated veriﬁer VS is statistically diﬀerent from V . This gap in the statistical
properties allows us to reduce promise problem (ΠY\IY,ΠN\IN) to one of the complete
problems for SZKP [SV, GV, Vad3].
Proof of Lemma 4.2.2
Let (P,V ) be a zero-knowledge argument system for Π, with simulator S. Following Vad-
han [Vad3], we modify our interactive protocol (P,V ) to satisfy the following additional
properties.
I The completeness error c(|x|) and soundness error s(|x|) are both negligible. This can
be achieved by a standard error reduction via sequential repetition.
I On every input x, the two parties exchange 2`(|x|) messages for some polynomial `,
with the veriﬁer sending even-numbered messages and sending all of its r(|x|) random
2If gx is not distributionally one-way, then PS can be made to be eﬃcient, hence contradicting the compu-
tational soundness of (P,V ). Interestingly, Ostrovsky [Ost] uses the assumption that gx is not distribution-
ally one-way to invert the simulator S on the YES instances, and conclude that Π is not hard-on-average.
Although we use similar techniques as [Ost], we instead invert S on the NO instances to contradict the
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coin tosses in the last message. (Without loss of generality, we may assume that
r(|x|) ≥ |x|.) Having the veriﬁer send its coin tosses at the end does not aﬀect
soundness because it is after the prover’s last message, and does not aﬀect honest-
veriﬁer zero knowledge because the simulator is anyhow required to simulate the
veriﬁer’s coin tosses.
I On every input x, the simulator S always outputs accepting transcripts, where a
simulator output τ is an accepting transcript on x if all of the veriﬁer’s messages in τ
are consistent with its coin tosses (as speciﬁed in the last message), and the veriﬁer
would accept in such an interaction.
For a transcript τ, we denote by τi the preﬁx of τ consisting of the ﬁrst i messages.
For readability, we often drop the input x from the notation, for instance using ` = `(|x|),
hP,V i = hP,V i(x), r = r(|x|), and so forth. Thus, in what follows, hP,V ii and Si are
random variables representing preﬁxes of transcripts generated by the real interaction and
simulator, respectively, on a speciﬁed input x.
Using the simulator S, we deﬁne the simulation-based prover PS as follows: On input x
and execution preﬁx τ2i, for i = 1,2,...,` − 1, do the following:
1. If simulator S(x) outputs a transcript that begins with τ2i with probability 0, then
PS replies with a dummy message.
2. Otherwise, PS replies according with the same conditional probability as the prover
in the output of the simulator. That is, it replies with a string α with probability
pα = Pr[S(x)2i = τ2i−1 ◦ α|S(x)2i−1 = τ2i−1].
The simulation-based veriﬁer VS can be deﬁned analogously as follows: On input x and
execution preﬁx τ2i−1, for i = 1,2,...,`, do the following:
1. If simulator S(x) outputs a transcript that begins with τ2i−1 with probability 0, then
VS replies with a dummy message.
2. Otherwise, VS replies according with the same conditional probability as the veriﬁer
in the output of the simulator. That is, it replies with a string β with probability
pβ = Pr[S(x)2i+1 = τ2i ◦ β|S(x)2i = τ2i].
Observe that hPS,VSi(x) is identically distributed to S(x), for every x. Following [AH,
PT, GV, Vad3], we consider the following quantity:
h(x) =
` X
i=1
[H(S(x)2i) − H(S(x)2i−1)] =
` X
i=1
[H(hPS,VSi(x)2i) − H(hPS,VSi(x)2i−1)] ,
(4.1)
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From [AH, PT, GV], we know that for every x ∈ {0,1}∗, and every prover strategy P0,
r(|x|) =
` X
i=1

H(hP0,V i(x)2i) − H(hP0,V i(x)2i−1)

. (4.2)
The above sum in (4.2) measures the total entropy contributed by the honest veriﬁer’s
messages, and hence it is natural that this should equal r(|x|), the number of coin tosses of
the honest veriﬁer. This is because the honest veriﬁer reveals all its coin tosses at the end.
From (4.1) and (4.2), we observe that how close the value of h(x) gets to r(|x|) is a
measure of how close the simulation-based veriﬁer VS is from the honest veriﬁer V (when
interacting with PS). Following our intuition in the proof sketch above, we let IY be the
set of instances x ∈ ΠY for which the VS is far from the honest veriﬁer V , and we let IN be
the set of instances x ∈ ΠN for which the VS is close to V . Formally, we deﬁne:
IY = {x ∈ ΠY : h(x) < r(|x|) − 1/q(|x|)} ;
IN = {x ∈ ΠN : h(x) > r(|x|) − 2/q(|x|)} ,
where the polynomial q(|x|) = 256 · `(|x|).
Having deﬁned sets IY and IN, Lemma 4.2.2 is established by the following claims. The
ﬁrst three are proven in the same way as in [Vad3], and hence we defer their proofs to
Appendix A.3.
CLAIM 4.2.3
Problem (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) ∈ SZKP.
CLAIM 4.2.4
There exists an instance-dependent one-way function on IY.
CLAIM 4.2.5
For Π ∈ HV-SZKA, we can take IY = ∅.
The main novelty in our analysis is the following claim.
CLAIM 4.2.6
There exists an instance-dependent one-way function on IN.
Proof of Claim. To get an instance-dependent one-way function on IN, we use the following
idea of Ostrovsky [Ost]: if we can invert the simulator, then PS’s replies can be approximated
eﬃciently. By the computational soundness of (P,V ), this is impossible, so the simulator
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output the messages of the simulator, as follows:
gx(i,ω) = (x,i,S(x;ω)2i) . (4.3)
Note that gx is polynomial-time computable because the simulator S runs in polynomial
time. If gx is not distributionally one-way (in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.4.7), then we can
devise an eﬃcient cheating prover strategy, call it e P, that eﬃciently approximates our
simulation-based prover PS upto negligible statistical error. The way to do this is to feed
a given transcript preﬁx τ2i after the veriﬁer has responded in round 2i, into the inversion
algorithm of gx to obtain the simulation-based prover response for round 2i+1. In doing so,
we contradict the computational soundness property of (P,V ). This argument is captured
by following proposition, whose proof is given in Appendix A.3.
PROPOSITION 4.2.7
(Based on [Ost, Lem.1].) Let gx be as in (4.3). For every set K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if gx is
not an instance-dependent distributionally one-way function on K, then for every
polynomial p, there exists a nonuniform PPT prover e P such that
∆(he P,V i(x),S(x)) ≤ `(|x|) ·

1
p(|x|)
+ 2 · ∆(hPS,V i(x),S(x))

,
for inﬁnitely many x ∈ K.
Our main goal is to upper bound ∆(he P,V i,S) because doing so would contradict the
computational soundness of V : by virtue of the fact that S always outputs accepting tran-
scripts, if he P,V i is close to S, then the nonuniform PPT e P will convince V to accept with
noticeable probability. The above proposition tells us that in order to obtain an upper
bound on ∆(he P,V i,S), we just need to upper bound ∆(hPS,V i,S), which we do next.
Recall that for every x ∈ IN, we have h > r − 2/q. From [AH, PT, GV], we know
that h = r − KL(hPS,V i,S), where KL is the Kullback-Leibler distance deﬁned as
KL(X,Y ) = Eα←X

log(Pr[X = α]) − log(Pr[Y = α])

. (See [GV, Lem.2.2].) Hence,
we get KL(hPS,V i,S) < 2/q. Using the fact that for any random variables X and Y ,
KL(X,Y ) ≥ (1/2) · (∆(X,Y ))2 [CT, Lem.12.6.1], we get that for all x ∈ IN,
∆(hPS,V i,S) < 2/
√
q = 1/(8 · `) , (4.4)
since q = 256 · `.
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and choose p(|x|) = 4 · `(|x|), to get a nonuniform PPT e P such that
∆(he P,V i,S) ≤ ` · (1/p + 2 · ∆(hPS,V i,S))
= 1/4 + 2 · ` · ∆(hPS,V i,S)
< 1/2 . (by 4.4)
And since the simulator S always produce accepting transcripts, we have
Pr[(e P,V )(x) = accept] ≥ 1/2 ,
for inﬁnitely many x ∈ IN. This contradicts the computational soundness of (P,V ). There-
fore, gx must be a distributionally one-way function on IN. By Proposition 2.4.8 (due to
Impagliazzo and Luby [IL]), gx can be converted into an instance-dependent (standard)
one-way function on IN, as desired. 
Let us see how the above ﬁve claims establish Lemma 4.2.2. Deﬁne set I = IY ∪ IN.
This means that the promise problem (ΠY\I,ΠN\I) = (ΠY\IY,ΠN\IN), and Claim 4.2.3
places this problem in SZKP. Claims 4.2.4 and 4.2.6 give us instance-dependent one-way
functions on IY and IN, respectively; to obtain a single instance-dependent one-way function
on I = IY ∪ IN, we use the following claim.
CLAIM 4.2.8
For any sets J,K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if there exist instance-dependent one-way functions on J and there
exist instance-dependent one-way functions on K, then there exist instance-dependent one-way
functions on J ∪ K.
Proof of Claim. Let fx and gx be any instance-dependent one-way function on J and K,
respectively. Then, hx(y,z) = (fx(y),gx(z)) is an instance-dependent one-way function on
J ∪K. This is because inverting hx involves inverting both fx and gx, at least one of which
is hard to invert on J ∪ K. 
Therefore, by Claim 4.2.8 above, we know that Π ∈ HV-CZKA satisﬁes the Vadhan
condition. Furthermore, if Π ∈ HV-SZKA, Claim 4.2.5 tells us that IY = ∅, and hence
I ∩ ΠY = IY = ∅, giving us that Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES
instances. This completes our proof of Lemma 4.2.2.
4.2.2 From the Vadhan condition to instance-dependent commitments
In this subsection, we show that every problem Π satisfying the Vadhan condition yields
an instance-dependent commitment scheme for Π. This is obtained by combining the
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hiding commitments from one-way functions of Theorem 3.0.4, and the instance-dependent
commitments for SZKP of Theorem 3.0.5.
LEMMA 4.2.9
The following conditions hold for problems Π satisfying the Vadhan condition.
I SZKP case: if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF instances, then it has an
instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding on the YES instances
and statistically binding on the NO instances. Moreover, this scheme is constant round.
I CZKP case: if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF NO instances, then it has
an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computationally hiding on the YES
instances and statistically binding on the NO instances. Moreover, this scheme is constant
round.
I SZKA case: if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES instances, then it
has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically hiding on the YES
instances and computationally binding on the NO instances.
I CZKA case: if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition, then it has an instance-dependent com-
mitment scheme that is computationally hiding on the YES instances and computationally
binding on the NO instances.
Furthermore, all the above instance-dependent commitment schemes are public coin.
The proof of Lemma 4.2.9, tying together all the following propositions and claims, is
given at the end of this subsection. But ﬁrst, we provide an outline of the steps of our
construction in the next paragraph.
For a problem Π that satisﬁes the Vadhan condition, let IY and IN be the set of OWF
YES and OWF NO instances, respectively. We break the task of constructing an instance-
dependent commitment scheme for a Π into following four steps: (i) construct a scheme
that is hiding on ΠY\IY and binding on ΠN\IN, (ii) construct a scheme that is hiding on IY
and binding everywhere, (iii) construct a scheme that is hiding everywhere and binding on
IN, and (iv) combine all these three schemes into a single instance-dependent commitment
scheme for Π. We will explain why these four steps yield an instance-dependent commitment
scheme for Π in the proof of Lemma 4.2.9, given at the end of this subsection.
Step 1. Obtain a statistically-hiding and statistically-binding instance-dependent com-
mitment scheme for problem (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) ∈ SZKP from Theorem 3.0.5, restated
below.
RESTATEMENT OF THEOREM 3.0.5
Every problem in SZKP has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is statistically4.2 PROOF OF THE CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS 133
hiding on the YES instances and statistically binding on the NO instances. Moreover, this
instance-dependent commitment scheme is public coin and is constant round.
Step 2. From an instance-dependent one-way function on IY, apply Proposition 2.4.14 to
get an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computationally hiding on IY and
statistically binding elsewhere.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPOSITION 2.4.14
(Follows from [Nao, HILL].) For every set K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if there is an instance-dependent one-
way function on K, then problem (K,K) has an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is
computationally hiding on the YES instances (namely, instances in K), and statistically binding
on the NO instances (namely, instances in K). Moreover, the instance-dependent commitment
scheme obtained is public coin and constant round.
Step 3. From an instance-dependent one-way function on IN, apply Proposition 3.5.44 to
get an instance-dependent commitment scheme that is computationally binding on IN and
statistically hiding elsewhere.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPOSITION 3.5.44
For every set K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if there is an instance-dependent one-way function on K, then
problem (K,K) has an instance-dependent commitment that is statistically hiding on the YES
instances (namely, instances in K), and computationally binding on the NO instances (namely,
instances in K). Moreover, the instance-dependent commitment scheme obtained is public coin.
Step 4. Finally, we use standard methods to combine the three instance-dependent com-
mitment schemes that we have constructed into a single instance-dependent commitment
scheme for Π. The ﬁrst method gives a combined scheme for the intersection of two prob-
lems.
CLAIM 4.2.10
Suppose problems Γ0 = (Γ0
Y,Γ0
N) and Γ00 = (Γ00
Y,Γ00
N) have instance-dependent commitment
schemes Com0
x and Com00
x, respectively. Then problem Γ
def = Γ0 ∩ Γ00 = (Γ0
Y ∩ Γ00
Y,Γ0
N ∪ Γ00
N) has
an instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx with the following properties.
I Comx is statistically [resp., computationally] hiding if both Com0
x and Com00
x are statistically
[resp., computationally] hiding.
I Comx is statistically [resp., computationally] binding if either of Com0
x or Com00
x is statis-
tically [resp., computationally] binding.
I Comx is public coin if both Com0
x and Com00
x are public coin.134 CHAPTER 4 / UNCONDITIONAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
I The round complexity of Comx equals the larger of the round complexities of Com0
x and
Com00
x.
Proof. In commitment scheme Comx, the sender commits to b by committing to b in both
schemes Com0
x and Com00
x, with the execution of both schemes done in parallel. The claimed
properties of Comx follow by inspection. 
The second method provides a combined scheme for the union of two problems.
CLAIM 4.2.11
Suppose problems Γ0 = (Γ0
Y,Γ0
N) and Γ00 = (Γ00
Y,Γ00
N) have instance-dependent commitment
schemes Com0
x and Com00
x, respectively. Then problem Γ
def = Γ0 ∪ Γ00 = (Γ0
Y ∩ Γ00
Y,Γ0
N ∪ Γ00
N) has
an instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx with the following properties.
I Comx is statistically [resp., computationally] hiding if either of Com0
x or Com00
x is statisti-
cally [resp., computationally] hiding.
I Comx is statistically [resp., computationally] binding if both Com0
x and Com00
x are statis-
tically [resp., computationally] binding.
I Comx is public coin if both Com0
x and Com00
x are public coin.
I The round complexity of Comx equals the larger of the round complexities of Com0
x and
Com00
x.
Proof. In commitment scheme Comx, the sender on input bit b, ﬁrst secret shares b into
two shares, b0 and b00, with the property that b0 ⊕ b00 = b and both b0 and b00 are uniform
in {0,1}. (This can be done by choosing a random b0 ← {0,1}, and setting b00 = b0 ⊕ b.)
The sender then commits to b by committing to bits b0 and b00 in schemes Com0
x and Com00
x,
respectively. The execution of schemes Com0
x and Com00
x is done in parallel.
The hiding property follows from the fact that bit b remains hidden as long as one of the
bits b0 or b00 remains hidden. Then binding property follows from the fact that b = b0 ⊕ b00,
and hence b is bounded to a ﬁxed value if both b0 and b00 are bounded to ﬁxed values. The
public coin property and round complexity of Comx follow by inspection. 
Having established the propositions and claims that we need, we now prove Lemma 4.2.9.
Proof of Lemma 4.2.9. Given that problem Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition, let I be the
set of OWF instances. We will partition I into the OWF YES instances IY = I ∩ ΠY
and the OWF NO instances IN = I ∩ ΠN. By Theorem 3.0.5, and Propositions 2.4.14 and
3.5.44, we have three instance-dependent commitment schemes, call them Com
(1)
x , Com
(2)
x ,
and Com
(3)
x , for the problems (ΠY \ I,ΠN \ I) ∈ SZKP, (IY,IY), and (IN,IN), respectively.
Moreover, all three schemes are public coin, and the ﬁrst two are constant round.4.2 PROOF OF THE CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS 135
If Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF instances, then set I = ∅, and hence
Com
(1)
x suﬃces to be our instance-dependent commitment scheme for Π. If Π satisﬁes the
Vadhan condition without OWF NO instances, then IN = I ∩ ΠN = ∅. Consequently, we
do not need scheme Com
(3)
x , and can just combine schemes Com
(1)
x and Com
(2)
x in a manner
prescribed by Claim 4.2.11 to get a constant-round instance-dependent commitment scheme
for Π.
Analogously, if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES instances, then IY =
I ∩ ΠY = ∅. Consequently, we do not need scheme Com
(2)
x , and can just combine schemes
Com
(1)
x and Com
(3)
x in a manner prescribed by Claim 4.2.10 to get an instance-dependent
commitment scheme for Π. Finally, if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition, we ﬁrst combine
schemes Com
(1)
x and Com
(2)
x in a manner prescribed by Claim 4.2.11 to get an instance-
dependent commitment scheme for (ΠY,ΠN\IN), and then combine this scheme with Com
(3)
x
in a manner prescribed by Claim 4.2.10 to get an instance-dependent commitment scheme
for Π.
The hiding, binding, and public coin properties of the instance-dependent commitment
scheme for Π follow by inspection. 
4.2.3 From instance-dependent commitments to zero-knowledge
protocols
The instance-dependent commitment scheme for a problem Π ∈ NP obtained in the previous
subsection can be used to unconditionally construct a zero-knowledge protocol for Π. Recall
that we did this in Section 2.5 where we substituted instance-dependent commitments for
standard commitments in the Blum protocol [Blu]. In the following lemma, we expand
upon Proposition 2.5.2 from Section 2.5.
LEMMA 4.2.12
(Expanded version of Proposition 2.5.2, which is based on [Blu].) If problem Π ∈ NP has an
instance-dependent commitment scheme Comx, then it has an eﬃcient-prover protocol (P,V )
with perfect completeness and the following additional properties.
I (P,V ) is statistical [resp., computational] zero knowledge if Comx is statistically [resp.,
computationally] hiding on the YES instances. Moreover, (P,V ) has a black-box simula-
tor.
I (P,V ) is a proof [resp., argument] system if Comx is statistically [resp., computationally]
binding on the NO instances.
I (P,V ) is public coin if Comx is public coin.
I (P,V ) has polynomially-small soundness error.
I The round complexity of (P,V ) equals that of Comx plus an additive constant.136 CHAPTER 4 / UNCONDITIONAL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF ZERO KNOWLEDGE
REMARK 4.2.13
Protocol (P,V ) in Lemma 4.2.12 above is obtained by repeating the Blum protocol [Blu],
given by Protocol 2.5.1, a total of O(logn) times in parallel, which still maintains the zero
knowledge property (cf., [BL, BLV]).
4.2.4 Putting it all together
We now show how our lemmas in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3 imply our main character-
ization theorems in Section 4.1.
Proof of Theorems 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, and 4.1.5. The implications for these four theorems
are captured by the same lemmas, so we can conveniently state them together.
(1) ⇒ (2) is established by Lemma 4.2.1 for the SZKP and CZKP cases, and by Lemma 4.2.2
for SZKA and CZKA cases.
(2) ⇒ (3) is established by Lemma 4.2.9.
(3) ⇒ (4) is established by Lemma 4.2.12. This is the only step that requires the problem
Π to be in NP. For problems Π ∈ IP having zero-knowledge proofs, this direction was
established in [Vad3, Sect.4.2] based on techniques from [IY, BGG+, IOS].3
(4) ⇒ (1) follows directly from deﬁnition. 
4.3 Symmetry between Zero Knowledge and Soundness
The characterization theorems in Section 4.1 yield the Symmetry Theorem (Theorem 1.2.2)
presented in Section 1.2. Here we restate our Symmetry Theorem in a slightly more general
form that captures promise problems. For a discussion on why we regard this theorem as
establishing an unconditional symmetry between computational zero knowledge and com-
putational soundness, refer back to page 8.
RESTATEMENT OF THEOREM 1.2.2
(Symmetry Theorem.)
1. CZKA versus co-CZKA: a problem Π ∈ NP∩co-NP has a computational zero-knowledge
argument system if and only if its complement Π has a computational zero-knowledge
argument system.
3Vadhan [Vad3] constructed public-coin honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge proofs for Π ∈ IP from instance-
dependent commitment schemes for Π with weaker properties, such as having an ineﬃcient sender, and used a
result of Goldreich, Sahai, and Vadhan [GSV1] to convert them into general, malicious-veriﬁer zero-knowledge
proofs. Since we now have instance-dependent commitments with standard properties, the construction
presented in [Vad3, Sect.4.2] would directly yield general, malicious-veriﬁer zero-knowledge proofs (without
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2. SZKA versus CZKP: a problem Π ∈ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument
system if and only if its complement Π has a computational zero-knowledge proof system.
Observe how the quality of the zero-knowledge condition for Π translates to the quality
of the soundness condition for Π and vice-versa.
Proof of Theorem 1.2.2. Using the fact that SZKP = co-SZKP [Oka, GSV1], and the sym-
metric role played by the set of OWF instances I in the Vadhan condition (Deﬁnition 1.2.3),
we can derive the following claim.
CLAIM 4.3.1
(Symmetry of the Vadhan condition.)
1. A problem Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition if and only if its complement Π
satisﬁes the Vadhan condition.
2. A problem Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES instances with
if and only if its complement Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF
NO instances.
For our ﬁrst result, by Theorem 4.1.5, we know that Π ∈ NP ∩ co-NP is in CZKA if
and only if Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition. From Item 1 of Claim 4.3.1 above, this is
equivalent to Π ∈ NP ∩ co-NP satisfying the Vadhan condition. Applying Theorem 4.1.5
again makes this equivalent to Π ∈ CZKA.
For our second result, by Theorem 4.1.4, we know that Π ∈ NP is in SZKA if and only if
Π satisﬁes the Vadhan condition without OWF YES instances. From Item 2 of Claim 4.3.1
above, this is equivalent to Π ∈ co-NP ⊆ IP satisfying the Vadhan condition without OWF
NO instances. Applying Theorem 4.1.2 again makes this equivalent to Π ∈ CZKP. 
While our Symmetry Theorem establishes that the class CZKA is closed under comple-
ment for problems in NP ∩ co-NP, we still do not know if the classes CZKP or SZKA are
closed under complement (even for problems in NP ∩ co-NP). Nevertheless, the Symmetry
Theorem allows us to derive the following relationships.
COROLLARY 4.3.2
The following three statements are equivalent.
1. The class CZKP is closed under complement for problems in NP∩co-NP. In other words,
CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) = co-CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP).
2. The class SZKA is closed under complement for problems in NP∩co-NP. In other words,
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3. The class CZKP equals SZKA for problems in NP ∩ co-NP. In other words, CZKP ∩
(NP ∩ co-NP) = SZKA ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP).
Note that none of the above statements are known to be true unconditionally (though
they all hold under the assumption that one-way functions exist), but if any one is true,
then so are the others.
Proof of Corollary 4.3.2. We prove the equivalences of the three statements as follows.
(1) ⇒ (2) is established by:
SZKA ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) = co-CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by the Symmetry Theorem)
= CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by 1)
= co-SZKA ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by the Symmetry Theorem).
(2) ⇒ (3) is established by:
SZKA ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) = co-SZKA ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by 2)
= CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by the Symmetry Theorem).
(3) ⇒ (1) is established by:
CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) = SZKA ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by 3)
= co-CZKP ∩ (NP ∩ co-NP) (by the Symmetry Theorem). 
We have now established all the results contained in this dissertation. In the next
chapter, we explore a direction for future research.5
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FUTURE RESEARCH
In this dissertation, we constructed instance-dependent commitment schemes for a problem
Π based on any—even an honest veriﬁer—zero-knowledge protocol for Π. We then estab-
lished our various unconditional results by substituting instance-dependent commitments
for standard commitments in existing zero-knowledge protocols. In this ﬁnal chapter, we
explore a future research direction motivated by the following question: can we obtain
constant-round statistical [resp., computational] zero-knowledge arguments for every prob-
lem in SZKA ∩ NP [resp., CZKA ∩ NP]?
For comparison, our characterization theorems for zero-knowledge proofs, as stated
by Theorems 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, yield constant-round statistical [resp., computational] zero-
knowledge proofs (with perfect completeness and a polynomially small soundness error) for
every problem in SZKP∩NP [resp., CZKP∩NP]. The bottleneck in extending this to argu-
ment systems turns out to be that the known construction of statistically-hiding commit-
ments based on any one-way function, as presented in this dissertation, has polynomial num-
ber of rounds (cf., [HR2]). Moreover, any fully-black-box construction of statistically-hiding
commitments even from any one-way permutation requires Ω(n/logn) rounds [HHRS], and
indeed ours is a fully-black-box construction.1 Recall that we needed to base our construc-
tion of statistically-hiding commitments on one-way functions because in Theorems 4.1.4
and 4.1.5, we characterized every problem having zero-knowledge arguments in terms of
instances with a statistical zero-knowledge proofs plus a set of instances IN from which we
can construct a one-way function (i.e., the OWF NO instances).
Nevertheless, constant-round statistically-hiding commitment schemes can based on any
1See [RTV, Def.2.3] and [HHRS, Def.2.6] for the deﬁnition of a fully-black-box construction.
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collision-resistant hash family [NY, DPP].2 Thus, if we can characterize every problem
Π = (ΠY,ΠN) ∈ SZKA in terms of instances with a statistical zero-knowledge proof system
plus a set of instances IN ⊆ ΠN from which we can construct a collision-resistant hash family,
then we should expect to resolve the above question in the aﬃrmative in the SZKA case:
proving that every problem in SZKA∩NP has a constant-round statistical zero-knowledge
argument system.
And although not immediately obvious, the CZKA case does follow from the SZKA case
if our hypothesis turns out to be true. This is because, based on our main characterization
theorems, every problem Π ∈ CZKA ∩ NP can be characterized in terms of instances with
a statistical zero-knowledge argument system plus a set of instances IY ⊆ ΠY from which
we can construct a one-way function (i.e., the OWF YES instances). And we can construct
constant-round computationally-hiding and statistically-binding commitments from this set
of OWF YES instances (see Proposition 2.4.14).
To formalize our hypothesis as an open problem, we ﬁrst give a proposed deﬁnition of a
hash family that is collision resistant on a set I, following the spirit of an instance-dependent
one-way function in Deﬁnition 2.4.6.
DEFINITION 5.0.3
A polynomial-time computable family H =
S
x Hx = {h: {0,1}n(|x|) → {0,1}m(|x|)}, where
n(·) > m(·) are polynomials, is an instance-dependent collision-resistant hash family
on I if there exists a negligible function ε such that for every nonuniform PPT A, the
following holds for every x ∈ I:
Pr
h←Hx
[A(x,h) = (α,α0) such that h(α) = h(α0)] ≤ ε(|x|) .
OPEN PROBLEM 5.0.4
For a problem Π = (ΠY,ΠN) ∈ SZKA ∩ NP, does there exists a set IN ⊆ ΠN such that:
I the promise problem (ΠY,ΠN \ IN) is in SZKP, and
I there exists an instance-dependent collision-resistant hash family on IN ?
As a ﬁrst step, we could even ask whether the above two conditions hold for problems Π ∈ NP
having constant-round statistical zero-knowledge arguments (instead of considering all problems
in SZKA ∩ NP).
More ambitiously, it would be interesting to see if the techniques presented in this
dissertation can be extended to conduct an unconditional study on other cryptographic
constructs, like multiparty cryptographic protocols (cf., [Yao, GMW1]).
2A collision-resistant hash family is a family of hash functions H = {h: {0,1}
n → {0,1}
m} where
n > m, and given a random hash h ← H, it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd a pair y and y
0 such that
h(y) = h(y
0). See Deﬁnition 5.0.3 for an instance-dependent variant.A
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DEFERRED PROOFS
We present proofs that have been deferred from the main text. Appendices A.1, A.2, and
A.3 contain proofs deferred from Sections 3.2.2, 3.5.2, and 4.2.1, respectively.
A.1 Interactive Hashing with Multiple Outputs
This section is devoted to prove Theorem 3.2.4 from Section 3.2.2, restated below.
RESTATEMENT OF THEOREM 3.2.4
There exists an interactive hashing with multiple outputs protocol, namely Protocol 3.2.3.
The correctness of Protocol 3.2.3 is easy to see. Hence, we divide the proof of this
theorem into lemmas establishing the hiding and binding properties of Protocol 3.2.3. The
proofs presented are very similar in nature to those in [NOVY], with additional analysis
needed to handle interactive hashing for multiple outputs.
LEMMA A.1.1
Protocol 3.2.3 satisﬁes the hiding property of Deﬁnition 3.2.1. In other words, letting inter-
active hashing (SIH,RIH) be as in Protocol 3.2.3, we have for all R∗, (V,Z) is distributed
identically to (V,Uk), where V = viewR∗(SIH(Uq),R∗) is the view of receiver R∗, and Z =
outputSIH(SIH(Uq),R∗) is the private output of SIH.
Proof. The view of any R∗ will be the hash functions h0,h1,··· ,hq−k−1 together with SIH’s
responses c0,c1,...,cq−k−1. Given queries h0,h1,··· ,hq−k−1 from R∗, we show that there
are 2q−k possible y’s that would make SIH(y) respond to c0,c1,...,cq−k−1.
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Consider the matrix H = (h0,h1,··· ,hq−k−1) whose rows are the hi’s, vector c =
(c0,c1,...,cq−k−1), and the equation Hy = c. Since hi is of the form 0i1{0,1}q−i−1, the
ﬁrst q − k columns of the matrix are linearly independent. Hence, any setting of the last k
bits of y, will fully determine the ﬁrst q − k bits of it. Since the output of SIH, denoted as
z, is the last k bits of its private input y, any z ∈ {0,1}k is equally as likely given the view
of R∗. 
LEMMA A.1.2
Protocol 3.2.3 satisﬁes the binding property of Deﬁnition 3.2.1. That is, letting interactive
hashing (SIH,RIH) be as in Protocol 3.2.3, there exists a oracle PPT algorithm A such that:
For every S∗ and any relation W, denoting the common output as C = (S∗,RIH)(1q,1k),
and private outputs of S∗ as ((x0,z0),(x1,z1)) = outputS∗(S∗,RIH), if it is the
case that
Pr[x0 ∈ WC(z0) ∧ x1 ∈ WC(z1) ∧ z0 6= z1] > ε ,
where the above probability is over the coin tosses of RIH and S∗, then it is also
the case that
Pr
y←{0,1}q[AS∗
(y,1q,1k,ε) ∈ Wy] = Ω(ε3q−62−k) .
REMARK A.1.3
Independent of our work, Haitner and Reingold [HR1] gave an improved bound that brings
the success probability of AS∗
to Ω(ε2q−82−k). Their witness-ﬁnding algorithm AS∗
is also
diﬀerent from ours and is more eﬃcient in terms of its running time. We will, however, not
need these improved bounds for our applications.
We prove Lemma A.1.2 by providing an algorithm A that ﬁnds a valid witness (according
to relation W) for a random string y ← {0,1}q with nonnegligible probability. Before
describing algorithm A, we provide the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions. In the enumerated deﬁnitions below, hi is of the form 0i1{0,1}q−i−1, and
hi(y) = hhi,yi. Without loss of generality, we can assume that S∗ is deterministic because
every probabilistic S∗ can be converted to a (nonuniform) deterministic one with the same
success probability and running time by ﬁxing its random coins to maximize its success
probability.
1. For 0 ≤ i < q, let Hi denote the family of hash functions of the form 0i1{0,1}q−i−1,
i.e., Hi = {0i1w : w ∈ {0,1}q−i−1}.
2. A node N at level i is deﬁned by a series of hash functions (h0,h1,...,hi−1), whereA.1 INTERACTIVE HASHING WITH MULTIPLE OUTPUTS 143
each hj ∈ Hj. (Since S∗ is deterministic, this determines c0,...,ci−1 where cj =
S∗(h0,...,hj).) Let Li denote the set of nodes at level i.
3. The set of compatible hash functions at node N ∈ Li is denoted as
Comp(N,y) = {hi ∈ Hi : S∗(N,hi) = hi(y)} ,
where S∗(N,hi), with N = (h0,...,hi−1), denotes S∗(h0,...,hi).
4. A string y is γ-balanced at N ∈ Li if
1 − γ
2
≤
Comp(N,y)
|Hi|
≤
1 + γ
2
.
A string y is γ-fully-balanced at N ∈ Li if it is γ-balanced at all its parental
nodes. That is, letting N = (h0,...,hi−1), y is required to be γ-balanced at all
N0 = (h0),N1 = (h0,h1),...,N = Ni−1 = (h0,...,hi−1).
5. A string y is said to be compatible with a node N = (h0,...,hi−1) if hj(y) =
S∗(h0,...,hj) for all 0 ≤ j < i. Let U(N) denote the set of compatible y’s with node
N. Note that for every N ∈ Li, we have |U(N)| = 2q−i.
6. Let B(N) and F(N) denote the set of γ-balanced strings and γ-fully-balanced strings
at node N respectively. Moreover, let G(N) = U(N)\F(N) be the set of strings that
are not fully-balanced. Note that for every node N, we have F(N) ⊆ B(N) ⊆ U(N).
7. At every node N ∈ Lq−k, we can assume without loss of generality that S∗(N) outputs
a pair of strings (x0,z0) and (x1,z1), but it is not necessarily the case that any of
xb ∈ WC(zb).
The description of our witness-ﬁnding algorithm is presented next.
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Algorithm AS∗
: on input y ∈ {0,1}q,1q,1k and ε, do the following.
1. Set parameters γ = 1/q, β = log(1/ε) + 2log(q) + 4log(1/γ) + 4, and α = q − β − k.
2. Repeat the following for i = 0,1,...,α − 1:
When A is at node N ∈ Li, explore along a random hi ← Comp(N,y) to get
to a new node N0 = (N,hi) ∈ Li+1. (This can be done eﬃciently by choosing
a random hi ← Hi and querying S∗ to make sure that hi ∈ Comp(N,y),
and repeat up to 8q times if not. If after 8q repetitive tries and fail to
encounter any hi ∈ Comp(N,y), then output fail.)
3. At node N ∈ Lα, choose random hα ← Hα,...,hα+β−1 ← Hα+β−1, to arrive at
node e N = (N,hα,hα+1,...,hα+β−1) ∈ Lα+β. (Note that q − k = α + β, and hence
e N ∈ Lα+β = Lq−k.)144 APPENDIX A / DEFERRED PROOFS
4. Query S∗( e N) to get (x0,z0) and (x1,z1). If either of C(zb) = y, then output xb. Else,
output fail.
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It is clear that algorithm AS∗
stated in Algorithm A.1.4 runs in polynomial time (with
oracle queries to S∗). The remainder of the proof is broken down into the following claims.
CLAIM A.1.5
For every node N ∈ Li, the set of unbalanced strings, U(N) \ B(N) ≤ 2/γ2.
Proof. Let X ⊆ U(N) be a set of size 2d, where d = 2log(1/γ). We interpret X as a
random variable that has equal weights on each of its 2d elements. Let Hi be the family
of hash functions after node N of the form 0i1{0,1}q−i−1. Observe that for every x 6= x0,
Prhi←Hi[hi(x) = hi(x0)] ≤ 1/2. Also, note that hi requires exactly q−i−1 bits to describe.
Recall the deﬁnition of collision probability, denoted as CP, from Section 3.5.2. Com-
puting the collision probabilities (using the notation Hi to denote a random hash function
from Hi), we get
CP((Hi,Hi(X))) ≤ CP(Hi)(CP(X) + Pr[Hi(X) = Hi(X0) : X 6= X0])
≤ CP(Hi) · (1/2d + 1/2)
= 2−(q−i−1)(1/2d + 1/2) whereas,
CP((Hi,U1)) = CP(Hi) · 1/2
= 2−(q−i−1) · (1/2) .
Thus,
∆((Hi,Hi(X)),(Hi,U1)) = 1/2|(Hi,Hi(X)) − (Hi,U1)|1
≤ 1/2 ·
√
2q−i−1 ·
p
CP((Hi,Hi(X))) − CP((Hi,U1))
≤ 1/2
q
1/2d
= 2−d/2−1
≤ γ/2 ,
with the last inequality following from d = 2log(1/γ).
Having establish the above bound, assume for sake of contradiction that U(N)\B(N) >
2d+1 = 2/γ2. Then we will have a set T ⊆ U(N)\B(N) of size greater then 2d with elements
that are unbalanced in one direction (i.e. all > 1/2+γ, or all < 1/2−γ). But this contradicts
the requirement that ∆((Hi,Hi(T)),(Hi,U1)) ≤ γ/2 (since |T| > 2d). A.1 INTERACTIVE HASHING WITH MULTIPLE OUTPUTS 145
CLAIM A.1.6
For every node N ∈ Li, the set of strings that are not fully balanced, G(N) = U(N)\F(N) ≤
2i/γ2. In particular, for γ = 1/q, |F(N)| ≥ |U(N)|/2 for i ≤ q − 4logq.
Proof. Follows from Claim A.1.5 by taking a union bound over all unbalanced elements at
levels i and smaller. 
CLAIM A.1.7
For every node N ∈ Lα, the fraction of children nodes Nα+β with greater than one element
from G(N) is at most ε/4.
Proof. Consider any ﬁxed node N ∈ Lα. The number of non-fully-balanced (aka bad)
elements in that node is G(N). Hence, the number of pairs of these bad elements is at most
|G(N)|
2. Since for each x 6= y ∈ U(N), Pr[hi(x) = hi(y)] ≤ 1/2 for all α ≤ i < α + β, the
fraction of children nodes N0 ∈ Lα+β with greater than one element from G(N) is at most
|G(N)|
2 /2β.
Since β = log(1/ε) + 2log(q) + 4log(1/γ) + 4, we can bound |G(N)|
2 /2β as follows:
|G(N)|
2 · 2−β ≤ (2αγ−2)22−β ≤ 4q2γ−42−β < ε/4 . 
A node N ∈ Lα+β = Lq−k is witness revealing if both of S∗(N)’s outputs, namely
(x0,z0) and (x1,z1), satisfy C(zb) ∈ U(N) and xb ∈ WC(zb), for b ∈ {0,1}. A node N ∈ Lα
is said to be good if greater than ε/2 of its children at level q − k are witness revealing.
CLAIM A.1.8
The fraction of good nodes at level α is at least ε/2.
Proof. By the assumption that
Pr
"
x0 ∈ WC(z0) ∧ x1 ∈ WC(z1)




(S∗,R)(1q,1k) = C , and
outputS∗(S∗,R) = ((x0,z0),(x1,z1))
#
> ε ,
we know that at least ε fraction of all the nodes at level q − k are nonbinding. And, by a
Markov bound, we have that ε/2 fraction of nodes at level α are good. 
CLAIM A.1.9
For any ﬁxed N ∈ Lα and y0 ∈ F(N), we have
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 + γ)α ·
1
|Lα|
≤ Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0] ≤
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 − γ)α ·
1
|Lα|
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where the probability is taken over y ∈ {0,1}q and the random coins of A.
Proof. Let N = (h0,h2,...,hα−1), and for 1 ≤ j ≤ α, deﬁne Nj = (h0,...,hj−1). To get
the upper bound,
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0] = Pr[y = y0] · Pr[A reaches N]
= 2−q
α−1 Y
j=0
1
Comp(Nj,y)
≤ 2−q
α−1 Y
j=0
2
1 − γ
·
1
|Hj|
=
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 − γ)α ·
1
|Lα|
.
To get the lower bound, we use very similar techniques.
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0] = 2−q
α−1 Y
j=0
1
Comp(Nj,y)
≥ 2−q
α−1 Y
j=0
2
1 + γ
·
1
|Hj|
=
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 + γ)α ·
1
|Lα|
. 
CLAIM A.1.10
Pr[The node N reached by A is good ∧ y ∈ F(N)] ≥
ε
4(1 + γ)α ,
where the probability is taken over y ∈ {0,1}q and the random coins of A.
Proof. Let N ∈ Lα be any good node at level α. Then,
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y ∈ F(N)] =
X
y0∈F(N)
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0]
≥
X
y0∈F(N)
1
|Lα|
·
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 + γ)α
=
|F(N)|
2q−α ·
1
|Lα|
·
1
(1 + γ)α
=
|F(N)|
|U(N)|
·
1
|Lα|
·
1
(1 + γ)α
≥
1
2
·
1
|Lα|
·
1
(1 + γ)α ,A.1 INTERACTIVE HASHING WITH MULTIPLE OUTPUTS 147
with the last inequality following from the fact that |F(N)|/|U(N)| ≥ 1/2, noting α ≤
q − 3logq (refer to Claim A.1.6).
There are |Lα| nodes at level α, and at least ε/2 fraction of them are good. Hence, we
multiply the above probability by (ε/2)|Lα| to get our stated result. 
CLAIM A.1.11
In any good node N ∈ Lα, the fraction of nonbinding children of N at level α+β that has one
or less image in G(N) is at least ε/4.
Proof. The fraction of nonbinding children is greater than ε/2, and by Claim A.1.7, the
fraction of children nodes of N with greater than one element from G(N) is at most ε/4.

CLAIM A.1.12
For any ﬁxed N ∈ Lα and y0 ∈ F(N), we have
Pr[y = y0|A reaches N ∧ y ∈ F(N)] ≥
1
|F(N)|

1 − γ
1 + γ
α
,
where the probability is taken over y ∈ {0,1}q and the random coins of A.
Proof. For any ﬁxed N ∈ Lα and y0 ∈ F(N),
Pr[y = y0|A reaches N ∧ y ∈ F(N)] =
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0]
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y ∈ F(N)]
.
For the numerator, by Claim A.1.9,
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0] ≥
1
|Lα|
·
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 + γ)α .
For the denominator, also using Claim A.1.9,
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y ∈ F(N)] =
X
y0∈F(N)
Pr[A reaches N ∧ y = y0]
≤
X
y0∈F(N)
1
|Lα|
·
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 − γ)α
= |F(N)| ·
1
|Lα|
·
1
2q−α ·
1
(1 − γ)α .
Combining the two, we have our result. 
We are now ready to prove Lemma A.1.2.148 APPENDIX A / DEFERRED PROOFS
Proof of Lemma A.1.2. Observe how algorithm A in Algorithm A.1.4 operates. On input y,
it follows a random compatible (with y) hash functions hi out of node N ∈ Li, for 1 ≤ i < α,
and then takes random hi’s (not necessarily compatible with y) when α ≤ i < α + β. (For
now, we can ignore failure to obtain compatible hash functions.) Algorithm A will ﬁnd a
valid witness for y if the all following conditions hold.
1. Algorithm A reaches a good node N ∈ Lα such that y ∈ F(N). This happens with
probability at least ε/(4(1 + γ)α) (Claim A.1.10).
2. Algorithm A reaches a witness revealing child with at most one element in G(N).
Given that Item 1 occurs, this happens with probability at least ε/4 (Claim A.1.11).
When this is the case, S∗ outputs (x0,z0) and (x1,z1), such that at least one (xb,zb)
will have xb ∈ WC(zb) and C(zb) ∈ U(N) \ G(N) = F(N). Let y0 = C(zb).
3. The string y equals y0 = C(zb). The conditional probability of this happening, by
Claim A.1.12, is:
Pr[y = y0|A reaches N ∧ y0 ∈ F(N)] ≥
1
|F(N)|

1 − γ
1 + γ
α
.
When this happens, A will output xb ∈ Wy, a valid witness for y.
Combining all the probabilities, we have
Pr
y←{0,1}q[A(y) ∈ Wy] ≥
ε
4(1 + γ)α ·
ε
4
·
1
|F(N)|

1 − γ
1 + γ
α
≥
1
2β+k ·
ε2
32
·

1 − γ
(1 + γ)2
q
.
With settings of parameters γ = 1/q and β = log(1/ε) + 2log(q) + 4log(1/γ)) + 4, we
have the probability of ﬁnding a witness to be greater than c·(ε3q−62−k), for some constant
c > 0.
Finally, we need to account for the case when we fail to ﬁnd compatible hash functions
hi out of node N ∈ Li, for 1 ≤ i < α. Nevertheless, because our analysis has only focused on
fully balanced y, and we repeat 8q times to ﬁnd a compatible hash, the probability of failure,
by a Chernoﬀ bound, is exponentially small. Therefore, the overall success probability is
greater than c · (ε3q−62−k) − exp(q) = Ω(ε3q−62−k). A.2 COLLISION PROBABILITY LEMMAS 149
A.2 Collision Probability Lemmas
We prove the lemmas presented in Section 3.5.2.
RESTATEMENT OF LEMMA 3.5.4
For independent pairs of random variables (X1,Y1),...,(Xm,Ym),
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym)) =
m Y
i=1
CP1/2(Xi|Yi) .
Note that Xi and Yi can be correlated, it is only required that the pair (Xi,Yi) be independent
from the other tuples.
Proof. Since the Xi’s are independent, for all y1,...,ym, we have
CP((X1,...,Xm)|Y1=y1,...,Ym=ym) =
m Y
i=1
CP(Xi|Yi=yi) . (A.1)
This gives us
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym))
= E
(Y1,...,Ym)
h
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|Y1,...,Ym)
i
= E
(Y1,...,Ym)
"
m Y
i=1
CP1/2(Xi|Yi)
#
(by A.1)
=
m Y
i=1
E
Yi
h
CP1/2(Xi|Yi)
i
(by independence of Yi’s)
=
m Y
i=1
CP1/2(Xi|Yi) . 
RESTATEMENT OF LEMMA 3.5.5
Suppose random variables (X1,Y1),...,(Xm,Ym) satisfy the following conditions for some val-
ues of α1,...,αm ∈ R+ and all i = 1,2,...,m:
1. For every (y1,...,yi−1) ∈ Supp(Y1,Y2,...,Yi−1),
CP1/2(Xi|Y1=y1,...,Yi−1=yi−1 | Yi|Y1=y1,...,Yi−1=yi−1) ≤ αi .
2. For every (y1,...,yi) ∈ Supp(Y1,Y2,...,Yi), the i+1 random variables X1,X2,...,Xi,
and Yi+1 are independent, even if we condition on Y1 = y1,...,Yi = yi.150 APPENDIX A / DEFERRED PROOFS
Then,
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym)) ≤
m Y
i=1
αi .
Proof. By induction, it suﬃces to prove
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym)) ≤ αm · CP1/2 ((X1,...,Xm−1)|(Y1,...,Ym−1)) , (A.2)
and then by iteratively expanding CP1/2 ((X1,...,Xm−1)|(Y1,...,Ym−1)) in terms of αj’s,
we get our result. To simplify notation, we write X0
m = Xm|Y1=y1,...,Ym−1=ym−1 and Y 0
m =
Ym|Y1=y1,...,Ym−1=ym−1 when y1,...,ym−1 are clear from context. We prove (A.2) as follows:
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|(Y1,...,Ym)) (A.3)
= E
(Y1,...,Ym)
h
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|Y1,...,Ym)
i
(A.4)
= E
(Y1,...,Ym−1)

E
Y 0
m
h
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm)|Y1,...,Y 0
m)
i
(A.5)
= E
(Y1,...,Ym−1)

E
Y 0
m
h
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm−1)|Y1,...,Y 0
m) · CP1/2(Xm|Y1,...,Y 0
m)
i
(A.6)
= E
(Y1,...,Ym−1)

CP1/2((X1,...,Xm−1)|Y1,...,Ym−1) · E
Y 0
m
h
CP1/2(Xm|Y1,...,Y 0
m)
i
(A.7)
= E
(Y1,...,Ym−1)
h
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm−1)|Y1,...,Ym−1) · CP1/2(X0
m|Y 0
m)
i
(A.8)
≤ αm · E
(Y1,...,Ym−1))
h
CP1/2((X1,...,Xm−1)|Y1,...,Ym−1)
i
(A.9)
≤ αm · CP1/2 ((X1,...,Xm−1)|(Y1,...,Ym−1))) . (A.10)
Equation (A.6) follows because X1,...,Xm conditioned on Y1 = y1,...,Ym = ym are
independent. Equation (A.7) follows because X1,...,Xm−1, and Ym conditioned on Y1 =
y1,...,Ym−1 = ym−1 are independent. Finally, (A.9) follows from the assumption that for
all (y1,...,yi−1) ∈ Supp(Y1,Y2,...,Ym−1),
CP1/2(X0
m|Y 0
m) = CP1/2(Xm|Y1=y1,...,Ym−1=ym−1 | Ym|Y1=y1,...,Ym−1=ym−1) ≤ αm . 
RESTATEMENT OF LEMMA 3.5.6
(Randomness Extraction Lemma.) Let (X,Y ) be any (possibly correlated) pair of random
variables, and let random variable H denote a random hash function from a family of pairwise-
independent hash functions H with range {0,1}α. Suppose the hash functions from H are
represented by (q − α)-bit strings and CP1/2(X|Y ) ≤
√
2−(α+3). If H is independent from
(X,Y ), then
CP1/2((H,H(X))|Y ) ≤
p
2−(q−1) .A.2 COLLISION PROBABILITY LEMMAS 151
Proof. We bound the value of CP1/2((H,H(X))|Y ) as follows:
CP1/2(H,H(X)|Y )
= E
y←Y
h
CP1/2(H,H(X)|Y =y)
i
≤ E
y←Y

CP1/2(H) ·
q
CP(X|Y =y) + 2−α
  
since CP(H,H(Z)) ≤
CP(H) · (CP(Z) + 2−α)
!
≤ E
y←Y
h
CP1/2(H) ·

CP1/2(X|Y =y) +
√
2−α
i
(Cauchy-Schwartz/Jensen)
= CP1/2(H) ·

E
y←Y
h
CP1/2(X|Y =y)
i
+
√
2−α

= CP1/2(H) · (CP1/2(X|Y ) +
√
2−α)
≤
p
2−(q−α) · (CP1/2(X|Y ) +
√
2−α) (since |h| = q − α)
≤
p
2−(q−α) ·
 r
2−α
8
+
√
2−α
!
<
p
2−(q−α) ·
√
2−α ·
√
2

=
p
2−(q−1) . 
RESTATEMENT OF LEMMA 3.5.7
For any triple of (possibly correlated) random variables X, Y and Z,
CP1/2(X|Y ) ≤ CP1/2(X|(Y,Z)) ≤
p
|Supp(Z)| · CP1/2(X|Y ) .
Proof. For each y ∈ Supp(Y ) and z ∈ Supp(Z), let vy,z be the vector
(Pr[X = x ∧ Z = z|Y = y])x∈Supp(X). With this, we compute:





X
z
vy,z





2
≤
X
z
kvy,zk2 (triangle inequality)
≤
q
Supp(Z|Y =y) ·





X
z
vy,z





2
(Cauchy-Schwartz/Jensen)
≤
p
Supp(Z) ·





X
z
vy,z





2
.
Since CP1/2(X|Y =y) = k
P
z vy,zk2 and CP1/2 ((X|Y =y)|(Z|Y =y)) =
P
z kvy,zk2, taking
expectations over Y for both sides yield our result. 
RESTATEMENT OF LEMMA 3.5.8
Let random variable H denote a random hash function from a family of pairwise-independent
hash functions H with range {0,1}α. For any ε > 0, if CP(X) ≤ ε2·2−α and H is independent152 APPENDIX A / DEFERRED PROOFS
from X, then random variable (H,H(X)) is ε-close in statistical distance to uniform.
Proof. Let D = 2q−α and L = 2α. We bound the statistical distance of (H,H(X)) from
uniform as follows:
1
2
|(H,H(X)) − Uq|1 ≤
√
DL
2
k(H,H(X)) − Uqk2
=
√
DL
2
·
p
CP(H,H(X)) − 2−q
≤
√
DL
2
·
s
1
D

CP(X) +
1
L

−
1
DL
=
p
CP(X) · L
2
≤
ε
2
. 
A.3 Establishing the Vadhan Condition
We restate and prove Claims 4.2.3, 4.2.4, and 4.2.5, and Proposition 4.2.7 from Section 4.2.1.
Doing so would give a complete proof of Lemma 4.2.2, which states that every problem Π
having a zero-knowledge argument system also satisﬁes the Vadhan condition. The three
claims are proven using techniques from Vadhan [Vad3], and Proposition 4.2.7 is based on
ideas from Ostrovsky [Ost]. Recall that (P,V ) is the zero-knowledge argument system for
Π, with simulator S.
Before proving the above claims and proposition, we ﬁrst deﬁne the conditional en-
tropy of two jointly distributed random variables as follows: For jointly distributed random
variables X and Y , we deﬁne the conditional entropy of X given Y to be
H(X|Y )
def = E
y←Y
[H(X|Y =y)] = E
(x,y)←(X,Y )

log
1
Pr[X = x|Y = y]

= H(X,Y ) − H(Y ) .
Next, recall the deﬁnition of h(x) as stated by (4.1) in Section 4.2.1:
h(x) =
` X
i=1
[H(S(x)2i) − H(S(x)2i−1)] =
` X
i=1
H(S(x)2i|S(x)2i−1) , (A.11)
recalling that H(·) is the entropy measure. The second equality in (A.11) follows the fact
that the output of S2i contains S2i−1, and hence H(S2i,S2i−1) = H(S2i).
Finally, recall that from (4.2) in Section 4.2.1, we have that for every x ∈ {0,1}∗, and
every prover strategy P0, the number of coins used by the honest veriﬁer, denoted by r(|x|),A.3 ESTABLISHING THE VADHAN CONDITION 153
is:
r(|x|) =
` X
i=1

H(hP0,V i(x)2i) − H(hP0,V i(x)2i−1)

=
` X
i=1
H(hP0,V i(x)2i|hP0,V i(x)2i−1) ,
(A.12)
with the second equality following from the fact that the output of hP0,V i2i contains
hP0,V i2i−1, and hence H(hP0,V i2i,hP0,V i2i−1) = H(hP0,V i2i).
RESTATEMENT OF CLAIM 4.2.3
Problem (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) ∈ SZKP.
Proof. The following proposition is from [Vad3].
PROPOSITION A.3.1
(Based on [Vad3, Prop.3.2].) Consider the problem Conditional Entropy
Approximation = (CEAY,CEAN), where CEAY = {((X,Y ),r) : H(X|Y ) ≥
r} and CEAN = {((X,Y ),r) : H(X|Y ) ≤ r−1}. Here (X,Y ) is a samplable joint
distribution speciﬁed by two circuits that use the same coin tosses. Conditional
Entropy Approximation is complete for SZKP.
Given the above proposition, it suﬃces to show a reduction from (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) to
Conditional Entropy Approximation. Our reduction is as follows: On input x, we
construct circuits X and Y that sample from the following (joint) random variables.
(X,Y ): Select i ← {1,...,`(|x|)}, choose random coin tosses ω for the simulator, and
output (S2i(x;ω),S2i−1(x;ω)).
When x ∈ ΠY \ IY, we have h(x) > r − 1/q, and hence:
H(X|Y ) =
1
`
` X
i=1
H(S2i|S2i−1) =
h
`
>
r − 1/q
`
=
r
`
−
1
q · `
.
And when x ∈ ΠN \ IN, we have have h(x) < r − 2/q, and hence:
H(X|Y ) =
1
`
` X
i=1
H(S2i|S2i−1) =
h
`
<
r − 2/q
`
=
r
`
−
2
q · `
.
This is what we need to prove, except the entropy gap is only 1/(q · `). This can be
increased to 1 by taking q · ` independent samples from the joint distribution. That is, we
deﬁne (X,Y ) = ((X1,...,Xq·`),(Y1,...,Yq·`)), where the (Xi,Yi)’s are independent copies
of (X,Y ). Since (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) reduces to Conditional Entropy Approximation,
Proposition A.3.1 gives us that (ΠY \ IY,ΠN \ IN) ∈ SZKP. 154 APPENDIX A / DEFERRED PROOFS
RESTATEMENT OF CLAIM 4.2.4
There exists an instance-dependent one-way function on IY.
Proof. The following proposition is from [Vad3].
PROPOSITION A.3.2
(From [Vad3, Lem.3.10].) Let K ⊆ {0,1}∗ be any set. Assume that there exists
a polynomial-time computable mapping that maps every x ∈ K to samplable joint
distributions (X,Y ) and a parameter r such that H(X|Y ) ≤ r−1, but H(X0|Y 0) ≥ r
for some (X0,Y 0) indistinguishable from (X,Y ). Then there exists an instance-
dependent one-way function on K.
When x ∈ ΠY, then S is computationally indistinguishable from hP,V i. So (X,Y ), as
deﬁned in the proof of Claim 4.2.3 above, is indistinguishable from the joint distribution
(X0,Y 0) = (hP,V i2L,hP,V i2L−1), where random variable L denotes an independent uniform
element of {1,...,`}.
By (A.12), we have:
H(X0|Y 0) =
1
`
` X
i=1
H(hP,V i2i|hP,V i2i−1) =
r
`
,
for all x ∈ ΠY. And when x ∈ IY ⊆ ΠY, we have have h(x) < r − 1/q and hence:
H(X|Y ) =
1
`
` X
i=1
H(S2i|S2i−1) =
h
`
<
r − 1/q
`
=
r
`
−
1
q · `
.
Again, like in the proof of Claim 4.2.3, we can increase the entropy gap between H(X0|Y 0)
and H(X|Y ) to 1. Finally, we apply Proposition A.3.2 to establish our claim. 
RESTATEMENT OF CLAIM 4.2.5
For Π ∈ HV-SZKA, we can take IY = ∅.
Proof. For Π ∈ HV-SZKA, the output of the simulator S(x) is statistically close to hP,V i(x)
for every x ∈ ΠY. This implies that IY = ∅, since for every x ∈ ΠY, we have
h(x) >
` X
i=1
[H(hP,V i2i(x)) − H(hP,V i2i−1(x))] − neg(|x|) = r(|x|) − neg(|x|) ,
with the last equality following from (A.12). 
Finally, we prove Proposition 4.2.7, restated below. Recall that the function gx(i,ω) =
(x,i,S(x;ω)2i), as stated by (4.3) in Section 4.2.1.A.3 ESTABLISHING THE VADHAN CONDITION 155
RESTATEMENT OF PROPOSITION 4.2.7
Let gx be as in (4.3) in Section 4.2.1. For every set K ⊆ {0,1}∗, if gx is not an instance-
dependent distributionally one-way function on K, then for every polynomial p, there exists a
nonuniform PPT prover e P such that
∆(he P,V i(x),S(x)) ≤ `(|x|) ·

1
p(|x|)
+ 2 · ∆(hPS,V i(x),S(x))

,
for inﬁnitely many x ∈ K.
Proof. Let random variable I denote an independent uniform index i ← {1,2,...,`}, and
let random variable Ω denote independent uniform coins ω for the simulator S. Recall
the deﬁnition of instance-dependent distributionally one-way function as stated in Deﬁ-
nition 2.4.7. If gx is not an instance-dependent distributionally one-way function on K,
then for any polynomial q, there exists a nonuniform PPT A such that the random vari-
ables ((I,Ω),S(x;Ω)2I) and (A(S(x;Ω)2I),S(x;Ω)2I) are 1/q(|x|)-close for inﬁnitely many
x ∈ K. Let K0 ⊆ K be the inﬁnite set of instances x for which the previously stated random
variables are 1/q(|x|)-close. Let the polynomial p(|x|) = q(|x|) · (1/`(|x|)). For this point
on, we will drop the mention of x and assume that x ∈ K0.
Since I is independent from the other random variables, we have that for all i =
1,2,...,`, the random variables
((i,Ω),S(Ω)2i) and (A(S(Ω)2i),S(Ω)2i) are (1/p)-close , (A.13)
since ` · (1/q) = 1/p.
For any interactive machine A and B, let random variable hA,Bi[mj] denote the tran-
script of messages exchanged between A and B conditioned on the ﬁrst j messages being
mj. In other words, hA,Bi[mj] = hA,Bi|hA,Bij=mj. It follows from deﬁnition that
hA,Bi[hA,Bij] ≡ hA,Bi , (A.14)
for any index j.
By (A.13), and noting that PS and e P use (i,Ω) and A(S(Ω)2i) to produce their messages
in round 2i + 1, respectively, we have that for every i = 1,2,...,`,
(hPS,V i[S2i])2i+2 and (he P,V i[S2i])2i+2 are (1/p)-close , (A.15)156 APPENDIX A / DEFERRED PROOFS
Using (A.14) and (A.15) above, we have that for every i = 1,2,...,`,
∆(he P,V i2i+2,hPS,V i2i+2)
= ∆((he P,V i[he P,V i2i])2i+2,(hPS,V i[hPS,V i2i])2i+2) (by A.14)
≤ ∆((he P,V i[S2i])2i+2,(hPS,V i[S2i])2i+2)
+ ∆(he P,V i2i,S2i) + ∆(hPS,V i2i,S2i)
≤ (1/p) + ∆(he P,V i2i,S2i) + ∆(hPS,V i2i,S2i) (by A.15)
≤ (1/p) + ∆(he P,V i2i,S2i) + ∆(hPS,V i,S) . (A.16)
We now prove the following by induction on i = 0,1,2,...,`:
∆(he P,V i2i,S2i) ≤ i · (1/p + 2 · ∆(hPS,V i,S)) . (A.17)
Note that the case for i = ` establishes Proposition 4.2.7. The base case for i = 0 is trivial.
We prove the inductive step as follows:
∆(he P,V i2i+2,S2i+2)
≤ ∆(he P,V i2i+2,hPS,V i2i+2) + ∆(hPS,V i2i+2,S2i+2)
≤ ∆(he P,V i2i+2,hPS,V i2i+2) + ∆(hPS,V i,S)
≤ (1/p) + ∆(he P,V i2i,S2i) + 2 · ∆(hPS,V i,S) (by A.16)
≤ (i + 1) · (1/p + 2 · ∆(hPS,V i,S)) (by induction on i) .
This completes our proof of Proposition 4.2.7.                              
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